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Abstract 
 
 
Child protection social workers must make difficult decisions in real life 
circumstances that often involve limited knowledge, uncertainty, 
conflicting values, time pressures and powerful emotions. These 
circumstances can pose a significant challenge to reasoning skills, 
especially when the cost of errors and poor judgment can be 
unacceptably high. This study explores the psychological processes that 
underpin how child protection practitioners form judgments and how 
these are influenced by the organisational settings that they work within.  
 
The study has an ethnographic design with two sites; a local authority 
children's intake service and a NHS multi-disciplinary court assessment 
service. The sites were chosen as contrasting organisational settings 
within which to study practitioner decision making. Forty days of 
observation and twenty-four interviews with practitioners were completed 
across the two sites over a two-and-a-half year period. 
 
The study found that practitioners' reasoning processes were a dynamic 
interplay of intuitive and analytic processes with emotionally-informed 
intuitive processes as the primary driver. As practitioners became more 
experienced, they engaged in progressively more sophisticated pattern 
recognition and story building processes to analyse and evaluate 
complex information. However, practitioners of all experience levels were 
vulnerable to the same predictable errors arising from cognitive 
vulnerabilities that affect the whole population.  
 
Comparison of the two sites identified the following themes concerning 
the influence of organisational context; the timescales that practitioners 
worked within, the opportunities for case discussion, and the cultures of 
accountability within the organisation. In response to considerable time 
pressures and increased demand, local authority social workers at times 
engaged in a range of operational defences and speed practices. This 
was combined with a pervasive accountability culture that inadvertently 
led to local authority social workers being more likely to manage anxiety 
through practices that acted as a form of pre-emptive exoneration.    
 
The study contributes towards the existing literature by examining 
everyday child protection practice using a theoretical approach that 
combines insights from psychological and psychoanalytic approaches. 
The study identifies new insights into practitioner decision making, 
suggests new ways of understanding accountability, and has implications 
for how organisations can help both reduce errors and support expert 
practice. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
 
'The overwhelming response by welfare states to child deaths and 
other system failures has been to seek bureaucratic solutions by 
introducing more and more laws, procedures and guidelines. The 
more risk and uncertainty have been exposed, the greater the 
attempts to close up the gaps through administrative 
changes…Here, practice is regarded as little more than rule 
following' (Ferguson, 2004, p.10).   
 
‘Child protection work makes heavy demands on reasoning skills. 
With an issue as important as children's welfare, it is vital to have 
the best standard of thinking that is humanly possible. Mistakes are 
costly to the child and family’ (Munro, 2008, p.153). 
 
'The search for a scapegoat is the easiest of all hunting expeditions' 
(Dwight D. Eisenhower). 
 
 
For the last four decades, social work in England has been haunted by 
the memories of children known to local authorities who have died or 
been seriously harmed. Inquiry reports have described some of the 
everyday realities where professionals made difficult decisions in 
circumstances that often involved limited knowledge, uncertainty, 
conflicting values, time pressures and high levels of emotion. Although 
these are exceptional cases, the circumstances they describe are often 
recognisable to child protection social workers, who are all too aware of 
the significant challenges they present to form professional judgments 
in real life situations.  
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During a long history of public inquiries and serious case reviews in 
which children have been killed or seriously hurt, a frequent finding is 
that social workers made poor judgments (for example, Brandon et al., 
2009, 2008; Ofsted, 2008; Rose and Barnes, 2008). This is reinforced 
by research and practice literature that have consistently identified 
shortcomings in relation to analytical processes (Turney et al., 2012; 
Cleaver and Walker, 2004; Reder and Duncan, 2000; Munro, 1996, 
1999). Consequently, the role of professional judgment in the English 
child protection system has been an important and contested issue, but 
the primary focus has been on errors rather than everyday practice. 
This chapter sets out to introduce the research problem, to examine its 
importance to the child protection field and to me as the researcher and 
to contextualise it within the legal and policy frameworks within which 
child protection practitioners work in England. 
 
As Ferguson (2004) outlines in the opening quote, the dominant 
response has been to adopt bureaucratic solutions through increased 
procedures and guidelines. This reduces scope for professional 
discretion and promotes a view of practice as rule following. Yet the 
complexity of real practice situations suggests that child protection 
practitioners must draw upon professional judgment rather than simply 
‘following the rules’. For example, practitioners are required to 
undertake often emotionally fraught home visits that necessitate them 
engaging with hostile or deceptively compliant family members that 
requires skilled practice that cannot be contained in procedures 
(Ferguson, 2005; Littlechild, 2008; Smith, 2004).  
 
Herbert Simon (1956) argued that in order to understand human 
decision making, it is necessary to examine the individual decision 
maker and the decision environment that the individual is in. He used 
the metaphor of a pair of scissors, in which the individual and the 
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decision environment are like the two blades of the scissors. Applying 
this to the field of child protection, the interplay between how 
practitioners form professional judgments and the bureaucratic setting 
provokes the two research questions that guide this study:  
 
1. How do practitioners engage in sense-making and form 
professional judgments in their everyday work?  
2. How and in what ways are these sense-making processes 
influenced by the organisational setting within which practitioners 
work?     
 
These questions derive from my own experiences as a child protection 
social worker and as an academic. My initial curiosity about 
understanding professional judgment and how this can be influenced by 
the organisational setting can be traced back to my previous experience 
as a practitioner. This began as a social work student in a family centre, 
where I undertook my first parenting assessment with a deep sense of 
anxiety about the magnitude and importance of the task. I felt 
underprepared for the task but I received excellent support from my 
highly experienced supervisor and her colleagues, who seemed to 
undertake assessments with confidence and genuine skill. 
 
After qualifiying, I started work in a child and adolescent mental health 
(CAMHS) clinic and went on to complete psychodynamic counselling 
and initial family therapy training and these provided me with some 
conceptual tools for making sense of working with families. However, 
none of this prepared me for the powerful experience of becoming a 
senior practitioner in a local authority child protection team. Ferguson 
(2004) describes how new practitioners fresh from university are not 
prepared for the visceral, embodied work that they will experience in 
their everyday practice and this captures my own experience. The team 
that I joined only undertook s.47 investigations and covered a large 
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geographical area. The sheer pace of the work was demanding, but it 
was the complexity of the work and the emotional challenges of working 
with families that were resistant and sometimes deceptive that made 
the most significant impression. It also brought home to me the 
importance of the organisational setting, as the pressure of referrals 
limited the space available for case discussion and reflection. The 
experiences were raw and baffling and working out what happens in 
those settings has provided my motivation. Whilst I was aware of this at 
the start, as the study has progressed, I have become increasingly 
aware that the research process has been a 'working through' of 
previously undigested experience and it is only through this process 
that I have been able to understand my previous experience of working 
in child protection.  
 
The experience highlighted the role of procedures and guidance in 
decision making. As a senior social worker in a CAMHS service, I had 
lead responsibility for child protection. Having started work shortly after 
the Victoria Climbié Inquiry was published, the instrumental rationality of 
the inquiry report, with its focus on bureaucratic solutions, inculcated in 
me the importance of following procedures. As stated earlier, this view 
of child protection practice regarded it as little more than rule following 
(Ferguson, 2004). My role was to advise colleagues from other 
professionals when child protection concerns arose with the families 
they were working with. Central to this role was having a copy of the 
local child protection procedures to guide me and I was meticulous in 
keeping this up to date. 
 
When I moved to a child protection investigations team, my induction 
involved visiting local resources combined with an instruction to 'go into 
the storeroom to have a look at the policies and procedures'. On the 
shelves there were large volumes of regulations and guidance relating 
to looked after children, fostering and adoption. These were dusty and 
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clearly had not been consulted for a considerable period but this did not 
surprise me as they were not directly about child protection. When I 
asked where they kept a copy of the local child protection procedures, 
the team manager pointed to a corner of the main office. Picking up the 
copy, I was shocked to see that it was at least two years out of date. 
When I hesitantly pointed this out to the team manager, she handed me 
a stack of unopened envelopes that was in a pile on her desk and said, 
’Here are the updates, why don’t you put them in the folder?’ At the 
time, this made me anxious and I thought, 'How can this team make 
decisions without being guided by the latest procedures?' Yet the busy 
team operated efficiently without explicit recourse to the procedures. It 
was not that the team was ignoring the child protection procedures: they 
were working within them but their knowledge was gained from 
everyday discussions where changes in procedures were passed onto 
practitioners verbally. What became clear was that the procedures were 
operating as constraints on practice that precluded certain courses of 
action, rather than acting as primary guides to decision making.  
 
With hindsight, what strikes me is how naïve I was about how child 
protection decisions were made. I had unquestionally adopted the 
dominant technical-rational view of practice as ‘just following 
procedures’. Reflecting upon this now, this made me aware of the 
limitations of the technical-rational approach. I realised that when I was 
in the CAMHS team I would consult the procedures but I cannot think of 
a single instance where the guidance helped me to resolve a dilemma. 
The procedures were useful for basic information, telephone numbers 
and details of the forms required, although the team already had this 
information. But the real life cases that I was consulted on were too 
complex and the decisions too ethically fraught to find ready made 
answers in the procedures. Yet I consulted them every time. To begin 
with, I did hope to find answers and was disappointed. As I become 
more experienced, I consulted them less with a hope that I would find 
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an answer than to check that the answer I was recommending did not 
conflict with the procedures. Rather than looking to the procedures for 
wisdom, my search was about avoiding blame for not following the 
procedures. The process of consulting the procedures became not a 
search for guidance but a ritual that helped reduce my anxiety. This 
incident served to provoke my curiosity about how decisions were made 
in child protection and what the real life thinking processes were that lay 
behind these decisions. So, if everyday practice was not primarily 
driven by procedures, merely shaped and constrained by them, what 
was driving the judgments that practitioners made? This has been 
central in guiding the present study.  
 
1.1. The research questions and the wider 
policy context  
 
In order to understand the importance of the two research questions, it 
is helpful to put them in the context of the wider developments in 
contemporary child protection practice and foreshadow some of the 
debates in the literature that will be discussed in more depth in the next 
chapter.   
 
1.1.1  Intuition versus analytic reasoning  
 
The first research question about how practitioners engage in sense-
making processes concerns the underlying psychological processes 
that practitioners use to form professional judgments. This is often 
formulated as the debate between the use of intuitive and analytic 
reasoning (Munro, 2008a, 2008b; Turney, 2009). These two forms of 
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thinking have been the focus of intense rivalry (Hammond, 1996; 
O’Sullivan, 2011) and this has been expressed in the field of social 
work. In the 1960s, Olive Stevenson used a psychoanalytic approach to 
argue for the importance of intuition in social work as a source of 
insights (Stevenson, 1964). In the 1980s, this debate was formulated as 
whether social work was an art or a science (England, 1986). More 
recently, it has been expressed as a debate between the proponents 
and opponents of evidence-based practice (Sheldon, 2001; Webb, 
2001). This has continued to be the focus of polarised debates in social 
work. For example, Sheppard argues that practitioners must ‘go far 
beyond mere intuition’ and has emphasised the importance of social 
workers engaging in a high level of analytic thinking (Sheppard, 2006, 
p.199). By contrast, van de Luitgaarden (2009) argues that the nature of 
the social work task means that intuitive strategies are likely to be more 
important.  
 
Each form of reasoning has its own strengths and weaknesses. Intuitive 
thinking is quick and effective, enabling practitioners to form judgments 
within short timescales in real life situations (Munro, 2008a). It is strong 
in valuing previous experiences and emotions, so can be effective in 
supporting practitioners to draw upon their practice experience and 
build rapport with children and their families. However, it is often implicit 
and difficult to articulate, which is problematic when practitioners must 
share knowledge or explain or justify decisions, e.g., completing 
assessments to inform court proceedings (Turney, 2009; Holland, 
2010). Another disadvantage is that, although experienced practitioners 
can form accurate judgments based upon their experience, this 
generates only low-level generalisations or theories with a limited range 
of application (Munro, 2008a). The third weakness of intuition is that 
practitioners are vulnerable to heuristics and biases that lead them to 
make predictable errors, which are due to the cognitive vulnerabilities 
that affect everyone (Munro, 1999, 2008a). 
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The strengths of analytic reasoning mirror the weaknesses of intuitive 
reasoning. Firstly, analytic thinking is formalised and explicit, which 
enables it to be shared and to be used as the basis for justifying 
decisions (Turney, 2009; O’Sullivan, 2011). Secondly, it conforms to 
traditional conceptions of decontextualised and universalisable 
knowledge that can be generalised to a range of settings (Munro, 
2008a). The third strength of analytical knowledge is that it is less 
subject to bias and other errors in thinking that can affect human 
decision makers (Turney, 2009; Munro, 2008a). However, analytic 
reasoning has a number of weaknesses. Firstly, it is slow, demanding 
and cumbersome. Secondly, it is suspicious of emotion as a potential 
contaminant to thinking so can appear distanced from real life situations 
(O’Sullivan, 2011). As Zajonc argues;  
 
'People do not get married or divorced, commit murder or suicide, or 
lay down their lives for freedom upon a detailed cognitive analysis of 
the pros and cons of their actions' (Zajonc, 1980, p.172).  
 
Thirdly, it is only as strong as the research base that it draws upon. If 
there is a poor or unreliable research base, analytic thinking alone 
cannot make up for these shortcomings. Finally, it requires settings that 
are supportive of the slow and effortful demands of analytic thinking. 
 
Part of the problem has been that intuition has been understood in a 
wide range of ways. For example, it has been described as both the 
highest level of expertise (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986) and as the 
absence of analysis (Hammond, 1996). Such views lend themselves to 
polarised debates and perpetuate an understanding of the problem as a 
choice between competing approaches. In the next chapter, alternative 
definitions of intuition will be discussed that focus upon the underlying 
psychological processes and various models to understand these will 
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be explored. Developments in psychological research are challenging 
the traditional conceptions of analytic and intuitive thinking and the 
research evidence will be examined in order to develop a deeper 
understanding of human decision making.  
 
 
1.1.2  Organisational influences on 
professional judgment  
 
The second research question focuses upon how organisational 
settings influence practitioner sense-making processes and 
professional judgment and needs to be understood in the context of the 
wider policy developments in England.  
 
In the quote that began the chapter, Ferguson highlighted that the 
overwhelming response to perceived failings in child protection has 
been to focus upon bureaucratic solutions, such as more detailed 
guidance and procedures and organisational restructuring, which he 
describes as a form of bureaucratic modernism (Ferguson, 2004, p.10). 
As noted earlier, much of the literature on professional judgment and 
decision making drawn from inquiries and serious case reviews 
(Brandon et al., 2009, 2008; Ofsted, 2008; Rose and Barnes, 2008) and 
from the academic literature (Munro, 1996, 1998, 1999; Reder et al., 
1993; Reder and Duncan, 2000) has focused upon errors in decision 
making. Consequently, a primary focus for bureaucratic reforms has 
been the use of more formalised systems that can monitor the work of 
practitioners, who tend to be regarded as sources of human error. This 
rational-bureaucratic approach has been described as the ‘human as 
hazard’ approach (Reason, 2000), which focuses upon organisational 
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checks, reminders and constraints to protect against the frailty of 
human judgment. 
 
This rational-bureaucratic approach is underpinned by a technical-
rational model of decision making in which it is assumed that, when 
practitioners make a choice, they engage in a process of identifying the 
available options, evaluate each option in terms of the likely risks and 
benefits of each option and then chose the best option. As such, it 
represents a prescriptive model of decision making that advocates the 
dominant use of analytic reasoning processes and is wary of the use of 
intuitive reasoning.  
 
There has been a range of critiques of the bureaucratisation of social 
work, which gained momentum in the early 1990s (Howe, 1992; Parton, 
1991). A key example of the application of a rational-bureaucratic 
approach is the Victoria Climbié inquiry (Laming, 2003), which identified 
108 recommendations and was followed by a progress report that 
provided another 58 recommendations. The analysis presented by the 
Laming report has been criticised for being naïve (Ferguson, 2005) 
because it does not pay sufficient attention to the complexities of 
working with resistant and sometimes hostile service users and the 
emotions that can be provoked by the work. Similarly, Cooper (2005) 
criticises the report for oversimplifying the nature of child protection 
practice and focusing upon the surface of policies and structures of 
accountability rather than engaging with the depth of working with 
children and families through relationships.  
 
This analysis has gained significant momentum with the Munro Review 
of Child Protection (Munro, 2010, 2011b, 2011a, 2012), which provides 
a critique of the technical-rational approach of managerialism. The 
coalition government initiated the Munro Review immediately after 
coming into office in 2010 with a remit to review the state of child 
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protection in England. The Munro Review highlighted that earlier 
reforms have pursued technical solutions at the expense of giving 
sufficient attention to the knowledge and skills involved when engaging 
with families and the organisational support necessary to enable 
practitioners to manage the emotional aspects of the work without it 
harming them or their judgment (Munro, 2010). It was argued that this 
approach lead to an organisational culture that encouraged practitioners 
to focus on procedural compliance (‘doing things right’) rather than 
using their judgment to decide the best course of action (‘doing the right 
thing’) (Munro, 2010, p.14). A central recommendation of the Munro 
Review was less central prescription and greater emphasis on 
professional judgment (Munro, 2011a, 2011b).  
 
Shortly after the Munro Review, the Family Justice Review (known as 
the Norgrove review) was published in November 2011 and the key 
recommendations have recently passed into legislation with the 
Children and Families Act 2014. The Family Justice Review (Norgrove, 
2011) made a number of changes that have implications for 
professional judgment, but two recommendations were the most 
central. Firstly, it recommended that the timescales in public law 
proceedings should be reduced to 26 weeks. This could be seen as a 
return to centralised prescription away from professional discretion, 
though some commentators have suggested that the drivers were more 
complex (Beckett and Dickens, 2014). The second recommendation 
was a reduction in the court’s reliance upon expert witnesses such as 
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists in public law proceedings. The 
two changes that were implemented were a higher legal threshold 
before courts could have recourse to expert witnesses and a reduction 
in the fees paid for expert witness assessments. Whilst the financial 
drivers were clear, an interesting consequence has been the potential 
for revaluing of the professional judgment of local authority social 
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workers. For example, the President of the Family Division, Sir James 
Munby, provided the following guidance to family court judges: 
 
Social workers are experts. In every care case we have at least two 
experts – a social worker and a guardian – yet we have grown up 
with a culture of believing that they are not really experts and that 
we therefore need experts with a capital E… One of the problems is 
that in recent years too many social workers have come to feel 
undervalued, disempowered and de-skilled. In part at least this is an 
unhappy consequence of the way in which care proceedings have 
come to be dealt with by the courts. If the revised Public Law Outline 
is properly implemented one of its outcomes will, I hope, be to re-
position social workers as trusted professionals playing the central 
role in care proceedings which too often of late has been 
overshadowed by our unnecessary use of and reliance upon other 
experts (Mumby, 2013, p.3).  
 
As a consequence, the Norgrove review has had a complex effect on 
the debate between centralised prescription and professional judgment. 
It has served to both introduce centralised prescription and thereby 
reduce professional discretion but also lead to a call for a revaluation in 
the court's view of local authority social workers' status as experts. At 
one level, this could simply be seen a cynical attempt to shoulder local 
authority social workers with greater responsibility as a result of 
financial cutbacks that restrict courts access to independent experts. 
Yet it also offers opportunities for a gradual revaluation of the 
professional judgment of social workers that is compatible with the 
aspirations of the Munro Review.   
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1.2. Summary and structure of the thesis  
 
In this chapter, the key debates that provide the context for the present 
study were explored in the wider socio-political context of child 
protection social work in England. The aims of the thesis are to explore 
the sense-making processes that underpin how child protection 
practitioners form judgments and to examine how these are influenced 
by the organisational settings that practitioners work within. These are 
important research problems because developing a clearer 
understanding of how practitioners engage in these reasoning 
processes would be helpful in both enabling practitioners to develop 
their skills and identifiying how organisations can help or hinder these 
processes.  
 
Two key debates were outlined; firstly, about the form of practitioner 
sense-making and professional judgment, focusing upon the debate 
about intuitive and analytic reasoning processes. Secondly, the 
organisational influence on professional judgment were examined, 
focusing upon the tension between professional judgment and 
bureaucratic accountability.  
 
In chapter 2, I will examine how this problem has previously been 
approached, drawing upon the psychological and psychoanalytic 
literature to develop a theoretical approach to understanding 
practitioner sense-making within organisations. Chapter 3 will explain 
and justify the research approach and design that guided the study. 
Chapters 4-7 are the main findings chapters and consist of two parts. In 
the first part (chapters 4 and 5), I will present a detailed, ethnographic 
account of each of the two research sites. Chapter 6 will focus on the 
first research question, which identifies and explores the common 
processes that practitioners used to make sense of their work with 
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families across both sites. Chapter 7 will focus on my second research 
question, namely, in what ways contrasting organisational settings 
influenced practitioners’ sense-making processes. Whilst chapter 6 
focused upon commonalities in sense-making processes across both 
sites, chapter 7 will examine how differences in organisational setting 
had an impact on practitioners' thinking. The final chapter will discuss 
the findings and their implications for child protection policy and 
practice, identify the strengths and limitations of the study and identify 
further areas for research. 
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Chapter 2: Psychological and psychoanalytic 
perspectives on professional judgment within 
organisations 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I outlined my central research problem as 
understanding how child protection practitioners engage in everyday 
sense-making processes and exploring the ways in which the 
organisational setting may influence them. In this chapter, I will examine 
how this problem has previously been approached in the social work 
research literature and explore the potential of psychological 
approaches by drawing upon research into judgment and decision 
making and the psychoanalytic literature on emotion and organisations.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the literature that informs my 
theoretical approach and how I will approach my research questions. 
Whilst the previous chapter provided the wider policy context of child 
protection, this chapter will focus on theoretical developments in 
understanding the cognitive and emotional processes that underpin how 
people make professional judgments. It was argued that a rational-
bureacratic approach had dominated previous governmental responses 
to public inquiries, which made an implicit assumption that practitioners 
make decisions through a rational, conscious and deliberate process in 
which they identify and deliberate between alternatives in order to 
select the best option available. The common thread that unites the 
different literature discussed in this chapter is their rejection of this core 
assumption. 
 
To begin with, it would be helpful to define the terms 'sense-making' 
and 'professional judgment' and integrate them into a model of how 
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practitioner sense-making leads to decision making. In this thesis, I will 
argue that the decision making process consists of two main stages: the 
sense-making and professional judgment stages. Sense-making refers 
to the psychological and social processes that practitioners engage in 
when they seek to understand families referred to their service, which 
can be undertaken alone or with colleagues. These sense-making 
processes begin when a family is referred to a service and continue 
throughout their involvement with the service.  
 
Professional judgment refers to the stage when a professional reaches 
a conclusion or recommendation, which can be an overall assessment 
or relate to a specific issue. In essence, sense-making is ‘upstream’ of 
professional judgment. The difference is that sense-making refers to the 
earlier parts of the whole process, from early thoughts leading to 
forming judgments. This leads onto decision making, which refers to the 
selection of a course of action as a result of a deliberate process, which 
can be by one individual or a number of people (Taylor, 2013). 
 
Figure 2.1 From sense-making to professional judgment 
Stage 1: Sense-making processes 
(Psychological and social processes undertaken to  
assemble, collate and understand information about a family) 
 
Stage 2: Professional judgment 
(Forming a conclusion or recommendation)  
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A literature search was conducted using the following bibliographic 
databases: Academic SocINDEX, Applied Social Sciences Index and 
Abstracts (ASSIA) and Social Services Abstracts, Cumulative Index to 
Nursing and Allied Health Literature (CINAHL), PsycInfo, PsycArticles. 
Key search terms were identified and a thesaurus was used to identify 
suitable synonyms to generate a comprehensive list of search terms. 
The search terms used were child* or infant* or adolescen* or teen*) 
AND (social work* or casework* or youth work* or social service* or 
child welfare) AND (sense-making, decision making/decision-making, 
judg(e)ment) or assess*, emotions, affect, organisation*). The search 
terms were combined using Boolean operators and wildcards. A search 
of theses was completed using the British Library's ETHOS service. 
Once the full text of key articles was obtained, reference harvesting was 
used to examine the references list to identify additional material that 
was not identified in the initial database searches. Additional articles 
were identified through citation tracking. Snowballing was also used to 
draw upon the knowledge of supervisors and colleagues.  
 
2.1  Practitioner sense-making and 
professional judgment in child protection 
 
The intention is not to conduct a comprehensive history of child 
protection as this is beyond the scope of this study (For historical 
accounts, see Ferguson, 2004; Parton, 1985, 1991). My aim is to 
provide a focused review of the key studies about professional 
judgment and organisational contexts that have shaped the current 
understanding to provide a broader context to the research questions.  
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There has been a history of studies that have focused upon the working 
of the child protection system itself, particularly upon how child 
protection agencies put legislation and policy into practice. In the wake 
of the Cleveland inquiry in 1988, the Department of Health funded a 
number of influential studies into the workings of the child protection 
system (Corby, 2006). Decision making and professional judgment was 
a central focus for criticism in the Cleveland inquiry, which was initiated 
after 125 children were diagnosed as having been sexually abused 
(Butler-Sloss, 1988). The first group of studies were summarised in 
Messages from Research (Department of Health, 1995) and consisted 
of studies that examined how referrals were responded to (Gibbons et 
al., 1995), partnerships with parents (Thoburn et al., 1995), how 
investigations were carried out (Cleaver and Freeman, 1995; Farmer 
and Owen, 1995) and interprofessional collaboration (Birchall and 
Hallett, 1995). These were followed by a second wave of studies, 
known as the Children Act Now studies (Aldgate and Stratham, 2001), 
which focused upon how referrals for children in need are responded to 
(Aldgate and Tunstill, 1995; Tunstill and Aldgate, 2000), how child 
protection interventions are delivered within a family support context 
(Brandon et al., 1999; Thoburn et al., 2000) and parental perspectives 
on the child protection process (Freeman and Hunt, 1998). 
 
A central message of these studies was that a large number of child 
protection investigations were conducted but only a relatively small 
proportion (25,000 cases out of 160,000 investigations or approximately 
15%) resulted in children's names being placed on what was then the 
child protection register (Department of Health, 1995). Gibbons et al 
(1995) summarised this by describing the child protection system as like 
a small-meshed net in which a large number of less severe cases 
('minnows) were caught and thrown back with little or no support. This 
over concentration of resources on conducting child protection 
investigations to the detrimental of family support services and the 
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emotional cost to families of these investigations (Cleaver and 
Freeman, 1995) provoked what came to be known as the ‘refocusing’ 
debate, which sought to shift the focus from child protection 
investigations towards family support services. This balance between 
child protection and family support remained an important focus for 
studies in the UK and Ireland (Ferguson and O’Reilly, 2001; Spratt, 
2001; Platt, 2006). Parton (1996) provides a critique of the Messages 
from Research studies, arguing that they do not fully understand the 
importance of risk within its political context and therefore fail to 
understand how attempts to move from a child protection to a family 
support orientation were likely to be more challenging than envisaged. 
The importance of these studies was in drawing attention to the role of 
individual and societal values in child protection decision-making, 
although the detail of their findings is now somewhat historical.  
 
There is now a significant body of research that has examined 
professional sense-making from sociologically-informed perspectives, 
particularly social constructionism (Parton, 1985, 1991; Parton et al., 
1997), ethnomethodology and conversation analysis (Dingwall et al., 
1983; Wattam, 1992; Hall, 1993; White, 1997). Earlier studies focused 
upon the social construction of child abuse and maltreatment itself 
(Parton, 1985, 1991; Wattam, 1992; Thorpe, 1994; Parton et al., 1997). 
Indeed, the influence of social constructionism has been sufficient to 
create a general consensus in more mainstream texts about the 
importance of viewing child abuse as socially constructed (Munro, 
2008a; Corby, 2006). Social constructionist approaches have been 
broadened out to include a range of issues including gender (Scourfield, 
1999, 2003), class (De Montigny, 1995) and professional identity 
(Leigh, 2013) within child protection services.  
   
Wattam (1992) completed a study of decision making in child protection 
informed by the work of Garfinkel (1967) and Sacks (1966) that focused 
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upon the social organisation and structure of everyday practice, 
particularly conversational interaction and categorisation work. Her 
research was based upon two ethnographic studies conducted between 
1988 and 1991 in North West England, one based in a child protection 
team and another in the Crown Prosecution Service. Data collection 
included participant observation, interviews with professionals and 
children and case file analysis. She found that sense-making was 
characterized by four main structures, which were motive, 
corroboration, specificity and categorization. These were pervasive and 
underpinned by implicit rules that guide what was regarded as relevant 
by child protection professionals (Wattam, 1992).  
 
Another classic early study was Thorpe (1994), which was a case file 
documentary analysis using a 100% sample in Western Australia. 
Quantitative and qualitative analysis of 325 substantiated and ‘at risk’ 
cases reported to a state child welfare agency. His analysis focused 
upon the moral reasoning of frontline professionals and the bureaucratic 
frames used in the expert system. He found that the seriousness of the 
presenting condition of the child, i.e., the clinical evidence, was not the 
best guide to predicting decision outcomes and other factors, such as 
perceptions of the parents' moral character, the extent to which they 
cooperated with professionals and wider level of family support were 
highly influential in decision making. 
 
In summary, there is a history of studies that have examined decision 
making within child protection from a broadly sociological perspective. 
These have predominantly focused upon what aspects or factors that 
professionals take into account when making decisions at crucial 
decision points, e.g., how referrals are responded to, whether a case 
should go to a child protection conference, whether legal orders should 
be applied for. These have generated important sociological insights 
that have informed current understanding, but less attention has been 
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given to the psychological approaches that underpin professional 
judgment.  
 
 
2.2 Psychological approaches to 
judgment and decision making  
 
In the previous chapter, the debate about the relative emphasis that 
should be given to intuitive and analytical reasoning processes was 
discussed. In this chapter, this debate will be explored in more detail 
and developments within the psychological literature on judgment and 
decision making will be examined to see how this can inform the 
present study. I will argue that there have been important developments 
that shed light on practitioner sense-making processes. The literature 
draws from the disciplines of cognitive and social psychology and my 
account will be broadly chronological, charting how an understanding of 
human judgment and decision making has developed.  
  
Reason (2008) has identified two approaches to studying human 
judgment and decision making. The first approach is the study of errors 
in judgment, which he names the 'human as hazard' approach. The 
second approach focuses on the study of skilled professional judgment, 
which he calls the 'human as hero' approach. Reason (2008) argues 
that the study of error (‘human as hazard’) has traditionally received 
greater attention than the study of skilled practice (‘human as hero’). In 
the previous chapter, it was argued that the study of professional 
judgment in child protection has been dominated by the 'human as 
hazard' approach, not just in the form of inquiries and serious case 
reviews but in the whole body of academic research (Munro, 1999; 
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Scourfield, 1999, 2003). Within the field of social work, this tendency to 
focus on human failings rather than human strengths can be seen 
within the wider tendency to adopt a deficit model of social work 
(Ferguson, 2003, 2001).  
 
In the previous chapter, I drew attention to the emphasis in previous 
inquiries and reforms on the importance of practitioners engaging in 
rational decision making through careful evaluation of available options 
in order to determine the optimal choice in each situation. This is known 
as the classical technical-rational model of decision making, which 
assumes that people behave as rational social actors (Klein, 1999).  
 
The technical-rational model of decision making was challenged within 
the field of psychology in the 1950s (Hardman, 2009). Simon (1956) 
argued that rational models of decision making do not take into account 
real life limitations, such as the limited capacity that people have to 
process information and time pressures. Simon (1983) studied how 
decisions were made within organisations and developed the concept of 
bounded rationality to describe situations where decision makers have 
limited time and information processing capacity as well as 
environments that have a variety of ‘irregular informational structures' 
(Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002).  
 
A possible objection is that inquiry reports often recognise that 
practitioners make decisions within the limitations of real life situations, 
e.g., time pressures and imperfect knowledge (Munro, 1996). However, 
they usually also have an implicit assumption that practitioners should 
engage in a rational process of selecting an optimal choice under 
constraints, which retains the core beliefs of classical decision making. 
As such, they implicitly apply an ‘optimisation under constraints’ model 
that is even more unrealistic than the classical technical-rational model 
of decision making:  
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Optimisation under constraints requires even more demanding 
cognitive processing than the approach idealized by standard 
rational choice theory. In his writings on bounded rationality (BR) in 
the 1980s and 1990s, Simon rejected such interpretations (Simon, 
1983, 1992) because of their reliance on an Olympian version of 
rationality (Muramatsu and Hanoch, 2005, p.210). 
 
The two main approaches that have rejected the classical technical-
rational model, the heuristics and biases approach and the naturalistic 
decision making approach, will be examined and a recent 
rapprochement between the two traditions will be discussed.  
 
 
2.2.1 The heuristics and bias (HB) approach  
 
The first of the two approaches, the heuristics and biases approach, 
traces its intellectual tradition back to a well-known monograph by 
Meehl in 1954 (Meehl, 1954; Kahneman and Klein, 2009; Kahneman, 
2011). Meehl reviewed 18 studies that examined the accuracy of 
predictions made by simple statistical algorithms with those made by 
professionals on a range of topics such as academic success, parole 
violations, and successfully completing pilot training (Meehl, 1954; 
Klein, 2009). The professionals outperformed the algorithms in only one 
out of the 18 studies, produced similar results in a few cases but the 
statistical algorithms were more accurate in the majority of cases. In 
2000, a review of 136 similar studies mostly in medicine and clinical 
psychology comparing statistic models with clinical judgments found 
similar results (Grove et al., 2000). Professional judgment outperformed 
statistical models in only 8 of the 136 models and the statistical models 
produced more accurate predictions in 63 of the studies. The remaining 
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65 studies found no difference between the two methods. Meehl 
concluded that professional judgment is more fallible and inconsistent 
than is commonly believed.   
 
Tversky and Kahneman completed the first study explicitly within the 
heuristics and bias tradition, which examined the systematic errors that 
researchers made when asked to intuitively estimate the sample size in 
a psychological experiment (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971). The study 
concluded that even experienced researchers were poor intuitive 
statisticians and judgments should be based upon formal calculation.  
 
Within the heuristics and biases approach, the term ‘heuristic’ is defined 
as 'a simple procedure that helps find adequate, though often imperfect, 
answers to difficult questions' (Kahneman, 2011, p.98). The term ‘bias’ 
refers to systematic and predictable errors, though its traditional use in 
social work refers to prejudice and discrimination. 
 
Further studies of heuristics focused upon systematic errors that are 
made when using intuition. It was the imperfect answers that became 
the central focus of the study of heuristics and two important heuristics 
that were proposed in the early 1970s were the availability and 
representativeness heuristics (Hardman, 2009).  
 
The availability heuristic states that people will estimate the frequency 
or probability of an event by how easy it is to bring instances to mind 
(Slovic et al., 1977; Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). For example, a 
person concerned about safety who has to make a choice between 
travelling by car, plane or cruise ship is likely to be influenced by the 
ease with which they can bring accidents to mind. We are prone to error 
because we find it easier to remember some events compared to others 
and mass media means that we have uneven exposure to events. The 
relative infrequency of aviation and cruise accidents compared to car 
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accidents means that they receive greater media attention, which can 
lead people to believe that the risks are greater than they are. 
 
The representativeness heuristic states that people are likely to judge 
the probability that an individual belongs to a category based upon the 
degree to which they resembles the typical category stereotype (Rehak 
et al., 2010; Kahneman and Frederick, 2002). A classic exercise is: 
 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She 
majored in philosophy. As a student she was deeply concerned with 
issues of discrimination and social justice and also participated in 
antinuclear demonstrations (Kahneman, 2011). 
 
When participants are asked, ‘What is Linda’s likely occupation?’ and 
given a range of options, they were more likely to choose ‘Bank cashier 
who is active in the feminist movement’ than ‘Bank cashier’.  Since it is 
logically impossible for her to be more likely to be a feminist bank 
cashier than to be a bank cashier, it was concluded that participants 
were answering the question of how closely she fitted the stereotype of 
the category. Therefore, their error was that they acted on an erroneous 
belief that something is more likely if it is more representative.  
 
When a heuristic rather than a target attribute is chosen, there can be 
more than one heuristic attribute available. For example, when asked, 
‘Which is more dangerous, a rattlesnake or a bee?”, participants may 
think of any news stories that we can bring to mind (availability 
heuristic). If they can’t bring anything to mind, they may think about 
which creature fits our stereotype of a ‘dangerous animal’ 
(representativeness heuristic). It may be that the question provokes 
both a search for instances and an assessment of dangerousness and 
the final answer to decided by a ‘contest of accessibility’ (Kahneman 
and Frederick, 2002).  
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Three other heuristics that are relevant to this study are the halo effect, 
confirmation bias and the Semmelweis complex. The halo effect refers 
to the influence of an overall evaluation of a person on evaluations of 
their individual attributes, i.e., we are more likely to regard a person that 
we like as trustworthy, even in the absence of information to base this 
upon (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977). Confirmation bias is the tendency for 
people to seek and pay attention to information that confirms our 
existing hypotheses rather than information that challenges our 
hypotheses, which can result in a 'cognitive tunnel vision' where we are 
likely to ignore conflicting or inconsistent information (Chia, 2005). This 
is heightened when factors such as time pressures are present (Dror 
and Fraser-Mackenzie, 2008). A related heuristic is the Semmelweis 
reflex, which refers to the tendency to automatically reject new evidence 
that contradicts a paradigm. It was named after Ignaz Semmelweis, a 
physician who discovered that infectious diseases were being 
inadvertently transmitted by physicians who did not wash their hands 
between seeing patients. Such beliefs were so unacceptable to the 
medical establishment that they were rejected during his lifetime 
(Hardman, 2009).     
 
 
2.2.2  The dual process model 
 
In chapter one, the traditional distinction between intuitive and analytic 
reasoning processes was examined. Kahneman and Frederick (2002) 
argue that this traditional division is best thought of as two types of 
thinking that have been named System 1 and 2 (Stanovich and West, 
2000). Rather than perceiving thinking as a single process, the dual 
process model presents our thinking as characterised by two types or 
systems of thinking, System 1 and System 2.  
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System 1 is a form of thinking that operates rapidly and automatically 
and with little sense of voluntary choice or effort. For example, when we 
speak to someone we know on the phone, we are often aware of their 
mood within the first few words. System 2 is controlled, effortful and 
analytical and is able to undertake complex computations that require 
considerable effort. For example, we use System 2 thinking to work out 
complex arithmetical calculations and other rule-based problems. 
 
In everyday situations where judgment problems arise, System 1 
provides intuitive answers that are rapid and associative. The quality of 
these proposals is monitored by System 2, which applies rules and 
uses deduction to endorse, correct or override them (Kahneman and 
Frederick, 2002; Kahneman, 2011). If the proposals are accepted 
without significant revision, it is likely that we will regard them as 
intuitive. Whilst System 1 processes characterise the majority of our 
everyday thinking, our sense of agency, choice and identity is 
associated with System 2 (Gilovich et al., 2002; Kahneman, 2011). The 
dual process theory offers an interesting account of how we develop 
expertise. Kahneman and Frederick (2002) argue that as we gain 
proficiency and skill, the complex cognitive operations that originate in 
System 2 migrate over into System 1 (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002).  
 
 
2.2.3 The naturalistic decision making (NDM) 
approach 
 
In contrast to the heuristics and biases tradition, a second approach has 
evolved called the naturalistic decision making (NDM) approach. The 
NDM approach developed in the late 1980s, though it grew out of 
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earlier studies of the intuitive expertise of master chess players, which 
found that chess grand masters rapidly identified the best moves which 
were commonly overlooked by less skilled and experienced players 
(DeGroot, 1978; Chase and Simon, 1973). The NDM approach has 
focused upon the study of skilful decision making by expert practitioners 
in real life settings, such as pilots and fireground commanders. Indeed 
naturalistic decision making has been defined as the study of 'the way 
people use their experience to make decisions in field settings' 
(Zsambok, 1997, p.4).    
 
Rasmussen offers a three-phasee model that explains the development 
of the study of decision making and the place of the NDM approach 
(Rasmussen, 1997). The first phase consists of normative models of 
classical decision making, which make the assumption that social 
actors engage in rational choice by comparing options and choosing the 
optimal choice. This model was challenged by the second phase, the 
heuristics and biases approach, which presented models of how human 
beings deviate from classical rational behaviour. The third phase is the 
naturalistic decision making tradition, which challenges the previous two 
phases by arguing for the observation of actual behaviour in real life 
field settings (Rasmussen, 1997; Lipshitz et al., 2001). 
 
The focus of my discussion of the NDM tradition will be the work of one 
of its main theorists, Gary Klein, who has developed an approach called 
the recognition primed decision (RPD) model. This has been chosen 
partly because it has been described as the 'prototypical NDM model' 
(Lipshitz et al., 2001, p.335) and partly because it appears potentially 
relevant to child protection.  
 
Whilst the heuristics and biases approach focuses upon how heuristics 
can lead to systematic errors, the naturalistic decision making approach 
focuses upon how heuristics led expert practitioners to make skilled 
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decisions. For example, Klein accepts the concept of heuristics and his 
approach blends three of Kahneman and Tversky's heuristics, i.e. 
representativeness, availability and simulation (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1982):  
 
Instead of seeing these as biases, I have found it more useful to see 
them as strengths that permit skilful decision making in field settings. 
Experienced decision makers are able to categorise situations 
rapidly as typical of various prototypes, using representativeness 
and availability heuristics, and are able to evaluate the courses of 
action suggested by these prototypes by conducting mental 
simulations, using the simulation heuristic, without us having to 
compare options' (Klein, 2002, p.114).  
 
In his research with firefighters, Klein interviewed experienced 
fireground commanders about critical incidents with a working 
hypothesis that they did not compare a wide range of options and were 
likely to compare only two options under time pressure (Klein, 1999). 
He found that even his reduced option was incorrect and that the 
option-comparison model did not reflect real-life decision making for fire 
commanders. In urgent situations, there was simply insufficient time to 
be able to engage in the classic option comparison model. Instead, the 
fire commanders engaged in intuitive thinking, which consisted of a 
rapid pattern-recognition process in which they identified the key 
features of the situation based upon their previous repertoire of 
experiences. When they were asked about how they made decisions, 
the fire commanders commonly stated that they did not make 
‘decisions’ because they did not engage in the option-comparison type 
decision making that they had been taught. 
 
The concept of practitioners engaging in intuitive thinking can be 
problematic because the term ‘intuition’ can suggest some mystical or 
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extraordinary power, such as extra sensory perception (ESP). However, 
the way that it is used in both the HB and NPD tradition is more 
straightforward. In a joint article, Kahneman and Klein (2009) agreed on 
the definition offered by Herbert Simon:  
 
The situation has provided a cue: This cue has given the expert 
access to information stored in memory, and the information 
provides the answer. Intuition is nothing more and nothing less than 
recognition (Simon, 1992, p. 155).  
 
In the recognition primed decision making (RPD) model, experienced 
practitioners see patterns when they start to see particular cues that link 
together and lead them to look for further cues. For example, when 
firefighters see that smoke has a particular colour, they are alerted that 
it is likely to have been started by specific chemicals and when 
paediatric nurses see a particular combination of symptoms such as 
skin colour and lethargy, they know that a baby may be experiencing 
sepsis. As practitioners accumulate experiences, they build up a 
repertoire of recognised patterns (Klein, 2004). 
 
The recognition-primed decision making model states that practitiones 
do not identify a range of options that they evaluate in order to identify 
the best option. Instead, they identify these relevant cues that aid 
situational understanding and enable them to develop expectancies and 
appropriate goals and to identify a course of action. They evaluate this 
through the use of mental simulation in order to imagine how the course 
of action would play out. It is only when they identify that their chosen 
course of action has a problem that they consider other options (Klein, 
1999).  
 
Klein provides a model of mental simulation that we use to develop 
explanations and argues that mental simulation is good for solving 
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problems where traditional analytic strategies do not apply (Klein, 
1999). However, he states that there is a danger that we can place too 
much credence to the mental simulations that we develop, particularly if 
we lack experience:  
 
Once we have built a mental simulation, we tend to fall in love with 
it. Whether we use it as an explanation or for prediction, once it is 
completed, we may give it more credibility than it deserves, 
especially if we are not highly experienced in the area and do not 
have a good sense of typicality' (Klein, 1999, p.68). 
 
This 'overconfidence effect' has also been documented by Hirt and 
Sherman (1985), who found that less knowledgeable subjects had 
strong confidence in their predictions even though they had little 
experience. This suggests that feelings of confidence in one’s 
judgments on their own are not a reliable indicator if one is 
inexperienced and this will be discussed shortly in relation to the 
boundary conditions for genuine expertise identified by Kahneman and 
Klein (2009).  
 
Pliske and Klein outline three types of cases faced by practitioners 
(Pliske and Klein, 2003). The first type of case is the simplest, where 
the practitioner ‘sizes up’ the situation, forms expectations about what is 
going to happen next, determines the cues that are most relevant, 
recognises the reasonable goals to pursue in the situation, recognises a 
typical reaction, and carries it out. It is practitioners' experience that 
provides them with prototypes of how to respond in typical cases 
(Lipshitz et al., 2001).   
 
The second type of case is where the practitioner is not entirely sure 
about the nature of the situation, perhaps because there is some 
irregularity in the information that may make the practitioner unsure 
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about what type of situation it is. The primary activity becomes 
identifying what type of scenario it is and the effort in identification may 
exceed that of then deciding what to do, e.g., categorising a referral. 
Identification strategies take two common forms. Firstly, feature 
matching, where the focus is upon looking for similar features to known 
cases. Secondly, story building where the features of the situation are 
synthesised into a causal explanations. The practitioner will frequently 
use a story-building strategy to develop mental simulations of events 
that have led up to the situation (Pennington and Hastie, 1993; Klein 
and Crandall, 1995).  
 
The RPD model argues that the decision maker tries to find the most 
plausible story or sequence of events in order to make sense of what is 
going on. This claim is supported by studies on how juries form 
judgments in criminal and civil cases, which found that jurors 
constructed their own plausible storyline from the evidence that they 
had heard and then decided which party in the case had an account 
that was closer to their storyline (Pennington and Hastie, 1993; Hastie, 
2008).  
 
In the third scenario, the practitioner has recognised a pattern and 
decided on a course of action but events make them reconsider. Mental 
simulation again helps the practitioner to imagine different options. 
Lipshitz et al., (2001) states that the third option, called progressive 
deepening (DeGroot, 1978), is where practitioners evaluate a course of 
action without comparing it to others to see whether it will work. Instead 
of comparing options, their focus was on thinking ahead for potential 
unintended consequences that may be unacceptable.  
 
Klein’s model emphasises the importance of experience and traces its 
intellectual heritage back to Dreyfus and Dreyfus' (1986) five-stage 
model of skill acquisition. The Dreyfus and Dreyfus model describes 
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how expertise develops from initial novice to the final stage of expert, 
where decision making is characterised by high level of intuition. This 
model has been used in the field of nursing (Benner, 1982) and to a 
lesser extent in social work (Fook et al, 2000). 
 
Klein does not dismiss the use of analytic thinking, he simply argues 
that it cannot replace intuition at the centre of the decision making 
process (Klein, 2004). He uses the example of chess grandmasters and 
states that they do not take the first satisfactory option because they 
want to play the best move. Rather than comparing options by set 
criteria, they use mental simulation to see how different options play 
out: 
 
Analysis has a proper role as a supporting tool for making intuitive 
decisions. When time and the necessary information are available, 
analysis can help uncover cues and patterns. It can sometimes help 
evaluate a decision. But it cannot replace the intuition that is at the 
centre of the decision making process (Klein, 2003, p.24).  
 
More recently, Klein has argued that traditional decision-making models 
treat social actors as if they were passive gamblers making bets by 
comparing the costs and benefits for different options (Klein, 2009). 
Klein argues that, in real life situations, people experience themselves 
as actively managing situations and shaping options.  
 
The NDM approach argues that, since expert knowledge is context 
specific, modelling should be informal and context-bound rather than 
abstract modelling (Ericsson and Lehmann, 1996). It does provide 
prescriptive models of decision making, in the sense that prescriptions 
are derived from empirical models of expert practitioners in real life 
settings, but these aim to improve rather than replace practitioners' 
actual decision making modes (Lipshitz et al., 2001, p.335).    
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Klein’s RPD model tends to focus upon decisions made under time 
constraints. One criticism is that not all naturalistic decision making 
happens under these conditions (Hardman, 2009). Munro (2008) 
argues that Klein's model appears to be accurate for front line teams 
dealing with referrals, e.g., duty officers categorising referrals. However, 
she asserts that it does not encourage workers to think broadly so the 
danger is that workers get stuck in tunnel vision, e.g. viewing the choice 
as whether a child stays long term with the current foster carers or goes 
back to live with birth parents, rather than considering a wider range of 
options. Klein (1999) found that workers commonly responded to all 
cases with a fixed pattern of response, which is understandable given 
the expertise they had built up. However, Munro (2008) argues that it is 
also necessary at times to stand back and consider a broader range of 
options.  
 
The traditional dispute between the heuristics and biases and the 
naturalistic decision making approaches had an interesting recent 
development with a joint publication between two of their key 
proponents, Daniel Kahneman and Gary Klein (Kahneman and Klein, 
2009). This focused on the nature of intuitive expertise and sought to 
identify where they agreed and disagreed about the boundary 
conditions that separated true intuitive skills from biased and 
overconfident impressions. 
 
Subtitled as, 'a failure to disagree', they found that there were many 
areas of agreement and they identified two boundary conditions that 
relate to the environment in which the judgment is made and the extent 
to which the judge has learnt the patterns and regularities of that 
environment. Firstly, the judgment must be made in an environment that 
has a reasonable degree of validity in the sense that there is a stable 
relationship between cues and subsequent events or between cues and 
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outcomes. They argue that medicine and firefighting are high validity 
environments whilst making long-term predictions of political events or 
the value of individual stocks are low or zero validity because they are 
too unpredictable. The second boundary condition is that practitioners 
have sufficient experience through prolonged practice and clear and 
rapid feedback (Kahneman and Klein, 2009). Their article is an 
important step towards an integrated model that has a conception of 
intuitive expertise whilst also allowing for expert error. 
 
Appying this analysis to child protection practice is an interesting 
challenge and raises two questions. Firstly, is child protection a low or 
high validity environment? Secondly, do practitioners get clear and 
rapid feedback? In response to the first question, it would appear that 
medicine and firefighting are better analogies than stock market 
speculation, which is promising for the potential for expert practice in 
child protection. The second question is more problematic since the 
extent to which child protection practitioners receive clear and rapid 
feedback varies between tasks and organisations. A child protection 
practitioner trying to build up a relationship with a hostile parent during a 
difficult home visit is likely to get rapid feedback about whether they are 
successful, particularly when they are not. The same practitioner 
placing a child for adoption is in a much more difficult position to get 
feedback about whether this was a successful long-term decision 
because they are likely to lose contact with both child and birth parent. 
However, it can be argued that this is similar to other professions, such 
as medicine where practitioners lose contact with patients where 
interventions are successful. Consequently, there are prima facie 
grounds for arguing that child protection practice generally satisfies the 
boundary conditions for the possibility of expert practice.  
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2.2.4  Application of judgment and decision 
making research to child protection 
 
The psychological literature of judgment and decision making was 
initially applied to the field of child protection in the work of Eileen 
Munro. In an early study, Munro applied a theoretical framework utilising 
the heuristics and biases literature to identify common errors that child 
protection practitioners made in their reasoning process (Munro, 1996, 
1998, 1999). Her study analysed 45 publicly available reports of 
inquiries into child abuse deaths between 1973 and 1994. Munro 
concluded that the inquiry reports persistently identified errors that could 
be understood in terms of heuristics. One of the most prevalent errors 
was confirmation bias, which is the tendency for people to see what 
they expect or want to see and this made practitioners less likely to 
revise their judgments in the light of new information (Munro, 1996, 
1999). Practitioners were repeatedly criticised for confirmation bias 
because they accepted information that supported their perceptions of 
the family whilst being sceptical about information that conflicted with 
their view (Munro, 1996, 1999).  
 
More recently, Munro's work has developed to incorporate the growing 
literature within the naturalistic decision making tradition. Whilst the first 
edition of her main text (Munro, 2002) focused almost entirely about the 
heuristics and biases approach (‘human as hazard’), her second edition 
(Munro, 2008a) presented a more balanced perspective based upon 
developments in naturalistic decision making ('human as hero'). 
Similarly, the Munro Review itself has a strong and positive sense of 
professional judgment and the importance of not seeking to eliminate it 
through rational bureaucratic approaches.  
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The other main empirical study that examines the reasoning processes 
that child protection practitioners use to form professional judgments 
was a doctoral study completed by Abigail Taylor (Taylor, 2007). Taylor 
aimed to reconstruct the cognitive dynamics of the reasoning processes 
used by social workers when completing core assessments. She 
completed a documentary analysis of 98 core assessments completed 
by 50 social workers across 4 local authorities and followed up with 
individual interviews with the practitioners (Taylor, 2007). Taylor (2007) 
contributed towards the literature by viewing the data using naturalistic 
decision making (human as hero) as well as the heuristic and biases 
(human as hazard) approach.  
 
Taylor (2007) concluded that, although intuitive decision making 
strategies were diverse, there were three primary strategies. Firstly, 
decisions were made based upon family member's reaction to 
intervention, with a positive and cooperative working relationship with 
the parents most likely to lead to children being reunited. Secondly, 
decisions were made based upon comparison to the known family 
history through prior experience of the family. Thirdly, decisions were 
made based upon comparison with other cases drawn from prior 
experience. Interestingly, no examples were found of practitioners using 
solely analytical decision making processes; analytical processes were 
always combined with intuitive processes.   
 
More recently, there has been increasing interest in applying 
psychological models to decision making in child protection. This has 
mainly taken the form of theoretical literature (van de Luitgaarden, 
2009; Taylor, 2012; Platt and Turney, 2013) and a small-scale 
Department of Education pilot study with very limited data gathering 
(Kirkman and Melrose, 2014). 
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In a theoretical article, Platt and Turney (2013) state that thresholds for 
child protection services have been a perennial problem and the 
technical rational solution has been to try to develop ever more precise 
definitions. However, they argue that the technical-rational approach to 
understanding thresholds is an oversimplification for two reasons. 
Firstly, the assumption that the risks faced by individual children can be 
quantified and compared on a scale underestimates the complexity of 
real life situations. Secondly, the technical-rational model of thresholds 
presupposes a sense of rationality that they argue did not exist in 
practice. Instead, they argue for the application of theoretical models 
from the psychological literature on judgment and decision making that 
capture how practitioners engage in real life decision making. In 
particular, they focused upon adopting a naturalistic decision making 
approach in which threshold decisions are viewed as being mediated 
through local sense-making strategies. They argue that, although these 
sense-making strategies may appear as shortcuts arising from a high 
pressure setting, further examination would enable a deeper 
understanding of decision making (Platt and Turney, 2013). 
 
More recently, the Department for Education commissioned the 
Behavioural Insights team (more commonly known as the 'nudge team') 
to apply a behavioural science approach to front line child protection 
services (Kirkman and Melrose, 2014). The study undertook a small 
amount of fieldwork (7 days of orientation and observation in 5 different 
local authorities), but this was intended to ensure that they focused 
upon the theoretical aspects from their models that were the most 
relevant rather than systematic data collection and analysis.  
 
The study argued that there were four key factors that reduced or 
complicated the efficiency of social workers’ ability to make decisions. 
Firstly, workload and time pressures increased reliance upon social 
workers’ intuition to make decisions in comparison to other professions 
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that have focused more overtly on evidence-based, skilled intuition. 
Secondly, practitioners were affected by a range of behavioural biases 
that impacted on their ability to make objective judgments, such as the 
availability heuristic and confirmation bias. Thirdly, they found that many 
sequential decisions had to be made throughout each day that 
increased the risk of ‘depletion’ or ‘decision fatigue’. Fourthly, the 
information that practitioners received was often low quality and 
entailed a considerable amount of effort to piece together information 
(Kirkman and Melrose, 2014, pp.4–5).  
 
In summary, there has been a growing theoretical interest in applying 
psychological models from judgment and decision making research to 
child protection. Although this is promising, there has been very limited 
empirical research into how these models can help us understanding 
every practice.   
 
2.3  The importance of emotions 
 
Decision making within child protection is highly emotionally charged 
and ethically fraught, yet efforts to improve the quality of decision 
making have traditionally paid insufficient attention to the emotional 
aspects of everyday practice (Ferguson, 2005; Cooper, 2005; Munro, 
2008a; Trevithick, 2014). This was particularly important given the 
complexities of relationships with children and their families, which often 
include involuntary clients. For example, in their study of all 319 child 
care referrals made to three social work teams over a three month 
period, Ferguson and O’Reilly (2001) found that 34% of the parents or 
carers involved were defined as involuntary clients who did not want a 
service.  
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Similar criticisms have been made of research on judgment and 
decision making from the cognitive psychology tradition, in which 
emotion has been largely ignored or regarded as a contaminant. For 
example, the heuristics and biases approach has developed the 
concept of the affect bias, which states that people's emotional 
responses to a particular object or situation (as distinct from the 
objective characteristics of the object or situation) may be treated as 
information in its own right that can influence their decision making 
(Schwarz and Clore, 2003; cited in Rehak et al., 2010, p.324). This 
supports a more general suspicion of emotion and the view that 
judgments are most reliable and trustworthy when people have little or 
no emotional response to the issue being considered.  
 
This view has been challenged by the work of Antonio Damasio, a 
neuroscientist whose work has generated insights into the relationship 
between emotions, judgments and decision making and highlights how 
emotions can inform intuitive judgments, even without conscious 
awareness. Damasio works with patients who have experienced 
damage to a particular area of the frontal lobe called the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (VMPC). Although patients typically have normal IQs 
and no cognitive impairments or memory disturbances, their capacity to 
experience emotion is impaired. For example, Damasio (2006) 
described how participants with ventromedial prefrontal cortex damage 
were shown pictures consisting of mostly bland images, e.g., scenery 
and abstract patterns interspersed with emotionally disturbing pictures. 
When measured using skin conductance, patients with damage to the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex demonstrated no emotional responses, in 
contrast to clear emotional responses to the control group and to 
patients with non-frontal lobe damage. Patients with ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex damage were able to discuss the content of the 
disturbing pictures and even describe the disgust, fear and sadness that 
the pictures ought to provoke but which they were unable to experience 
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(Damasio, 2006). As well as more powerful emotions, people with 
ventromedial damage are unable to experience the everyday emotional 
responses that guide our ordinary actions. For example, Damasio 
(2006) describes arranging an appointment with a patient, who was 
beset with acute and lengthy indecision. Damasio argued that, without 
any emotional markers, the patient was paralysed because all future 
dates seemed equally preferable.    
 
A key study completed by Damasio’s research group is the Iowa 
Gambling Test, which examines how participants respond to a situation 
where they must make choices to maximise their rewards (Bechara et 
al., 1994). In the Iowa Gambling Test experiment, participants are given 
money and asked to take cards from four decks marked A to D. Each 
card provides a reward or penalty, which are distributed unequally 
between the four decks. Participants have 100 attempts at the game, 
although they are unaware of this beforehand.  
 
The first two decks (A and B) provide high rewards ($100) but the 
penalties are disproportionately large compared to the rewards. If 
participants chose only cards from the first two decks, they cannot win 
and will end up losing money.  
 
The second two decks (C and D) provide lower rewards ($50) but the 
penalties are significantly lower (decks A and B have penalties up to 
$1,250, whilst decks C and D have penalties than are on average less 
then $100). The overall lesson of the game is that players will only end 
in profit if they choose cards from decks C and D (Bechara et al., 1994). 
 
The study had two groups of participants, a non-clinical control group 
and a group of patients who had experienced ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex damage. The control group sampled all of the decks, then learnt 
to avoid the A and B decks and maximised profit by choosing only from 
  
50 
the C and D deck. By contrast, the patient group behaviour was 
diametrically opposite, with players sampling all of the decks then 
drawing mainly from decks A and B. The result was that they quickly 
ran out of money, which required them to borrow more money from the 
researcher.  
 
The researchers interviewed participants as they undertook the task to 
explore their understanding and thinking processes. The control group 
participants moved away from choosing decks A and B within about 30 
turns, articulated a 'hunch' that the A and B decks were loaded against 
them after about 50 turns and clearly stated this after 80 turns.  
 
When skin conductance was used, they showed growing emotional 
responses in anticipation of a choice that guided them away from 
choosing the A and B decks (Bechara et al., 1996). By contrast, the 
control group showed no anticipatory emotional response and their 
behaviour was focused upon present rather than the future. The central 
difference is that the patient group had significant difficulty in thinking 
ahead and could only process the immediate present with clarity.  This 
is a state that Damasio described as a 'myopia for the future', a term 
previously used to describe people who are under the influence of 
alcohol and similar drugs (Damasio, 2006, p.218). 
 
Damasio's central argument is that the emotions experienced by the 
control group guided their behaviour. The patient group, who could not 
draw upon their emotions to inform their choices, repeatedly made 
poorer choices. Whilst there has always been clear evidence that strong 
emotions can impair our judgment and lead to rash decisions, 
Damasio's work provides evidence that judgment that is devoid of 
emotion is also poor.  
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In discussing Damasio’s work, my intention is not to undertake a 
comprehensive review of the neuroscience field at some length as this 
is beyond the scope of the present study. Instead, I have discussed 
Damasio’s work since it highlights how emotions can inform intuitive 
judgments, even without conscious awareness. It has been applied to 
the dual process model in order to understand how the pattern 
recognition involved in System 1 processes is informed by emotionally 
weighted intuitive judgments (Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2011; Dane and 
Pratt, 2007). For example, when a practitioner undertaking a home visit 
has a sense that something is not quite right, this can be seen as 
informed by Damasio’s somatic markers that often operate below 
conscious awareness (Ferguson, 2009; Munro, 2008a). Ferguson 
(2009) expresses it in the following way:  
 
Sensing atmospheres always occurs intuitively, but where the 
physical signs of risk are less overt, it is essential to use and rely on 
intuition and trust ‘gut feelings’ to make sense of the experiences 
that are swirling around and unconsciously entering the mind and 
body (Ferguson, 2009, p.476). 
 
By contrast, emotion is regarded quite differently in System 2 
reasoning, in which it is viewed as what Muramatsu and Hanoch (2005) 
describe as 'sand in the decision machinery'. Of course, either view is a 
partial truth and as Gigerenzer argues, gut feelings are in fact ‘neither 
impeccable nor stupid’ (Gigerenzer, 2007, p.228). What is needed is a 
balanced view that combines a healthy respect for the potential 
contribution of emotion in providing insights without losing a critical 
stance.  
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2.4  Organisational influences on 
practitioner sense-making and professional 
judgment  
 
There have been a significant number of studies about decision making 
in child protection that have examined how organisational settings can 
influence professional judgment. Although there were earlier studies 
(Mattinson and Sinclair, 1979; Satyamurti, 1981), a particularly 
influential large-scale study of child protection was completed by 
Dingwall et al (1983). This study had an ethnographic design in which 
the research team attended court hearings, case conferences and 
home visits in three local authories combined with interviews with a 
range of professionals and managers and case file analysis. Their main 
research problem was examining why the level of child protection 
referrals was considerably lower than the levels predicted by survey 
research using adult self report of childhood abuse and neglect 
(Dingwall et al., 1983).    
 
Dingwall et al. (1983) argued that child abuse was not inherent in a 
child's presentation in a similar way to physical illnesses, but was a 
product of complex social processes of identification and confirmation. 
The study concluded that the relative rarity of confirmed cases of child 
abuse was at least partly explained by practitioners not only looking at 
the clinical and social evidence of abuse, but undertaking an 
assessment of parents' moral character, which is conducted under what 
they describe as a 'rule of optimism', that required staff members to 
think the best of parents (Dingwall et al., 1983). The rule of optimism 
was operated through two mechanisms that enabled child protection 
professionals to neutralise parental 'deviance'. Firstly, they could justify 
parental behaviour through cultural relativism, in which this behaviour is 
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permitted because it is part of a wider cultural context and there was a 
belief that it was unacceptable for the agency to impose dominant 
societal values (Dingwall et al., 1983, p82). Secondly, there was the 
excuse of ‘natural love', which acknowledged parental deviance but 
worked on the belief that all parents love their children as a fact of 
nature. Consequently, it becomes difficult to understand information in 
ways that contradict this basic assumption. If parents are seen as being 
able to fulful the basic test of loving their children, workers were more 
prepared to go to great lengths to avoid removing children (Dingwall et 
al., 1983). 
 
The term ‘rule of optimism’ is sometimes misunderstood as suggesting 
that individual social workers were naïve and unquestioning in their 
work with families. For example, the Jasmine Beckford inquiry (London 
Borough of Brent, 1985) misused the ‘rule of optimism’ to suggest that 
the individual social workers were easily deceived and overly optimistic 
(White, 1997). Indeed, in their postscript to the 1995 version of their 
study, Dingwall et al (1995) go as far to suggest that the behaviour of 
staff that led to the Cleveland inquiry (Butler-Sloss, 1988) could be seen 
as attempting to operate a 'rule of pessimism' in response to Louis 
Blom-Cooper's criticisms in the Jasmine Beckford inquiry. In their 
preface to the second edition, Dingwall et al. (2014) make a wider point 
that treating the rule of optimism as a psychological property of 
individuals leads to individual workers being blamed and diverts 
attention from the wider organisational and social contexts that require 
practitioners to make decisions with fragmented and imperfect 
knowledge. Rather than being the failing of gullible workers, the rule of 
optimism was an organisational strategy that results from the nature of 
the social licence that governs the child protection system. This is 
based upon the compromises involved in a liberal society in which 
families are expected to lay themselves open to inspection, but on the 
basis that state services are required to take great care when 
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intervening in private family life and to only confirm deviance if there is 
overwhelming evidence (Dingwall et al., 2014).  
 
The rule of optimism has been both confirmed and challenged by later 
studies. For example, Buckley (2000, 2003) found that practitioners 
were anxious about the potentially ‘devastating’ impact of a child 
protection investigation on a family and about imposing standards, 
particularly when familes were experiencing considerable adversity. 
This appeared to orientate practitioners to construct evidence in a 
positive light and less likely to seek more evidence that would contradict 
this view (Buckley, 2000). By contrast, Parton et al (1997) argued that 
social work had become increasingly authoritarian and White (1997) 
found that professionals were implicitly expected to demonstrate 
scepticism about parental accounts as an essential part of being a 
competent child protection professional, although actual removal from 
home occurred in very few cases (White, 1997). Corby (1987) found 
mixed evidence of social work interventions that were both authoritarian 
and over-liberal, concluding that interventions were generally a form of 
supportive surveillance.  
 
More recently, there has been an interest in the influence of 
organisational systems, particularly how technology has hindered or 
supported practitioner sense-making. A key study was an ESRC-funded 
study of the everyday working of children’s services in five local 
authority areas in England and Wales (White 2009; White, Hall, et al. 
2009; White, Broadhurst, et al. 2009; Peckover et al. 2009; Pithouse et 
al. 2009; Broadhurst et al. 2010; Broadhurst et al. 2010; White et al. 
2010; Wastell et al. 2011). The study had a broadly ethnographic 
design with a mixed method approach that combined institutional 
ethnography, interviews, documentary analysis and the development of 
micro-world simulation software to provide a quasi-experimental means 
of testing hypotheses. In total, 280 days of observation were completed 
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across the five sites combined with 60 interviews and 12 focus groups 
over a two year period (White, 2009).  
 
A key finding of the study (White, 2009) was that the ICT data 
management systems used in child protection, known as the Integrated 
Children’s System (ICS), had become increasingly formalised to the 
point where it was impeding rather than supporting practitioners in their 
decision making. White, Hall, et al., (2009) argue that the rigid and 
fragmented nature of the way in which information is recorded in the 
ICS acts as a ‘descriptive tyranny’ that disrupts the traditional storied 
nature of accounts that welfare professionals give of families that are 
assembled in a temporal narrative (White, Hall, et al., 2009). 
Information is split up into different domains and is not contextualised 
into an overall narrative or story about the child and their family, which 
often led to practitioners carrying a more meaningful account  ‘in their 
heads’ (White et al., 2010, p.412). These difficulties were highlighted in 
the Munro Review and the Department for Education responded by 
developing guiding principles for ICT use that should ‘rebalance 
functionality to take account of the importance of maintaining a 
narrative’ (Munro, 2010, p. 32).   
 
The study also found that the inflexibilities of the system led to 
practitioners using a range of ‘operational strategies’ that helped 
practitioners to meet performance targets and avoid blame. These 
included ‘speed practices’, such as ‘front and backing’ where 
practitioners only completed the beginning and end of initial 
assessments to save time. They also found ‘general deflection 
strategies’ designed to avoid taking on work, such as deflecting 
referrals by signposting them to other agencies and strategic deferment, 
where referrals were sent back to the referrers for additional information 
(Broadhurst et al., 2010).   
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In summary, there has been a rich history of studies from sociological 
perspectives that have provided valuable insights into how 
organisational settings influence everyday child protection practice. The 
literature using psychological perspectives has been less developed but 
there has been a small but promising vein of literature that does 
address emotions from a psycho-social or psychoanalytic perspective 
(Ferguson, 2004, 2005, 2011; Cooper et al., 1995, 2003; Cooper, 2005; 
Parkinson, 2010; Ruch et al, 2010; Trevithick, 2011) and this approach 
will be discussed next.  
 
 
2.4.1  Psychoanalytic approaches to 
understanding organisations 
 
Psychoanalytic approaches can be useful in helping understand how 
practitioners experience and manage emotions and how organisational 
settings can influence this (Obholzer and Roberts, 1994; Hinshelwood 
and Skogstad, 2000). Child protection work can provoke a range of 
emotions, such as fear, anger and disgust (Ferguson, 2004, 2011; 
Cooper et al., 1995; Cooper, 2005, 2009). If these emotional responses 
are not managed well, they can become overwhelming and practitioners 
can find it difficult to think coherently (Ruch, 2007a). Psychoanalytic 
approaches have been used in a range of classic studies that have 
examined local authority social work (Mattinson and Sinclair, 1979; 
Satyamurti, 1981; Woodhouse and Pengelly, 1991) as well as more 
recent studies (Stevenson, 2012; Lees et al., 2011). 
 
Bion's (1962) concept of container-contained provides a useful account 
of the processes involved when supervision is used to help practitioners 
understand and manage their emotions, which was developed from the 
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study of infant-caregiver relationships. When the infant experiences 
powerful emotions, the infant’s caregiver responds to the infant’s 
projections of confusion and anxiety by receiving them, processing 
them and returning them to the infant in a more acceptable form (Bion, 
1962; Briggs, 1995; Ferguson, 2009). In child protection settings, the 
anxiety-provoking nature of the work can provoke primitive feelings that 
make it difficult for social workers to think coherently about a situation 
(Ruch, 2007; Trowell, 1995). Supervision can provide effective 
containment for children and families in order to help parents develop 
their own internal resources. However, practitioners require effective 
containment for themselves in order to be able to manage their own 
emotions and the emotions that are projected into them by clients and 
professional colleagues (Hughes and Pengelly, 1997; Ruch, 2007; 
Ferguson, 2009). This can come from a range of sources, including 
personal supervision, peer support and other forms of what Ruch calls 
‘emotionally informed thinking spaces’ (Ruch, 2007a; Ferguson, 2009).  
 
As well as being a source of containment and support, organisational 
settings can be a source of anxiety and psychoanalytic approaches can 
provide useful insights into the processes involved. To be clear, a focus 
in this study is on exploring how psychoanalytic concepts can increase 
our understanding of how organisational cultures influence practitioner 
sense-making processes rather than wider aspects of practice.  
 
This study is informed by a theoretical framework developed within the 
Tavistock tradition because of the convergence of psychoanalysis and 
social science that took place at the Tavistock Institute of Human 
Relations after the Second World War (Obholzer and Roberts, 1994). A 
particular contribution of the psychoanalytic study of people within 
organisations in the Tavistock tradition has been the concept of 
defences. These are patterns of belief and behaviour, often 
unconscious, that individuals within organisations engage in that are 
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designed to enable them to avoid experiencing difficult emotions such 
as anxiety, disgust or fear of death (Menzies, 1960; Hinshelwood and 
Skogstad, 2000; Obholzer and Roberts, 1994). These have been used 
effectively within the social work literature to understand practitioners’ 
experiences of child protection work (Ferguson, 2011; Trevithick, 2011; 
Goddard and Hunt, 2011; Whittaker, 2011).  
 
The study of social defences against anxiety used within institutions has 
a long history, beginning with the seminal work of Isobel Menzies Lyth, 
who examined the reasons for the high rate of nursing students 
dropping out of their professional training within a large London 
teaching hospital (Menzies, 1960). She identified a range of social 
defences used by nursing staff to manage the anxieties inherent within 
their work and her theoretical model has been influential in how we 
understand behaviour within organizations. Menzies Lyth used the 
concept of social defences to understand how nurses coped with the 
high levels of anxiety in their everyday work with often seriously ill or 
dying patients. This model will be described in more depth because it is 
highly relevant to understanding the findings of the present study.  
 
Jaques (1955) originally developed the concept of social defences to 
refer to unconscious agreements or collusions within organisations to 
deny or distort aspects of experience that provoked unwanted emotion 
(Long, 2006). He later reformulated his ideas away from psychoanalytic 
towards structural accounts, in which social defences were viewed as 
the result of poor organisational structures (Long, 2006).  
 
In her study, Menzies Lyth identified a range of socially organised 
defences used by nursing staff, which can be grouped into three main 
constellations. The first constellation of defences concerned the 
reduction of the impact of the nurse-patient relationship by denying the 
importance of relationships. Rather than individual nurses providing all 
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of the care for a specific patient, the work was organised so that staff 
members performed one task for a large number of patients. The 
workload for nursing staff was organised into task lists and this splitting 
up of the nurse-patient relationship enabled staff members to avoid 
having to deal with the entirety of any patient’s needs.  
 
This social defence was combined with the depersonalisation, 
categorization and denial of the significance of the individual. An 
underpinning belief of the organisational culture was that all nursing 
staff members were interchangeable and this was was symbolised in 
the nursing uniform, which reduced the visible individuality of staff. 
Similarly, staff members regularly referred to individual patients by 
reference to their illness (“the gallstone in Bed 17”), even though this 
was officially discouraged. This was combined with the encouragement 
of detachment and the denial of feelings. Menzies Lyth recognised that 
having a level of professional distance was a necessary part of 
professional training, but found that the organisational culture within the 
hospital took this to extremes. For example, the organisational culture 
was that ‘a good nurse doesn’t mind moving’ so staff members found 
themselves moved to different wards without any notice. During 
individual interviews, Menzies Lyth found that senior staff demonstrated 
a good understanding of how distressing such experiences could be to 
student nurses. However, their responses were usually highly 
repressive and critical rather than supportive (Menzies, 1960).  
 
The second cluster of social defences related to the issue of 
responsibility. The role of the nurse provoked a strong sense of 
responsibility, creating a conflict between a sense of duty and impulses 
that would be regarded as irresponsible, e.g., avoiding difficult tasks, 
becoming overfriendly with patients. This was experienced at an 
individual level, but the role of being ‘responsible’ or ‘irresponsible’ was 
assigned to groups rather than individuals in the form of a collusive 
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social redistribution of responsibility and irresponsibility. Nurses 
regularly complained that others, usually more junior staff, required 
constant supervision because they were ‘irrresponsible’. On the other 
hand, many also complained that more senior staff members were 
overly strict and repressive. Another defence in this cluster was the 
purposeful obscurity in the formal distribution of responsibility. On the 
wards, the organisational systems routinely failed to clearly specify who 
was responsible for what, and authority was complex and widely 
distributed, e.g. more experienced students were treated as responsible 
for less experienced students. 
 
The third cluster related to social defences aimed at reducing the 
anxiety of decision-making. Since staff members never made a decision 
with perfect knowledge, every decision was anxiety provoking to some 
extent. One way of reducing this anxiety was ritual task performance, 
which reduced the need for active decision making by adopting 
prescriptive and inflexible ways of working. For example, there are 
several effective ways of making a hospital bed but one way was 
selected and used exclusively. Although this required effort to chose 
and enforce standardised procedures, it reduced the need for explicit 
decision making. A second social defence in this cluster was the use of 
checks and counterchecks as a means of reducing the anxiety involved 
in making a final decision. When a staff member had to make a 
decision, the responsibility was often dissipated by the staff member 
involving others in decision making, including people who were not 
directly involved but merely available.  
 
Another social defence was the use of upward delegation to avoid 
responsibility for a task. When faced with an anxiety-provoking task, a 
common response was for staff members to force it up the hierarchy in 
order to avoid responsibility. Menzies Lyth found that senior staff 
members were routinely engaged in relatively minor tasks that did not 
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require their skill levels and would be undertaken by more junior staff in 
comparable organisations. A final social defence in this cluster was an 
organisational culture that avoided change. Familiar ways of working 
were clung to, even when it was clear that they were no longer relevant 
or appropriate, since change threatened the status quo.  
 
The study had a number of limitations. Cooper (1999) argues that, like 
many psychoanalytic forays into the social, the study focuses on the 
intra-psychic level at the expense of larger social formations. The study 
uses language that conveys a sense of the certainty that characterises 
many social studies in the 1950s. Little detail is given about the 
methodology, though she later wrote about this (Menzies, 1960) and 
acknowledged the challenges involved in the study, e.g., only getting 
access to the nursing sub-system, not the medical and lay sub-systems. 
However, the relevance of Menzies Lyth’s model to the present study is 
that it explored how psychoanalytic concepts help to understand 
emotions at an organizational level. More specifically, it deepens 
understanding of how anxieties related to professional judgment can 
lead to social defences that distort how the work of the organisation is 
conducted.  
 
2.5 Rationale for the study  
 
This final section will draw together these elements into my theoretical 
approach and provide a rationale for why the study is needed. The 
study examines how child protection practitioners engage in sense-
making processes and how these processes are influenced by their 
organisational setting. A key element of my rationale is that this is an 
important issue for social workers in child protection settings. It has 
been argued that the dominant approach to decision making adopted by 
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policy makers has been a rational-bureaucratic approach that ignores 
emotions and makes assumptions that are not borne out by real world 
decision making. Having a clearer understanding of how practitioners 
form professional judgments in real life situations and how they are 
influenced by organisational settings would generate a deeper 
understanding of practice and how it can be supported.  
 
The majority of previous studies of professional judgment in child 
protection have been informed by sociological perspectives and this has 
provided an important understanding of how organisational and wider 
contexts can influence everyday child protection practice (Dingwall et 
al., 1983; Pithouse, 1984; Wattam, 1992; Thorpe, 1994; Parton et al., 
1997; Scourfield, 1999; Holland, 1999). These studies have focused 
upon the social processes, meanings and contexts rather than the 
psychological and emotional processes that underlie professional 
judgment. There is a smaller but rich literature that uses psychoanalytic 
ideas to explore emotions and how they can be influenced by 
organisational settings (Cooper et al., 1995, 2003; Ferguson, 2004, 
2005). However, there is a relatively underdeveloped empirical literature 
that helps us understand the psychological processes that underpin 
professional judgment (Munro, 1996, 1999; Taylor, 2007), though there 
is evidence of growing theoretical interest (van de Luitgaarden, 2009; 
Platt and Turney, 2013; Kirkman and Melrose, 2014).  
 
My study will examine both cognitive and emotional processes in 
everyday child protection social work and explore how these can be 
influenced by organisational settings. My theoretical framework is 
informed by two perspectives, the psychological literature on judgment 
and decision making and the psychoanalytic literature on organisations. 
At the individual level, the psychological literature explains how 
individuals form judgments using both intuitive and analytic reasoning. 
At the level of the organisation, the psychoanalytic literature explains 
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how emotions are responding to within teams and institutions. In 
chapter 1, these two aspects were linked using Herbert Simon's 
metaphor of human decision making as a pair of scissors (Simon, 
1956).    
 
The study aims to build upon and extend previous empirical studies in 
this field. As discussed earlier, Munro completed an influential study 
that applied a psychological framework derived from the judgment and 
decision making literature to study child protection (Munro, 1996, 1999). 
My study will build upon this earlier work by examining everyday 
practice within child protection in naturalistic settings rather than public 
inquiries and my theoretical framework will include both the heuristics 
and bias (HB) approach and the recognition primed decision (RPD) 
model in order to study practitioners as both ‘hazard’ and ‘hero’. The 
two aspects are related in the sense that the primary focus for each 
tradition lend themselves to different methodological preferences, i.e., 
the study of skilled intuitive decision making is most easily conducted 
using naturalistic observation, whilst errors and biases are most easily 
studied using experimental designs.  
 
The second empirical study that was outlined was Taylor (2007), which 
I aim to build upon in two ways. Firstly, the current study will use the 
dual process model to examine the relationship of intuitive and analytic 
reasoning processes, which has become central in the psychological 
research on judgment and decision making since the Taylor study was 
completed. Secondly, it will examine the organisational context as the 
second blade in Simon’s decision scissors by using an ethnographic 
design.  
 
In summary, previous studies using psychological models have taken 
the form of retrospective analysis of cases either as documentary 
analysis (Munro, 1996, 1999) or as documentarly analysis combined 
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with interviews (Taylor, 2007; Hackett and Taylor, 2013). By contrast, 
this study has included ‘live’ ethnographic observations to examine the 
influence of organisational settings on professional judgment. The study 
also aims to make an original contribution to knowledge by paying 
attention to both cognitive and emotional processes in everyday child 
protection social work. The study integrates approaches that are 
traditionally regarded as incommensurate by combining psychological 
models of judgment and decision making with psychoanalytic 
approaches to organisations through the use of research into emotions 
and intuition.  
 
2.6  Summary  
 
In this chapter, I have examined how previous studies have explored 
the sense-making and decision making processes that practitioners 
engage in and provided a rationale for my study. I have examined how 
researchers from two opposing psychological traditions, the heuristics 
and biases approach and the recognition primed decision making 
approach, have recently found common ground in the study of intuitive 
expertise. The role of emotion in decision making was examined using 
research from a neuroscience perspective and the psychoanalytic study 
of organisations.  
 
Finally, I argued that the study contributes towards the research 
literature by examining everyday child protection practice using a 
theoretical approach that combines the dual process model, the 
heuristics and biases approach and the recognition primed decision 
making model. The influence of the organisational setting on 
practitioner sense-making will be examined using psychoanalytic 
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concepts to understand how emotions are experienced and responded 
to within organisations. 
 
Having set out my theoretical framework, the next chapter will set out 
my research approach and study design. It will consider the options 
available at each stage of the research design, provide a rationale for 
the choices made at each stage of the research process and explain 
how they are compatible with my theoretical framework. 
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Chapter 3 - Methodology 
 
Having identified the research question and established the context of 
the study within the wider literature in the two previous chapters, this 
chapter explains and justifies the research approach and design that 
guided the study. The wide range and competing research paradigms 
present a wide choice for the researcher and these choices need to be 
considered and explained in order to give a clear account of the choices 
made. Providing a clear account of the research methodology and 
process is a central element in establishing the credibility of research 
findings (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007; Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
 
The structure of the chapter will be broadly chronological, from initial 
stages and the background of the researcher through to gaining access 
to the research sites, collecting and analysing data and dissemination. 
Researcher reflexivity will be an important part of my approach and I 
shall be explaining the choices that I have made and exploring how my 
own personal history, values and beliefs influenced the research 
process.  
 
 
3.1 Research question, approach and 
epistemological position 
 
When deciding upon a research approach and design, the best 
research design is the one that answers the research questions 
(Bryman, 2012). Therefore, I shall begin by examining the research 
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questions and explaining my subsequent choices of research approach, 
design, methods and data analysis. The focus here is upon how my 
research questions match my epistemological position.  
This thesis examines practitioner sense-making processes in child 
protection and is organised around two interrelated research questions.  
 
1. How do practitioners engage in sense-making and form 
professional judgments in their everyday work?  
2. How and in what ways are these sense-making processes 
influenced by the organisational setting within which practitioners 
work?     
 
It is important that researchers explicitly address their epistemological 
position in order to ensure that their epistemology, methodology and 
research methods are consistent (Creswell, 2014). Identifying my 
epistemological position involves outlining my underlying assumptions 
about the nature of knowledge and the social world.  
 
Within social science research, the traditional epistemological debate 
has been between positivism and interpretivism (Sarantakos, 2005). 
Whilst positivist approaches has provided the central epistemological 
position for quantitative research, interpretivist approaches have been 
central to qualitative research. Positivism traces its intellectual heritage 
back to Comte and argues that the traditional scientific method applied 
in the natural sciences is appropriate to the study of society (Archer et 
al., 1998; Giddens, 1993). More specifically, social research should 
adopt methods from the physical sciences, exemplified in physics, 
which promote rigorous testing of hypotheses by means of quantifiably 
measurable data. It relies upon the study of artificial settings 
(experimental designs) or of what people say rather than what they do 
(survey design) (Atkinson and Hammersley, 1994). Positivism has been 
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influential within social sciences, promoting the status of surveys and 
experimental research (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). From a 
positivist stance, the researcher is seen as an objective observer whose 
role is to infer laws that explain relationships between observed 
phenomena. It lends itself to research that follows an experimental logic 
of examining quantitatively measurable variables that can be 
manipulated in order to understand the relationship between them. 
 
The contrasting position, interpretivism, is a broad term to describe a 
range of approaches that challenges positivism. Interpretivism argues 
that the research methods of the natural sciences are inappropriate to 
study social phenomena because they do not take into account the 
viewpoints of the social actors involved. Rather than seeking objective 
realities, interpretative research aims to uncover the subjective 
experiences of participants within their social world (Denzin and Lincoln, 
1994). It is often linked with a relativist approach to ethics, which 
challenges the idea that values can be universally and rationally 
grounded (Sarantakos, 2005).  
 
The traditional debate between positivism and interpretativism has 
become rather stylised, with positivism being presented almost as a 
caricature, a 'straw man' to be knocked down. This can be seen as 
reflecting a general cultural disillusionment with the natural sciences 
that developed in the late 20th century (Atkinson and Hammersley, 
1994).  
 
My epistemological position is critical realism, which argues that there is 
an external reality, but our knowledge of it is mediated by social 
structures and processes (Bhaskar, 1975). Critical realism provides an 
alternative to positivism by arguing that reality is constituted not only by 
experiences but also by structures, powers and tendencies (Archer et 
al., 1998). It acknowledges our understanding of the world is 
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provisional, but believes nevertheless that we are able to make 
statements about people’s experiences within the social world (Finlay 
and Ballinger, 2006). This epistemological stance is compatible with my 
study, which aims to examine practitioners’ sense-making processes 
using qualitative research methods and has been used in previous 
psychoanalytic studies (Briggs, 1997; Rustin, 1991).  
 
3.2 Reflexivity 
 
The issue of reflexivity is central to qualitative research and particularly 
so in ethnographic research (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). In 
chapter one, I described my original motivation and interest in the 
research topic as having being provoked by my experience as a 
practitioner and argued that my study has been a working through of 
issues that perplexed me in practice. It would now be helpful to discuss 
how my study developed in order to explore how my own personal 
history, values and beliefs influenced the research process. I will then 
discuss how I managed my reflexivity within the research process, 
ensuring that it informed but did not detract from my study. 
 
Although my research questions have remained relatively constant, the 
way that I approach these has changed over time. I had initially 
approached the research question from a broadly sociological 
perspective and had intended to use sociological frameworks to analyse 
my data in a similar way to many other ethnographic studies of child 
protection (for example, Dingwall et al., 1983; Pithouse, 1984; 
Scourfield, 1999; Holland, 1999). However, as my fieldwork progressed, 
I was struck again by the powerful emotions provoked by child 
protection practice, both by the direct work with children and their 
families and by societal expectations of child protection services.  
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When I started the study, I had been in academia for four years. During 
that time I had become acclimatised to the protected world of academia 
and had lost touch with the 'smell' of practice (Ferguson, 2004, 2011). 
Alongside my data collection and analysis, I was completing the 
literature review about decision making and child protection and found 
that the psychological and psychoanalytic literature was powerful in 
explaining what I was seeing in my observations and hearing in the 
interviews with practitioners. Consequently, my theoretical approach 
moved gradually towards more psychological and psychoanalytic 
approaches as they helped me make sense of my data in greater depth.  
 
Quantitative research has traditionally focused upon issues of bias in 
order to separate the influence of the researcher from the research. By 
contrast, qualitative research argues that this is neither possible nor 
necessarily desirable (Fook, 2001). As a researcher, I bring my 
background and identity to my research, but from a traditional positivist 
perspective this is viewed as a source of bias, rather than a valuable 
component to my research. This is addressed in qualitative research 
through the concept of reflexivity, which acknowledges that we bring our 
own thoughts, values and beliefs as well as our ethnicity, race, class, 
gender, sexual orientation, occupation, family background and 
schooling to our research (Kirby and McKenna, 1989). Viewed from a 
reflexive point of view, subjectivity is not a problem but an asset (Fook, 
2001).  
 
Since we are part of the social world that we study, we cannot escape it 
in order to study it, nor can we avoid relying upon 'common sense' 
knowledge or avoid having an effect on the phenomena that we are 
studying (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). Indeed, rather than viewing 
reactivity as a source of bias, we can exploit it as a form of data - how 
people react in the presence of ourselves as observers can be as 
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informative as how they react to other situations (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 2007). 
 
Managing my own reflexivity involved examining the aspects of myself 
that relate to undertaking the research. More specifically, I shall 
examine how I became aware of how my previous experience as a child 
protection social worker influenced how I approached my fieldwork and 
how I moved beyond an ‘insider’ perspective. Examining and 
understanding my previous experiences is central to understanding 
what Madden describes as the personal ‘ethnographic gaze’ that each 
researcher will be bring to the task (Madden, 2010).  
 
As I was approaching my fieldwork, I was intensely aware of my 
previous experience in the field. Mosse (1994) argues that membership 
of an organisation makes it harder to observe or understand that 
institution. This was my own experience and one of the greatest 
challenges for the study was developing an outsider perspective. The 
danger for my study was not the traditional danger in ethnographic 
research of ‘going native’, i.e., adopting a perspective in which I over 
identified with participants to the point of not being able to maintain a 
critical distance. Having been a ‘native’, the danger was that I would 
remain a native and not be able to get beyond an insider perspective.  
 
Having been previously immersed in the setting, I needed to be able to 
put one foot outside, to enable everyday, taken-for-granted 
assumptions to become visible. As a researcher, I am involved in 
constructing meaning from what I see and hear. In my interactions with 
participants, the danger is that my shared experience can signal shared 
understandings that can remain unexamined and unchallenged 
because they seem ‘common sense’ (Chew-Graham et al., 2002). They 
are common sense to the extent that they are beliefs and assumptions 
that are held in common with my participants. The danger is that, as a 
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former practitioner, I may be so steeped in experience that I feel a 
premature sense of certainty that closes off and reifies analysis too 
early. So the research task is precisely to make explicit those take-for-
granted aspects of everyday practice because they are vital for 
understanding the process of sense-making that practitioners 
undertake.  
 
I sought to develop my reflexivity in several ways. Firstly, I kept a 
fieldwork journal in which I reflected upon the emotional impact of 
undertaking the fieldwork and explored where my assumptions were 
challenged. Secondly, my supervision was invaluable in helping me to 
see aspects that would have otherwise gone unnoticed and supporting 
me to use theory to decentre from my everyday perspectives as a 
practitioner.  
 
A third resource was my doctoral group, who were helpful because 
there were a mixture of child protection practitioners and non-
practitioners. The practitioners worked in different geographical areas 
and were able to challenge my data analysis where it did not accord 
with their own experience or suggest alternative explanations. The non-
practitioners were helpful because they were able to help me to see the 
setting with fresh eyes and asked me to explain aspects that had 
become so familiar to me that they had become invisible. A fourth 
source was a Tavistock institutional observation group that I joined 
alongside my observational fieldwork. This included two practitioners 
and a manager who were working in the child protection field, who were 
able to offer alternative interpretations to the material that I presented.  
 
Finally, I found presenting my on-going research at conferences was 
helpful to expose my fledgling analysis to a wider national and 
international audience. For example, when I presented some of the 
early findings to a doctoral conference, a non-social work participant 
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said that it was good that I was raising awareness of how shocking it 
was in child protection social work. She added that 'it is good that you 
are observing it with fresh eyes'. I responded by discussing how difficult 
it was for me to view it with fresh eyes because it feels so familiar. 
Indeed, I had not felt shocked by the data that I was presenting 
precisely because it was so familiar. This enabled me to realise the 
extent to which my previous experience had raised my tolerance of 
difficult circumstances so that my personal ‘thresholds’ about what was 
intolerable were much higher than someone who was coming fresh to 
the field. With this in mind, I went back to my data analysis to look 
afresh at my data from that perspective.  
 
 
3.3 Research design and methods 
 
Within qualitative research, a wide range of approaches can be used.  It 
would be possible, for example, to address my research question to 
some extent by using only qualitative, semi-structured interviews. 
Interviews enable participants to talk about what they do and explain 
why they do it. However, the accounts that they give may be limited in 
the absence of any other data because participants may not be 
consciously aware of the sense-making processes that they use in real 
life situations or they may describe an ‘official’ version of how they form 
judgments that is about how they defend their judgments, not how they 
make them. Consequently, the research approach that I chose was 
ethnography, which combines observation with interviews.  
 
Ethnography has a long history in the social sciences, traditionally 
traced back to the work of Malinowski (1922) fieldwork in the Trobriand 
Islands (Atkinson and Hammersley, 1994). Ethnographic research has 
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a long tradition in the study of childcare social work in the UK ((Dingwall 
et al., 1983; Pithouse, 1984; White, 1997; Holland, 1999; Scourfield, 
1999), Ireland (Buckley, 2003), Canada (De Montigny, 1995) and 
Australia (Gillingham, 2009). Hammersley and Atkinson provide an 
account of its most central features:  
 
Ethnography usually involves the researcher participating, overtly or 
covertly, in people’s daily lives for an extended period of time, 
watching what happens, listening to what is said, and/or asking 
questions through informal and formal interviews, collecting 
documents and artefacts – in fact, gathering what data is available 
to throw light on the issues that are the emerging focus of inquiry” 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, p.3).  
 
I chose ethnography because my research question requires rich and 
detailed data about how practitioners developed judgments about the 
families they worked with.  This is a key feature of ethnography and 
Geertz (1973) borrows the term ‘thick description’ from the philosopher 
Gilbert Ryle to describe the ethnographic approach to observation. He 
illustrates with one of Ryle’s examples of a boy winking. To describe a 
wink as a contraction of the eyelid is an example of ‘thin description’ 
because it gives no indication of its significance. It may be an 
involuntary twitch, or it could be a deliberate message to another 
person employing a socially established code without the awareness of 
other people (Geertz, 1973). This is relevant to my research because it 
demonstrates the importance of context for understanding the meaning 
of social actions and communication.  
 
Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) argue that ethnographic research is 
characterized by a ‘funnel’ structure, in which the focus is developed 
over time. Over the course of the research, the research problem is 
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progressively developed and eventually clarified and delimited. This 
may involve significant changes in the research problem or a gradual 
process of refinement. Indeed, one of the advantages of ethnography is 
its flexibility in generating theory (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). 
Since it does not involve the extensive pre-fieldwork usually required for 
survey or experimental designs, the strategy or even whole direction of 
the research can be changed if initial ideas are not supported by early 
fieldwork or promising new ideas arise. The detailed nature of the 
research methods of ethnographic research will be discussed under 
research methods below (Section 3.5).  
 
 
3.3.1 Selecting research sites 
 
Like all elements of my methodology, my sampling strategy and my 
research sites were chosen to best respond to my research questions. 
At the beginning of this chapter I outlined my research questions, which 
are; what sense-making processes do practitioners engage in when 
seeking to understand their work with families and how are these 
sense-making processes influenced by the organisational setting within 
which practitioners work? Purposive sampling was used as it allowed 
me to choose a case because it illustrates the processes that I was 
interested in and where those processes are most likely to occur 
(Silverman, 2013; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). I will describe the sites 
briefly here to explain my sampling strategy and will describe them each 
in considerable depth in chapters four and five.  
 
The first site was a local office consisting of four children’s fieldwork 
teams providing an emergency service and the second site was a 
specialist NHS court assessment centre that undertakes planned 
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assessments. In both sites, practitioners engage in sense-making 
processes but in contrasting organisational settings. As such, the 
choice of sites represents an extreme or contrasting sampling strategy 
(Yin, 2009). The logic used was replication logic, in which contrasting 
cases are selected with the intention of producing a theoretical 
replication in which each example produces contrasting results but for 
predictable reasons (Yin, 2009).  These sites were chosen for both 
methodological and practical reasons because they examine the 
situated complexity of decision-making in everyday practice (Stake, 
2003) and resource limitations meant that a larger scale study was 
impractical.    
 
 
Site 1: The ‘City’ children’s fieldwork teams  
 
My first site was a local children’s office with four intake teams in an 
inner city local authority. The pseudonym ‘City teams’ is used to protect 
confidentiality. Intake teams were the ‘front door’ to children’s social 
care, responding to all referrals ranging from urgent child protection 
concerns to routine information requests about children from other 
agencies. The teams worked within the national guidance provided by 
The Framework for the Assessment of Children in Need and their 
Families (Department of Health, 2000), which sets out rigorous time 
limits. For example, at the time of commencement of the fieldwork, an 
initial assessment had to be completed within seven days of the 
referral.  
 
 
Site 2: Sycamore court assessment service 
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The second site was a much smaller service within an NHS mental 
health trust in the same large city in England. The pseudonym 
‘Sycamore service’ is used to protect confidentiality. It was a multi-
disciplinary team that included three team members from a social work 
background as well as members from child and adolescent psychiatry, 
child psychotherapy and clinical psychology backgrounds. Although it 
was formally one large team, it operated on the basis of several smaller 
teams led by a senior clinician who acted as the case manager.  
 
 
Comparison of the two research sites 
 
These two sites were chosen because they present contrasting 
organisational settings. The ‘City’ service was a high volume, fast 
moving environment, comprising of short-term assessments within short 
and nationally prescribed timescales. It acted as the ‘front door’ for all 
referrals and worked with a wide range of families, ranging from families 
that were unknown to services to those that had an extensive history of 
local authority involvement. It received a high number of referrals at the 
time of the fieldwork and this placed considerable pressure upon the 
service.   
 
By contrast, the Sycamore service was a low-volume service providing 
in-depth assessments within longer and more negotiable timescales. 
The service worked with families who predominantly had an extensive 
history of local authority involvement resulting in court proceedings.  
 
During the fieldwork, one practitioner in the City teams described the 
service as being like ‘an A&E department’ in the sense that it was fast, 
reactive and under constant pressure because it was the ‘single gate’ 
entry system for children’s social care. If the City teams were like an 
A&E department, then the Sycamore service was more like a surgical 
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ward where access was via referral from another service, the work was 
planned rather than reactive and it was a specialist service where small 
teams were lead by a senior clinician.  
 
Figure 3.1  Comparison of the two research sites 
 
 City Children’s Teams Sycamore assessment 
service 
Level of 
practitioner 
discretion 
Carrying out statutory duties 
within a tightly prescribed 
legal framework 
Working within a court 
process but with significant 
professional discretion about 
how they carry out their 
work. 
Organisational 
setting and 
culture 
High volume, fast paced, 
reactive environment. 
Large staff team (48 
members) 
 
 
A&E department metaphor 
Low volume, scheduled work 
where there is usually more 
time to plan.  
Small staff team (15 
members) 
 
Surgical ward metaphor  
 
 
As with any study, there are considerations about whether findings can 
be generalised to wider settings. Yin (2009) argues that there are two 
form of generalisation, statistical and analytic generalisation. Whilst 
statistical generalisation seeks to make inferences about a population 
based upon empirical data collected from a sample, analytic 
generalisation seeks to generalise a particular set of results to settings 
or populations wider than that of the research itself. Therefore, the 
appropriate criterion is whether the insights gained can be transferred 
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meaningfully and robustly to other settings. This will be discussed in 
depth in chapter 8, where the strengths and limitations of the study will 
be examined.  
 
 
3.4 Access and research ethics  
 
This section will address the practical aspects of gaining access to the 
research sites and the ethical issues that were addressed. Access is an 
important issue when considering any research design, but this is 
particularly important in ethnographic research (Gobo, 2008). The 
preliminary stage was undertaking the internal University of East 
London research ethics process, which was completed successfully. 
The University of East London research ethics approval letter is 
included in appendix 5.  
 
The next stage was to gain access to the two research sites, which 
presented a contrast at the formal level of research ethics procedures. I 
sought access to the City teams by emailing a senior manager with 
responsibility for training whose name I had been given as a suitable 
link person. I successfully completed a research ethics application to 
another local authority, but the key person to provide access changed 
job and was not replaced so my access could not proceed. When this 
senior manager asked for more details about the nature of the research, 
I sent him the full research ethics application that I had submitted to the 
previous local authority but tailored to the new local authority. The 
manager contacted me to say that he would be passing this onto the 
'research committee'. After three months, I got back in contact but found 
that this senior manager had since retired and the local authority did not 
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have a 'research committee'. It was suggested that I contact the service 
manager direct and send her my research ethics application. I 
approached the service manager and provided full details of my 
research study, which was followed by a lengthy telephone interview. 
This was successfully completed and I was allowed access to the 
teams. An introductory email was circulated within the team that had a 
participant information sheet with details of my research.  
 
By contrast, the Sycamore service was part of the National Health 
Service and was regulated by a detailed and robust national ethical 
governance system. The service manager in the Sycamore service was 
also welcoming and positive about research and willing to support my 
application. I attended an NHS ethics committee meeting in April 2011 
and permission was subsequently granted. The NHS ethics approval 
letter has not been included as it contains information that compromises 
the confidentiality of the research site but it is available on request.   
 
The sensitive nature of the topic and the potential vulnerabilities of the 
participants require detailed consideration of the risks involved and the 
following risks were identified and addressed. Firstly, there was the duty 
to protect the confidentiality of those involved, which was addressed at 
each stage of the research process. At the stage of conducting 
interviews, background information about participants was recorded on 
a personal details form that was kept separate from the interview 
transcript. The personal details form and the interview transcript were 
linked by a key in which each participant was given a number. This 
number was recorded on the transcript and the two sets of documents 
were kept separately, so that if another party should gain unauthorised 
access to the transcripts, they would not know the identity of the 
participant. Observation notes and interview transcripts were kept in an 
encrypted file on a password protected computer. At the stage of data 
analysis and presentation, careful attention was given to removing 
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identifying information. All names and characteristics that could identify 
participants were changed to protect the anonymity of those involved.  
 
Secondly, there was the risk that participants would feel pressurised 
into engaging in the research and would not truly give informed 
consent. This is particularly relevant to ethnography, where observation 
of a setting generates a wider range of ethical issues. For example, Sue 
White (1997) described how she obtained permission from her 
organisation to observe social workers in her work setting, but was then 
in a situation where she observed a social worker visiting from another 
organisation and was unsure about whether to explain her study in 
order to obtain consent. This did not occur in my study, but I had a more 
general concern about how participants would feel about being 
observed and asked to undertake individual interviews. This was 
particularly heightened as children’s social work is one of the most 
highly scrutinised areas of social work and this scrutiny is undertaken 
by public inquiries, the press and regulatory bodies.  
 
Thirdly, there was a possibility that a participant may disclose 
information that may indicate that a child or adult are at risk of harm. As 
I was interviewing social work professionals rather than children or 
family members, this risk was considerably less. It was arranged that in 
the first instance, I would discuss it with the research link person on 
each site, who was a senior manager.  Finally, there was a risk that a 
staff member could become upset during the interviews. My previous 
practice experience as a social worker and counsellor meant that I felt 
reasonably confident to respond during the interview and information 
was obtained on in-house staff support services to give to participants if 
appropriate. 
 
Cassell (1988) argues that field access strategies can be divided into 
two phases: ‘getting in’ (achieving physical access to the site) and 
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‘getting on’ (achieving social access)”. One of the early issues for me 
was how to introduce myself when I began fieldwork in each research 
site. I was aware that I had to negotiate the ‘getting on’ stage by 
building trust to achieve social access. When I was introduced to the 
teams, I explained about my study and I often added that I had 
previously worked in a child protection team. I did this because I wanted 
to be open about my own background as an 'insider' studying a setting 
that I had previously worked with but I was also aware that this was 
likely to reduce suspicion and mistrust. Since many practitioners were 
aware of negative media coverage and other research studies of local 
authority children's teams that were critical of practice, such mistrust 
was not entirely misplaced.  
 
Reflecting upon this, I was communicating that I was an ‘insider’, 
implicitly reassuring them that I was viewed them and their practice 
from the inside, not from the outside. This may have been in reaction to 
my expectation that they would feel a certain degree of defensiveness 
beyond the defensiveness that would be found in any participant who 
was also going to be observed rather than just interviewed. When one 
is being interviewed, one is giving a verbal account of one’s work, the 
original meaning of ‘audit’ (Power, 1999). This alone can be stressful 
and demanding because it requires the participant to present herself or 
himself in a way that they anticipate will be socially acceptable. My 
assumption was that the experience of being observed and interviewed 
was likely to increase the potential anxiety for participants because they 
may be concerned about whether there is a gap between what they say 
that they do and what they actually do. For social workers, this anxiety 
is often heightened by a fear that outsiders will come in and scrutinize 
their practice in a highly critical way.  
 
In reality, I was surprised by how willing and enthusiastic participants 
were to be interviewed and to discuss their daily work from their 
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perspective. At the time, I considered that this might be linked with me 
being a white, male, middle aged and middle class academic who was 
a traditional authority figure. However, I was also quite warm and 
friendly and may be able to communicate their perspective to a wider 
audience. As the interviews progressed, my impression was that their 
enthusiasm for being interviewed was not particularly related to me, but 
was more related to having the opportunity to talk about their everyday 
work in a setting with someone who showed sympathetic interest. This 
was particularly true in the City teams, where such opportunities for 
discussion were more limited by the pressurised nature of the work. 
 
My challenge was to develop a position as researcher in which I had 
one foot outside in order that I could look in with an awareness of the 
'taken for granted' assumptions that characterise such settings. The 
experience of being a passive observer in an active, busy office did 
create a sense of dislocation that was initially unnerving but created 
space for me to be able to be both within and outside the teams. In 
addition, the experience of supervision and the institutional observation 
group helped to tease out the implicit assumptions that would otherwise 
be invisible.  
 
3.5 Research methods 
 
In ethnographic research, the research methods that are traditionally 
used are a combination of participant observation, semi-structured 
qualitative interviews and documentary analysis. The strength of using 
multiple research methods is that it increases the depth and range of 
the data and reduces the risk that the findings are method-dependent 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007; Madden, 2010).  
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For this study, the research methods that were used were a 
combination of participant observation and interviews, which has been 
successfully applied in previous ethnographic studies in social work 
(For example, Dingwall et al., 1983; Pithouse, 1984; Scourfield, 1999). 
When designing the study and gaining access to the research sites, one 
of the data sources that I considered was agency client files using 
documentary analysis, as has previous been used in ethnographic 
studies as an additional source of data (Holland, 1999, 2010; 
Scourfield, 1999, 2003; Foster, 2009). As part of my initial induction, I 
read agency documents and historical case files as a means of 
orientating myself to the work of the organisation in a similar way that 
social work students would on a practice placement. However, I 
decided to not use it as a primary source of data in the present study for 
three reasons. Firstly, there were significant ethical issues about using 
client files as a main data source. The issue of whether to use client 
files was discussed explicitly at the NHS Research Ethics Committee 
when my application was heard and panel members expressed 
significant concern about this possibility.  
 
Secondly, there were significant practical problems about gaining 
access to client records. For example, the case records in my first 
research site were held electronically and required a staff log-in to gain 
access. Thirdly, there was an issue about the quality of data in case 
files. As Ferguson and O’Reilly (2001) noted, case files tend not to tell 
the full story of the decision making process. Other researchers 
conducting ethnographic studies in childcare social work settings have 
found similar issues when using documentary data. For example, 
previous doctoral studies of social work practice using an ethnographic 
approach has found that the agency documentation was not helpful for 
understanding the family’s narratives (Holland, 1999; Foster, 2009). The 
study previously discussed in chapter 2 came to similar conclusions 
(Broadhurst, et al., 2010). 
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In my first research site, the software used was in the form of a 
database and each entry was usually brief, sometimes fragmented. 
Consequently, there was also an issue about the quality of data and 
what it would add to the study. 
 
3.5.1 Fieldwork undertaken  
 
The following data was collected during the periods of fieldwork in both 
sites (see figure 3.2). The rationale for each data collection method will 
be discussed in the following sections.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Summary of data collection from both research sites 
 
Research 
method 
Number Site 
Timescale 
Participant 
observation 
18 days 
 
22 days  
 
Total  - 40 days  
‘City teams’ 
 
‘Sycamore 
service’ 
April 2010 - March 
2011 
July 2011 - May 
2012 
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Interviews 17 interviews 
 
7 interviews 
 
Total - 24 interviews 
‘City teams’ 
 
‘Sycamore 
service’ 
April 2010 - March 
2011 
 
July 2011 - May 
2012 
 
 
3.5.2 Participant observation  
 
In this study, participant observation took the form of spending time at 
each site, observing the everyday life of the teams, attending meetings 
and listening to conversations between team members about their work 
with families. The rationale for using participant observation is that it 
enables the observer to study aspects of behaviour in a natural setting 
that may be difficult to access using other methods, including behaviour 
that the social actor may not be consciously aware of. As a method, it 
gets the researcher closer to taken-for-granted aspects of the setting 
than other alternatives (Lofland et al., 2006).  
 
In ethnography, the traditional typology of observer roles was provided 
by Gold (1958), who identified the following four roles: complete 
observer, observer as participant, participant as observer, complete 
participant. Applying this typology to my study, I would argue that I 
adopted the role of observer as participant, i.e., I had a mainly passive 
role but with some ethnographic interviewing of participants in order to 
understand the meaning of the activities that participants were engaging 
in. I found the concept of cultivating the position of 'marginal native' 
(Freilich, 1970) to be useful for expressing my aim of recognising that I 
had been a member of the social group that I was studying but was 
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striving to develop a critical distance that would enable me to go beyond 
that. 
 
It is a potential weakness of any form of observation, however 
sensitively it is undertaken, that people behave differently when being 
observed (Patton, 2002). However, Hepburn and Wiggins (2007) argue 
that these effects are often less in practice than it may first appear for 
three reasons. Firstly, a period of acclimatisation can help to reduce 
participants’ sensitivity to being observed. Bryman (2012) also argues 
that participant observers typically find that participants become 
accustomed to their presence and begin to behave more naturally the 
longer that they are around. Secondly, they argued that observations 
are often done in situations where there are important practical goals, 
such as courtrooms, police interrogations, NSPCC calls, psychotherapy 
and so on. Since the parties are likely to be focused on these issues, 
the research process is less likely to make much difference here 
(Hepburn and Wiggins, 2007). Thirdly, recording technology is a 
pervasive feature of modern life.  
 
The exact nature of the observations was slightly different in each site 
because of the structures and rhythms of their everyday work. In site 
one, the four teams were situated in the same building and had a ‘duty 
room’ where the teams worked during the days when they were on 
duty. Consequently, I was based in the duty room amongst the 
practitioners as the teams regularly rotated. During the 18 days of 
observation, I had the opportunity to observe all four teams, which were 
similar in composition and practices. The fieldwork of 18 days of 
observation was undertaken over a period of 12 months (April 2010 - 
March 2011) and the pattern tended to be more intensive during the 
academic breaks at Christmas, Easter and summer due to my practical 
availability. The short-term nature of the team’s work meant that this 
pattern did not appear to present problems for data collection. It is 
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possible that there may have been some influence on my data 
collection because these also are periods when schools are closed so 
the teams may have been slightly less busy, but this was not noticeable 
to me and was not commented on by practitioners. Previous 
ethnographic studies had noted how demanding it is to observe for a full 
day (Scourfield, 1999; Holland, 2000) but I was keen to ensure that I 
understood the patterns over a whole work day. Consequently, all of the 
observation days were full working days (9am-5pm), which was very 
demanding but very exciting. In order to cope with the demands, I rarely 
did consecutive days and had quiet days before and after to ensure that 
I was able to maintain my attention as fully as possible.  
 
In site two, the fieldwork commenced with an induction where I attended 
a full range of activities, including observing a direct work session with a 
family with their permission. Given the ethical concerns, data were not 
recorded for this induction period. At this phase, I sat in the clinical team 
room, where all the practitioners were based. In site two, the 
observation included attendance at team meetings when cases were 
discussed and during assessment days when the team members 
involved would meet before the family arrived and at the end of the day 
when the sessions with the family had been completed.  Given that the 
work was more long term and structured, the pattern of observation of 
22 days over 9 months (July 2011 - May 2012) was more structured in 
order to enable me to follow teams working with specific families and 
tended to take the form of observing one day per week over the full 
working day.   
 
In both sites, I considered the possibility of observing worker-family 
interaction, but this was not necessary to answer my research 
questions and I had not included it in my research ethics applications 
because I was concerned that it would be unlikely to be granted. In 
chapter eight, I will revisit this decision as a potential limitation of the 
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study. Although I still maintain that observing practitioner-client 
interactions is not necessary to answer my research questions, it could 
generate interesting and valuable data that may suggest different 
avenues and with hindsight I would have questioned my self-limited 
assumptions about not receiving research ethics approval as it has 
provided possible in other studies (Ferguson, 2014a; Slembrouck and 
Hall, 2011).  
 
Data were recorded in both sites using detailed contemporaneous field 
notes. Scratch notes were taken in the field wherever possible and my 
fieldwork day was broken up by a lunch break, which enabled me to 
spend time intensively writing up the morning's observations as 
recommended in the ethnographic literature (Madden, 2010; Emerson 
et al., 2011). The field notes were informed by key texts in ethnographic 
research, including the importance of key field notes and analytical 
memos separately (Spradley, 1980; Emerson et al., 2011; Lofland et al., 
2006). After work, I immediately wrote up the afternoon session. In 
between, the infamous 'ethnographer’s bladder' (withdrawing to go the 
toilet to enable further opportunities for case recording) enabled me to 
withdraw to jot down notes. 
 
During many of the meetings that I observed at site one, such as 
strategy meetings and child protection conferences, other people were 
taking notes so I was able to write detailed notes during the observation 
without drawing attention to myself. In the second site, it was clear that 
making notes during the internal team meetings would be intrusive and 
recording the meeting would be even more intrusive for the team. This 
is common in ethnographic research, where the reactivity of participants 
to audio recording and note taking may preclude contemporaneous 
records (Madden, 2010). It is virtually impossible to state for sure when 
and to what extent participants were influenced by my presence, 
although my impression over the course of the fieldwork was that it 
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appeared to be less than I feared. However, I was sensitive to how my 
presence affected participants and treated each participant as what 
Hollway and Jefferson (2000) describes as a ‘defended subject’, i.e., 
with an understanding that participants’ actions and the accounts that 
they give may serve to defend against anxiety. I have noted in the 
presentation of data where I felt that this might have been in play.  
 
3.5.3 Semi-structured interviews  
 
After the majority of the participant observations had been completed, 
semi-structured interviews were undertaken with participants, which 
were informed by what had emerged through observation. The rationale 
for using semi-structured interviews is that they enable the researcher 
to understand practitioners’ behaviour from their own perspective.  
 
As well as formal interviews, the observations included more informal 
ethnographic interviews that were contemporaneous with the 
observations (Spradley, 1980). Most days of observation included at 
least one informal interview in which I talked to participants about what 
had just happened or was happening. For example, when I observed 
managers reading referrals, I often went over to ask them to talk to me 
about the referrals, what information they were focusing on and how 
they made decisions. This was helpful in understanding what was 
happening as it unfolded and for becoming more embedded within the 
setting and its implicit assumptions and meanings. The combination of 
observation combined with informal and formal interviews was 
particularly important as the focus was to understand the reasoning 
processes that practitioners engaged in rather than on direct social 
work practice.  
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The rationale for using interviews combined with observation is that 
together they provide an opportunity to gain a greater depth of 
understanding and allow participants to contextualise and explain 
observed behaviour (Spradley, 1980; Heyl, 2001). This design has been 
successful in similar doctoral studies of child protection work practice 
using an ethnographic approach (Scourfield, 1999; Holland, 1999).  
 
My early observations informed my sampling strategy for the semi-
structured interviews. In both sites, I completed more than half of my 
observation days before I started to conduct formal interviews because I 
wanted my observations to inform my interview sampling strategy. In 
the City teams, my observations suggested that it would be helpful for 
my interview sample to include practitioners with a wide range of 
experience to explore whether practitioners' sense-making processes 
changed as they gained more experience. In reality, it was 
straightforward to implement this sampling strategy as the City team 
practitioners had a wide range of experience ranging from student 
social workers to practitioners with more than twenty years of post-
qualifying experience. In the Sycamore service, the same sampling 
strategy was appropriate for the individual interviews as there was a 
similar range of experience.  
 
The dimension of practitioner experience was particularly significant 
and it is important to outline how I divided practitioners into discrete 
categories. In my original sampling strategy, the aim was to interview 
practitioners with a wider range of experience. Having achieved this, I 
analysed the interview transcripts and identified three categories of 
experience. It is important to emphasize that these categories were the 
result of my data analysis rather than predetermined before data 
collection. Indeed, it was not clear that the level of experience that 
practitioners had would be a clear influence upon how they engaged in 
sense-making, but this emerged as the data collection and analysis 
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progressed. In chapter six, I will explain in detail how I developed the 
three categories and provide data extracts that explain the key features 
of each stage.  
  
Figure 3.3  Level of experience of interview participants 
 
Category Level of experience The City teams The Sycamore 
service  
Less experienced Less than 18 months 
experience of assessment in 
a child protection setting 
 
3 participants 
 
2 participants 
 
Experienced Between 18 months and 5-6 
years experience of 
assessment in a child 
protection setting 
 
9 participants 
 
0 participants 
 
Highly 
experienced 
More than 5-6 years 
experience of assessment in 
a child protection setting 
 
5 participants  5 participants 
 
 
This table identifies interview participants only because it was not 
possible to reliably gain this information on all participants observed 
during the fieldwork. The names given are anonymised pseudonyms 
that will be used throughout the study. The three categories of 
practitioner experience were developed through analysing my data 
rather than imposed before data collection and in chapter six I will 
explain how I arrived at these categories.  
 
As the table indicates, the spread of experience was significantly 
different in each site. In the City teams, there was a spread of 
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experience, with more representation in the ‘experienced’ group and 
slightly smaller representation in other two groups. In the Sycamore 
team, the spread was polarised into two groups, the less experienced 
and highly experienced group. This was representative of the team, 
which consisted of highly experienced senior clinicians working with 
less experienced clinical associates such as assistant psychologists 
and family support workers who were predominantly undertaking the 
work in preparation for professional training in clinical psychology, child 
psychotherapy or social work. The total interview sample for the 
Sycamore service was almost 60% (4 out of 7) of the senior clinicians 
and just over 40% (3 out of 8) of the clinical associates. The total 
interview sample for the City teams was approximately 35% (17 out of 
48) of the practitioners in the service. The nature of the teams will be 
discussed in more detail in chapters four and five.  
 
There was a serendipitous aspect to my fieldwork because my sample 
included some practitioners who had trained or practiced overseas 
including Australia, New Zealand, USA, Canada, Nigeria, Zimbabwe 
and South Africa (7 out of 24 participants). These participants were 
often able to provide useful insights into the English child protection 
system by comparing it with other child protection systems worldwide. 
3.6 Data analysis  
 
3.6.1 Choosing a method of data analysis 
 
Analysing data is a crucial stage in any research study and the quality 
of a study is highly dependent upon the quality of data analysis. The 
method of data analysis that was chosen was thematic analysis as 
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proposed by Braun and Clarke (2006) because it provides a process 
and framework that is compatible within my research question, design 
and data collection. Thematic analysis has been defined as a method 
for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006) and is one of the most commonly used 
methods for analysing qualitative data (Bryman, 2012; Davies, 2007; 
Riessman, 2008).  
 
An alternative approach that was considered was narrative analysis but 
this was not appropriate because it requires a relatively standardised 
dataset. Whilst it is useful for analysing interview data where 
participants give developed accounts that are similar in structure and 
length, narrative analysis is more problematic with ethnographic data 
that are more heterogeneous (Riessman, 2008). For example, I 
collected data in meetings in which a particular family was discussed 
but it had a structure that was quite different to a story told by a 
practitioner about a family in an individual interview.  
 
A third approach that was considered was grounded theory. This is an 
approach to research rather than just data analysis, which emphasises 
the importance of generating new concepts and theoretical frameworks 
from data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). It is characterised by a number of 
key concepts and principles, namely, constant comparison, theoretical 
sampling and theoretical saturation (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Corbin 
and Strauss, 2008). Constant comparison refers to the practice of 
analysing data as it is collected in a continuous process. Theoretical 
sampling is an approach in which sampling is not predetermined but 
evolves as the research develops. Early sampling is directed towards 
having a wide variety of data, which is progressively narrowed as the 
analysis develops. This continues until new data does not provide any 
new insights, the point known as theoretical saturation. In practice, the 
study has incorporated almost all of these key features. However, there 
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is a tension between ethnography and grounded theory because, whilst 
ethnography focuses upon the relevance of culture for understanding 
meaning, grounded theory does not have this focus (Barnes, 1996).  
 
Like any method of data analysis, thematic analysis has its weaknesses 
and limitations. It has been criticised for having a less theorised 
approach than other methods such as interpretative phenomenological 
analysis (IPA) or grounded theory (Bryman, 2012). This can lead to 
analyses that are too descriptive and insufficiently interpretative unless 
they are used within some form of theoretical framework. Secondly, 
thematic analysis has been criticised for paying less attention to 
language practices compared to approaches such as discourse 
analysis or conversation analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2013).   
 
Both of these perceived weaknesses are less problematic within my 
study. The study already has a theoretical approach derived from 
psychological and psychoanalytic literature that supports interpretation 
that goes beyond description and thematic analysis is compatible with 
this approach, unlike approaches such as IPA. Secondly, although the 
study will pay attention to language use and practices, this is not a 
primary focus in the same way as discourse analysis or conversation 
analysis so thematic analysis is an appropriate approach. In conclusion, 
thematic analysis provides a more flexible and compatible approach to 
data analysis that is consistent with the research questions and study 
design.   
 
3.6.2 Undertaking the analysis 
 
In ethnography, as in most forms of qualitative research, the process of 
analysing data is an iterative process rather than a separate stage in 
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the research process (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007; Gobo, 2008). It 
begins before data is collected, with analytic memos and initial thoughts 
that feed into the research design and is not finished until the final draft 
of the thesis. During the fieldwork period, data collection and analysis 
work alongside one another.  
 
In the early stages of the research, the concepts that are being 
developed often take the form of a loose collection of ‘sensitizing 
concepts’ (Blumer, 1954).These sensitizing concepts provided the 
researcher with a general sense of direction and guidelines for dealing 
with empirical instances. As the analysis develops, these concepts are 
refined to the stage where they become ‘definitive concepts’, which 
identify the common features of a class of objects (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 2007). The difference between these two has been 
characterized by Hammersley and Atkinson as follows:  
 
“Where definitive concepts provide prescriptions of what to see, 
sensitizing concepts merely suggest directions along which to look” 
(2007, p.164). 
 
The data collection from 24 interviews and 40 days of observation 
amounted to more than 300,000 words, which was a daunting amount 
of data to analyse. In order to handle this amount of data successfully 
and systematically, qualitative data analysis software (NVivo version 
10) was used to code the data. Unlike quantitative data analysis 
software such as SPSS, computer aided qualitative data analysis 
software (CAQDAS) does not automatically analyse data, it simply 
offers the researcher a means of working with a considerable amount of 
data. The software uses a ‘code and retrieve’ system which means that 
the researcher completes a process of coding observation notes and 
transcripts in a similar way to traditional manual coding, but these are 
stored electronically and can be retrieved more easily. It works by 
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enabling the researcher to highlight text and link it to specific codes. 
When these codes are then selected, all of the data linked to it are 
retrieved. These codes can be grouped together into themes and sub-
themes, enabling the data to be worked with at a broader level 
combined with the ability to quickly drill down into the data itself. It also 
enables the codes or themes to be represented visually through the use 
of models to represent possible relationships between the codes or 
themes. 
 
One of the criticisms of qualitative data analysis software is that it has 
the potential to remove data too far from their context (Bazeley, 2007). 
For example, specific behaviour in practitioners can be given a 
particular code and each example can be grouped together, but the 
danger is that this can be abstracted from the immediate social context, 
such as the relationships between the practitioner and other social 
actors. My strategy to try to reduce the risk of this was to code data 
extracts generously, i.e., to include some data before and after the 
specific text that I was interested in so that I had a greater sense of the 
wider context.  
 
Braun and Clarke (2006, 2013) present a model of thematic analysis 
that outlines a six-stage process for analysing data. The first stage 
involved me reading through the dataset as a whole several times. One 
of my key aims was to know my dataset in considerable detail, so I also 
listened to the audio tapes as well as reading the transcripts repeatedly. 
This was repeated several times during the process. This was very 
helpful because it meant that, when I was coding a specific transcript or 
set of observational notes and noticed a potential theme, I was able to 
gain a sense of the wider context of the dataset as well as identify 
similar or contrasting examples.  
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The second stage was coding my transcripts and observational notes. 
In order to ensure that the coding framework addressed a wide range of 
data, care was taken to choose contrasting cases when building a 
coding framework (Yin, 2009). For example, my initial coding of 
interview data from site one began with two transcripts from relatively 
newly qualified practitioners (Amy, interview one and Josie, interview 
four) and two from more experienced practitioners (Areta, interview two 
and Kadin, interview five). This group also included a participant (Areta, 
interview two) who had qualified overseas so two more participants who 
had qualified overseas from different continents were chosen (Christina, 
interview eight and Jeanette, interview eleven). In this way, the process 
of developing a constantly evolving coding framework was shaped by 
cases that reflected the full range of experience and backgrounds of the 
participants across the dataset.  
 
At this second stage of coding my transcripts and observational notes, I 
created initial codes. A code identifies a feature of the data that is of 
interest to the researcher and is the most basic building block of data 
analysis (Boyatzis, 1998; Braun and Clarke, 2006). The aim of the 
process is to break down the data into its smallest parts (codes) before 
rebuilding it into major patterns (themes). I did this as new data come in 
and, after I had coded all of the data, I had over four hundred individual 
codes. Part of the reason for such a large number of codes is that I did 
not want to dismiss data at an early stage that may seem unpromising, 
but which may later prove to be important later. Although the software 
enabled me to keep track of such a large number of codes, the sheer 
volume of codes was overwhelming at times and it was difficult to see 
an overall framework at first. Whilst it is tempting to talk of 'emerging 
themes', it is important to recognise that data analysis is an active 
rather than a passive process, in which choices are continually made 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006).  
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The third stage is to search for themes by grouping codes together. The 
software was particularly helpful at this stage because it enabled me to 
start to construct models of how the codes may be sorted into broad 
themes, which represent 'some level of patterned response or meaning 
within the data set' (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.82). As the data analysis 
proceeded, it became clearer that there were some themes that were 
central to my research question whilst others were more peripheral. 
There were some codes that did not fit into any group and these were 
gathered together into a 'miscellaneous' category but were not 
discarded as they might prove important later in the analysis. Although 
coding was primarily inductive, there were data extracts that linked well 
with theoretical concepts identified in the literature review. At the end of 
this stage, I had developed a set of initial themes and sub-themes.  
 
In the fourth stage, I reviewed these initial themes and sub-themes in 
order to test and refine them at two levels. At the first level, I examined 
all of the data extracts within the individual themes in order to establish 
whether each theme had sufficient data and whether the meaning was 
consistent across the theme. At times, this involved dividing or 
combining themes. For example, I found that one theme had two 
distinct aspects and it was better to divide it into two separate themes 
whilst two related themes had such a degree of overlap that it was 
better to combine them into one theme. At the end of this stage, I was 
starting to generate thematic maps to understand my analysis and the 
software was helpful in enabling me to represent possible relationships 
between the codes or themes. As tentative conclusions were beginning 
to be developed, I explicitly sought disconfirming evidence to test the 
robustness of potential insights.  
 
In the fifth stage, the central task is defining and naming themes. This 
focused on defining the essence of what each theme is about, which 
involved going back to the data in order to organise them into an 
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internally consistent account. Each theme was considered individually 
and in relation to the overall analysis. At the end of this stage, I was 
able to identify and summarise each theme and provide a name that 
captured the essence of what the theme was about.  
 
The sixth stage is about writing up the final analysis in a form that tells 
the complex story of the data in a logical and coherent way. This 
involves writing an analytic narrative that illustrates the account, using 
appropriate data extracts to provide evidence of the merit and validity of 
the analysis. When selecting examples, I was aware of the danger of 
what Silverman (2013) has referred to as ‘anecdotalism’. This is the 
tendency for the analyst to select particularly interesting or unusual 
examples because they 'tell a good story', even though the anecdote is 
far from typical and possibly unique. To guard against this, I have 
endeavoured to indicate how typical examples and cases are. 
 
In practice, data analysis was a long and exhausting but fascinating 
process. The term 'data analysis' suggests a rather dry, analytical 
process, but I was surprised to discover that the process was both 
emotionally and intellectually demanding. Given the large volume of 
data, the process of immersion in the dataset at times in the early 
stages felt almost like drowning. I had to remind myself that feeling 
uncertain and confused were part of the process and I should not deal 
with my feelings of being anxious and overwhelming by racing into 
premature conclusions.  
 
One of the key lessons that I learnt was that the processes of reading 
the literature and data analysis were intensely interactive and iterative. 
Key concepts that were identified in the literature sensitised me to 
specific aspects of the data. Conversely, the process of data analysis 
sensitised me both to promising concepts that were worth following up 
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in the literature and to concepts that were prominent in the literature but 
absent in my dataset. 
 
 
3.7 Strategies for promoting rigour 
 
An ethnography is ultimately a story that is backed up by reliable 
qualitative data and the authority that come from active ethnographic 
engagement (Madden, 2010, p.6). 
 
The temptation to form premature theories upon insufficient data is 
the bane of our profession (Sherlock Holmes' remark to Inspector 
MacDonald), The Valley of Fear (Doyle, 1951).     
 
Like other forms of qualitative research, ethnography is often criticised 
for lacking rigour (Hammersley, 1992). Lincoln and Guba (1985) outline 
four qualities that are regarded as central to promoting rigour in 
qualitative research, which are credibility, transferability, dependability 
and confirmability. Credibility refers to the extent to which we can have 
confidence in the ‘truth’ of the findings. Transferability refers to the 
extent to which the findings are applicable to other contexts. 
Confirmability refers to the extent to which the findings are shaped by 
the respondents rather than researcher bias, motivation or interest. 
Dependability is concerned with the question of the extent to which we 
can rely upon a set of findings (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Becker, et al, 
2012). The strategies used in the study to promote these qualities are 
outlined below in Table 3.4.  
 
Table 3.4 Strategies to promote rigour 
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Based on Lincoln and Guba's (1985) criteria, adapted from Baillie 
(2007).  
 
Criterion Strategies adopted How strategy promotes rigour 
Credibility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credibility 
(continued) 
 
 
 
Developed detailed knowledge 
of research methodology by 
writing research textbooks in 
social work and nursing 
(Whittaker, 2009; Whittaker 
and Williamson, 2011; 
Whittaker, 2012b; Williamson 
and Whittaker, 2014).  
 
Research design and data 
collection tools, e.g., interview 
schedule, scrutinised by 
supervisor, doctoral group, 
university ethics committee, 
NHS research ethics 
committee, R&D staff and 
managers within the research 
sites.  
 
Use of appropriate and 
coherent research design, 
ethnography, which matches 
research question. 
 
 
Research sites chosen using 
an extreme case sampling 
strategy. 
Ensures that methodological 
choices are based upon 
knowledge of a wide variety of 
alternative approaches and 
methods.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inconsistencies and lack of clarity 
are identified and addressed early 
on in the process. Data collection 
tools are clear and likely to collect 
relevant data,  
 
 
 
 
Use of tried and tested approach 
that results in an in-depth account 
that is close to the lived 
experience of practitioners.  
 
Likely to lead to relevant data that 
will illustrate key features across 
the spectrum of cases.  
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Credibility 
(continued) 
 
 
Developed a rapport with staff 
on both research sites.  
 
Fieldnotes written at and 
immediately after the 
observation.  
 
Interviews were digitally 
recorded.  
 
Data analysed systematically 
and critically reviewed with 
supervisors and doctoral 
group.  
 
During data analysis, 
particular attention was paid to 
deviant or disconfirming cases 
and examining alternative 
explanations of the data. 
 
Researcher reflexivity 
developed through keeping 
research journal to explore 
previous experiences and 
beliefs. 
 
Published article in peer-
reviewed journal based upon 
preliminary findings 
(Whittaker, 2011b).  
 
 
 
Staff more likely to be relaxed and 
open.  
 
Accurate record of events.  
 
 
 
Accurate record of interview data. 
 
Ensures that data analysis 
processes are robust and well 
grounded in the data.  
 
 
Ensures that analysis is well 
grounded in the data and 
alternative explanations are 
carefully considered (Yin, 2009; 
Braun and Clarke, 2013). 
 
Develops increased 
understanding of how these 
impact on the research process. 
 
 
Ensures that preliminary findings 
are scrutinised at peer-reviewed 
journal standard. 
 
Ensures that preliminary findings 
are scrutinised at peer-reviewed 
conference standard and identify 
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Presented findings at 
conferences (Whittaker, 
2011a, 2012, 2013, 2014) 
 
whether they have a ’truth value’ 
for conference participants.  
Transferability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transferability 
(continued) 
Purposive sampling with an 
extreme case sampling 
strategy used to capture a 
wide range of organisational 
cultures and practitioners with 
a wide range of experience.   
 
 
 
Detailed description of 
research sites.  
‘Typical’ children’s teams in inner 
city local authority leads to 
potentially greater transferability 
with other inner city local 
authorities.  Atypical nature of 
organisational setting and culture 
in the second site can highlight 
what impact this has on social 
work practice.  
 
Enables readers to judge how the 
research sites may be similar or 
dissimilar to their own context.  
Dependability Interview schedule used.  
 
 
One researcher conducted all 
of the data collection.  
 
Clear account given of how 
the research was developed 
and conducted and how data 
was analysed.   
 
Researcher kept research 
journal.  
Ensures consistency in interview 
questions asked.  
 
Consistency in researcher 
approach and practice.  
 
Auditability of research process 
enables readers to follow 
researcher’s decision trail.  
 
 
 
Enables self-monitoring of 
consistency within the research 
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process.  
Confirmability Detailed description of 
research process provided an 
audit trail. 
 
Strategies described above to 
promote credibility, 
transferability and 
dependability will promote 
confirmability.  
Enables readers to assess 
choices made and understand the 
context of the findings.  
 
Described above.  
 
3.8 Summary 
 
This chapter has explained the rationale for the choice of research 
approach, design and research methods used and discussed how 
access to the two research sites was obtained and ethical issues were 
addressed. Each of the data collection methods and sampling methods 
was then outlined and the data analysis process was detailed. Finally, 
strategies for achieving rigour during the research process were 
outlined.  
 
The next chapter is the first of four findings chapters. Chapters four and 
five will present a detailed account of each research site. Chapter six 
will address my first research question by examining the sense-making 
processes that were common to both sites. Chapter seven will address 
my second research question about the influence of organisational 
setting by examining how differences in the research sites affected 
practitioner sense-making. Chapter eight will discuss the conclusions, 
  
106 
implications and limitations of the study as a whole and suggest future 
areas of research. 
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Chapter 4 - The ‘City’ local authority 
children's teams 
 
 
When French social workers participating in our study first walked 
through the doors of a London area office, they were astounded by 
the fortress atmosphere of the reception area (Cooper et al., 1995, 
p.111). 
 
 
This chapter is the first of four findings chapters. In the previous 
chapter, a rationale for choosing ethnography as a research design was 
presented. As an ethnographic study, it is important to set out the two 
research sites in depth and this is the function of this and the next 
chapter. These will be followed by chapter six, which will focus on how 
individual practitioners engage in sense-making in their everyday work 
with families. Chapter seven will draw together a cross-site analysis that 
will focus on upon how these sense-making processes are influenced 
by the organisational setting.  
 
This chapter will focus upon the first of the research sites, the local 
authority children's ‘City’ teams. The aim of this chapter is to enable the 
reader to gain a sense of how the teams operated through context-rich 
description, in which behaviour is described within its wider background 
to enable it to becomes meaningful to an outsider (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985; Miles and Huberman, 1994). Therefore, social and emotional 
aspects of the setting will be explored in order to provide a deeper 
understanding of the setting within which sense-making took place.   
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This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section will provide a 
short description of the City teams in the context of the wider service 
and local community. The second section will outline the everyday 
processes in the City teams through an extended excerpt from 
observation notes. The third section will examine the theme of 'a service 
under pressure', where the demands upon the service from national 
timescales, referrers and the families themselves will be explored. The 
final section will explore the theme of 'an accountable service', focusing 
upon the effect of high profile child deaths and anxieties around 
decision making. 
 
4.1 The City teams 
 
The City teams were a local authority children's intake service 
consisting of four teams. The service will be described in terms of its 
location within the local community and network of services, the nature 
of referrals and how their work was organised. As described in chapter 
three, the names of the local authority and all names and characteristics 
that could possible identify participants were changed to protect the 
anonymity of those involved. 
  
The teams were located in a single local office that was situated within 
an ethnically diverse local community. One third of local residents were 
Black African, a quarter were White British and fifteen percent are Black 
Caribbean. The remaining quarter were composed of Chinese, 
Bangladeshi, White Irish and Pakistani ethnicities. The levels of poverty 
were high by national standards but within the average for similar inner 
city local authorities.  
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The children's intake teams acted as the 'front door' or single entry 
which handled all referrals where there were concerns about the well-
being of a child, responding to all referrals ranging from urgent child 
protection concerns to routine information requests about children from 
other agencies. Referrals were received from a wide range of sources. 
Internal service monitoring information obtained through the local 
authority (April 2010 - March 2011) indicated that the four most 
common sources were the police (20%), schools (17%), other external 
or internal local authority teams (11%) and the local authority's out of 
hours emergency duty team (10%).  
 
Each of the four teams had approximately 10-12 social workers, two 
practice managers and a team manager. The term used to refer to 
social workers throughout the service was 'workers’ whilst practice 
managers and team managers were collectively described as 
'managers'. Each team had its own open-plan office and a separate 
small office for the manager. When teams were undertaking their  'duty' 
period, they moved to a separate duty room to demarcate their change 
of role. The duty room replicated the physical segregation between 
managers and workers, with practitioners occupying long rows of desks 
headed by a separate 'manager's desk' which operated as a central 
point. The teams operated a rota system whereby each team was on 
duty for four working days and responded to all referrals during that 
period. This was followed by an 'off duty' period of twelve working days, 
when they followed up and complete assessments on these referrals.  
 
Referrals were received by an unqualified information officer and 
reviewed by a duty manager, who would decide what course of action 
to take. When reviewing a referral, the manager had three main options; 
accept, reject or request further information. Once a referral was 
accepted, it was allocated to a social worker and an initial assessment 
was instigated. The teams worked within the national guidance provided 
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by the Framework for the Assessment of Children in Need and their 
Families (Department of Health, 2000) and a version of Working 
Together that applied during the period of the fieldwork (DCSF, 2010). 
These documents provided a detailed account of how referrals should 
be responded to and set out fixed time limits. For example, an initial 
assessment had to be completed within seven working days of the 
referral. During the period of the fieldwork, the national guidance 
changed to ten working days, but the local authority retained its seven-
day timescale.  
 
In most of the cases observed and reported in interviews, the initial 
assessment consisted of a single home visit by a lone social worker, 
which was then written up on a set pro forma on the local authority's 
computer database system.  This was consistent with a large-scale 
ethnographic study of five local authorities, which found that initial 
assessments typically consisted of a single home visit (Broadhurst et 
al., 2010).  The City teams received referrals that required emergency 
action that day, although the majority were less urgent and required 
attention over the timescales of several days. A more detailed 
assessment, known as a core assessment, was occasionally required, 
although this was normally completed by other teams where it was 
established that long term work with the family was necessary. Where a 
child protection conference was necessary, the intake teams wrote the 
initial reports and took the case to the conference and then handed it 
over.  
 
Internal service monitoring information obtained during the period of the 
fieldwork indicated that, during the previous 12-month period (April 
2010- March 2011), the teams completed approximately 2,900 
assessments. This means that on average eleven assessments were 
initiated every working day and when each team completed a four-day 
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duty period, they would have initiated forty-four assessments that would 
be completed during their off-duty period.  
 
The period of fieldwork commenced one year after the death of Peter 
Connelly became a high profile media case, which coincided with 
national pressures on local authority children's services that became 
known as the 'Baby P effect'. Local authority children's services across 
England experienced a significant increase in the number of referrals 
that they received during the period of the fieldwork and an increase in 
the number of court applications that they made to safeguard children. 
A report completed by the Children and Family Court Advisory and 
Support Service in November 2009 provides a possible explanation for 
this rise in demand in terms of local authorities becoming more averse 
to managing risk in response to a fear of public criticism following the 
Peter Connelly case (Hall and Guy, 2009).  
 
Like many local authorities, the electronic case record system had a 
'traffic light' system that indicated whether an assessment had been 
completed within statutory timescales. This meant that each case had a 
green light during the first seven days but this turned to a red light if the 
assessment had not been completed.  When practitioners logged onto 
the computer system, their caseload was presented with the most 
overdue cases at the top of the list listed in red with the number of days 
overdue indicated clearly.  
 
There were a number of opportunities for practitioners to discuss the 
cases that they were working on. The most common was informal 
supervision with a practice or team manager as an issue arose, which 
usually took the form of a short, ad hoc discussion that focused upon 
any immediate action that may be necessary.  Informal discussions with 
colleagues were another source of advice, although practitioners 
described being aware that their colleagues were also under pressure. 
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Formal supervision sessions were relatively rare and self-reports from 
practitioners suggested that formal supervision would take place every 
3-6 months. When teams were on duty, team meetings were held every 
morning but the purpose of the meeting was to check who was doing 
what and to allocate any work that needed doing rather than to discuss 
cases in any depth. 
 
When including quotations from individual participants, their level of 
experience will be indicated using three categories; 'less experienced' 
(less than 18 months experience), 'experienced' (18 months-5 years 
experience) and 'highly experienced' practitioners (more than 5-6 years 
experience), which was explained in chapter three. In chapter six I will 
explain how these categories derived from my data analysis.  
 
 
4.2  The everyday life of the teams 
 
In order to gain a sense of the everyday activities of the City teams, it 
would be helpful to examine an extended excerpt from my observation 
notes:  
 
Duty room, day 3, 12.30pm: The duty room was a large, open plan 
office. The focal point was the managers' desk, where the team 
manager and two deputy managers sat. Nine social workers and 
four information officers sat at the long rows of computer terminals 
that lined the walls. Five people were speaking on the phone, two 
were talking with each other and the remainder were typing at their 
computers. One social worker was out on a home visit and another 
was seeing a family who had presented themselves at reception. 
The team were on day two of a four-day duty period.  
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I sat at the desk that was nearest the manager’s desk. This bridged 
the social space between the ‘managers’ and 'workers'. Next to me 
was Sharon, a social worker in her thirties. At the duty team meeting 
this morning, she explained that she had a report to write by 4pm. 
The manager had been supportive and said that she would only 
allocate her a case that would start tomorrow morning. Her phone 
rang and it was a health visitor who wanted to talk about a referral 
that Sharon had dealt with yesterday. The mother that Sharon 
visited had complained about the health visitor for making the 
referral with 'wrong' information and the health visitor wanted to 
know what Sharon had told her. Sharon explained at length exactly 
what had been said, reassuring the health visitor that the information 
that she had passed on had been correct. On her desk sat an 
unopened Coke can and sandwich in a paper bag. 
 
Next to her sat Amy, a social worker in her twenties, who was on the 
phone to a GP surgery, seeking information about a child. She said, 
'You have a duty to share that information under the Children Act 
2004'. Her tone was formal and her voice sounded a mixture of 
annoyance and boredom. 'So the GP will be free at 1pm? Please tell 
him to expect my call'. She resumed her typing. When she clicked 
onto a record, nothing happened for 10-11 seconds. 'God, the 
system is slow today', she muttered.  
 
'We get some really rubbish referrals', said the team manager, 
Elaine, to her deputy manager who was sitting next to her. Elaine, a 
woman in her forties, was reading a referral from a hospital that 
related to a mother who was feeling depressed. The hospital staff 
weren’t sure whether mum was receiving the right services. Elaine 
added, ‘What are they expecting us to do with that? The mother 
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needs to go back to her GP'. Her deputy manager nodded in 
agreement.  
 
Faith, a social worker in her thirties, approached the manager's desk 
and started talking about a mother with a three-year-old whom the 
local authority had put in a hostel in an emergency. The team 
manager, Elaine, seemed to know the case well and, after listening 
for a minute or two then said, ‘What is it that you want from me?’ 
The social worker replied that she wanted the manager to agree that 
it was to okay to give a mother a one-week extension on her hostel 
tenancy otherwise the housing department would have insufficient 
time to rehouse her. The manager said, ‘Okay’. The social worker 
added that she also wanted her signature to give her £20 of section 
17 monies. In a mock outraged voice, the manager said ‘You want 
me to give her money too!? Sue looked a little tense, before 
realising that Elaine was joking. Elaine then talked to her about the 
practicalities of the finance process and who she should keep 
informed of the payments.  
 
Nicola, a social worker in her fifties, came back from reception after 
seeing a mother who had a fourteen-year-old son. Nicola explained 
to the manager Elaine that the family had been known to the local 
authority for several years for 'low-level neglect' but things had been 
getting better. The mother had come in today because she was 
worried that she was spending £75 a week on cannabis for herself 
and this was putting a lot of strain on the family's income. Andrew, a 
team manager in his forties, who had come in from another team, 
quipped, “Her problem is that she’s going to the wrong dealer. She 
can’t be smoking £75 of weed a week and still be standing, unless 
she’s getting a really bad deal. We should put her in contact with 
some of our looked after children, they’d get her a much better deal”. 
Everyone laughed. Elaine said that it was a positive sign that she 
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had come in, she hadn't done that before. She started talking with 
Nicola about the next steps (Observation notes, day sixteen, City 
teams).  
 
 
Reflective commentary 
 
This excerpt has been chosen as typical in two senses. Firstly, it 
captures the demands upon practitioners and managers from referrers, 
resistance from other agencies and the pressures of deadlines. 
Secondly, it illustrates some of the everyday strategies, such as 
humour, that the teams used to cope with these demands. It portrays 
the everyday activities of the teams as predominantly office-based, but 
this was a fair reflection of the whole observational data. The majority of 
the team were in the office at any one point in time, mainly working on 
PC screens and making telephone calls.  
 
Having provided a description of the key features of the service, the key 
themes from the observational and interview data will be examined. The 
key themes of City teams as a 'service under pressure' and 'an 
accountable service' will be examined in detail.  
 
 
 
4.3  Theme one: 'A service under pressure' 
 
In the everyday work of the City teams, a consistent theme was the 
pressure upon social workers and managers related to the national time 
limits on assessments and the level of referrals received by the service. 
There was a particular focus upon the influence of national time scales 
on how social workers worked with families:  
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... trying to keep up the timescales and get the information that they 
want it is a struggle and sometimes to be honest it’s an ethical 
struggle. Where the previous [country of origin] worker just left and 
she wrote a scathing analysis, honest, brutally honest and there was 
one line from there that sticks with me.  She said, “I learned that you 
either learn to cut corners or you sink”.  And I learned to cut corners 
to the point where I don't recognise myself anymore (Jeanette, 
interview eleven, experienced practitioner, City teams).  
 
I always feel that even with like initial assessments, we don’t have 
the time. Because you know you want to balance your organisation’s 
requirements with the needs of the family and sometimes that does 
conflict but you try and balance it as much as possible I think 
(Christina, interview eight, experienced practitioner, City teams). 
 
When you go and dig deeper you find there is more and more going 
on but normally you need time.  With time and then building a 
relationship of trust but because it is such a fast pace job we don’t 
give families time to process, because it must be shocking for a 
social worker to come to your door.  So by that time you are going to 
build your defences straight away, to give that social worker time to 
explain it for you and to gain the trust is beyond 7 days. It is not 
something you can build in 7 days, probably that could explain why 
referrals keep coming back” (Tanya, experienced practitioner, 
interview six, City teams).  
 
Sometimes you can only see a family once, and that’s all you can 
do.  You can see them once, speak for the child alone on one 
occasion and do checks with other agencies and then try and make 
a decision on that, which sometimes I don’t think is enough time 
really (Christina, interview eight, experienced practitioner, City 
teams). 
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I can’t believe the sheer amount of work that social workers are 
allocated. Trying to get it all done in the timescales is a real 
challenge (Comment by overseas trained practitioner, observation 
notes, day six). 
 
These accounts describe how practitioners felt that the timescales 
compromised how they would like to work with families. One of the main 
ways that practitioners responded was through the use of a range of 
‘operational strategies’ that enabled the work to be completed within the 
timescales (Broadhurst et al., 2010; Platt and Turney, 2013). The 
operational strategies observed consisted of two main types, 
organisational defences and speed practices, which occurred at 
different stages in the process. Organisational defences were aimed at 
reducing the demands on the service at the 'front door' by challenging, 
deflecting or delaying the acceptance of referrals. Speed practices refer 
to strategies that enabled practitioners and managers to complete work 
within timescales by creating shortcuts and have been identified in the 
previous ICS study discussed in chapter 2 (Broadhurst et al., 2010). 
 
Managers within the City teams had a key gatekeeping function 
because they decided whether a referral was accepted, rejected or sent 
back to the referrer for further information. Faced with considerable and 
growing demands, front line managers were not only expected to be 
able to make appropriate decisions but also manage increased demand 
within fixed resources.  
 
The first organisational defence that was observed was deflecting 
referrals by disputing responsibility when another local authority was 
involved. For example, one mother who had lived in the City area for 
several years had moved to a different local authority six months 
previously and now presented herself and her child to the new local 
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authority as in need. The new local authority said that she was really a 
resident of the City authority and had given her bus fare in order to 
present at the reception of the City teams. Staff from the City teams 
explained to her that she was now the responsibility of her new 
authority and gave her the bus fare to return to them. This process 
carried on as the mother and child moved back and forth between the 
two authorities and at the point of observation, they had travelled back 
and forth three times over two days before the City legal staff forced the 
new authority to accept responsibility. This issue has been identified by 
Brandon et al. (2008) in a biennial analysis of serious case reviews. 
Another deflection strategy that was observed was signposting as a 
means of redirecting referrals to another service, which was observed in 
the ICS study discussed in chapter 2 (Broadhurst et al., 2010; White, 
2009).  
 
A second organisational defence that was observed during the fieldwork 
period was when two out of the four City teams chose to adopt a 
‘robust’ approach to challenging referrers, which was lead by one 
manager in particular: 
 
The team manager told me that the team used to have about 180 
active cases but they are now down to about 75 because they had 
been applied the thresholds in the London Safeguarding Children 
procedures in a 'robust' way. The team manager said that their 
approach was to finish off every telephone conversation with a 
referrer by asking, “What is it that you want us to do?’ The manager 
said this was good to get the referrer focused on what the local 
authority can realistically do, adding that some referrers may say ‘I 
just wanted you to know about it’ or they may say, ‘I want you to go 
down there and talk to the family’. Sometimes you may find that they 
say, ‘Thinking about it, I don’t think that there is anything that you 
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can do about it?’ The manager added, ‘we get some inappropriate 
referrals, real rubbish’. The practice manager joked, ‘We’ve got a 
referral here for a child who picked his nose and his mother told him 
off!’ Everyone laughed (Observation notes, day fifteen, City teams). 
 
This excerpt captures how managers sought to defend against the 
demands of referrers by challenging them to be clear about what they 
want the local authority to do. The implication was this could be 
effective in challenging inappropriate (‘rubbish’) referrals. One way of 
interpreting this is using Bion's theory of the fight-flight basic 
assumption in groups (Bion, 1962). In the basic assumption of fight-
flight, the group prioritises its own survival by either fighting or taking 
flight from a perceived threat. In this case, taking a more combative role 
with referrers was seen as an effective means of gatekeeping and 
negotiating the demands upon the service.   
 
A part of this organisational defence that was observed was the 
‘normalising’ of referrers’ concerns, in which parental behaviour that 
had caused the referrers to be concerned was reframed as being part of 
a wider continuum of ‘ordinary’ (though imperfect) behaviour. The 
excerpt above ends with a practice manager using humour to ridicule 
what referrers thought was an appropriate referral.  This could be seen 
as an example of using humour to 'normalise' socially unacceptable 
behaviour by parents as a means of dealing with the problem of the 
demands upon the service. Similar strategies were identified in a study 
of local authority services for adolescents, which found that sometimes 
practitioners attempted to manage demand for non-urgent services by 
‘normalising’ the young people’s behaviour as means of justifying non-
intervention by downplaying parental concerns (Biehal, 2005). The 
study also suggested that practitioners may have become so used to 
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working with families with severe problems that they become 
desensitized to the extent of these difficulties.    
 
There was a wider issue of there often being a disparity between the 
City team managers and the referrers’ estimation of how severe the 
difficulties were. This usually took the form of the referrer seeing the 
difficulties as more severe than the City team managers. In some 
senses, this is to be expected because the referrer and City team 
managers usually came from different baselines for comparison. As 
Dingwall et al. (1983) argued, a health visitor who made a referral was 
referring a family whose difficulties were the highest of all of the families 
that she or he worked with. For the team manager who received the 
referral, those difficulties may be the lowest of the families that they are 
working with. Consequently, the potential for different assessments of 
need and risk could be considerable and one way that this was 
managed was that referrers were regarded as 'over anxious'. For 
example, one experienced practitioner stated:  
 
It actually pays to contact the referrer as your first port of call to 
gather further information because the majority of the time, let’s say 
80% of the time, when these concerns have come over, they are 
considered as the referrer’s crisis and not social services’ crisis. So 
it doesn’t meet our critical thresholds but it meets their thresholds 
(Areta, interview two, experienced practitioner, City teams). 
 
One manager gave the example of a health visitor who became 
concerned because a child had not received the controversial MMR 
vaccination and this anxiety was transmitted to the City team 
practitioner:  
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Then that rubs off on the worker because say, as a manager we’ll 
get the referral on paper, we’ll look at it, right, okay, fine this is the 
same, we’ll then give it to our worker, our worker then contacts that 
professional and gets it up there (hand held high above her head] 
where there it’s just there (hand held lower)… I think some workers 
are very good at managing anxieties of other professionals and then 
some are not' (Sadie, interview fourteen, highly experienced 
practitioner and manager, City teams).  
 
A third organisational defence that was observed was ‘strategic 
deferment’ of non-urgent referrals, though this was less prevalent than 
the other defences. Strategic deferment consisted of sending the 
referral back to the referrer to ask for more information, which also 
provided additional time (Broadhurst et al., 2010). For example, it was 
routine practice for managers to request further information from 
referrers:  
 
The information worker showed a referral to the manager. She 
scanned the referral and handed it back to him, saying 'Request 
more information from the referrer, that’ll give us a better picture and 
it'll give us some time' (Observation notes, day 15).  
 
Since the time limits did not start until a referral was accepted, sending 
a request to the referrer for more information meant that demand could 
be managed. This was not to suggest that the information requested 
was unnecessary or irrelevant, merely that it also served as a means of 
managing pressure on the service. An interesting alternative 
interpretation from a naturalistic decision making perspective is that 
practitioners sometimes requested further information to postpone 
having to make a decision, even when the information was unlikely to 
alter the decision:  
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... in an age of information, people are less comfortable making 
decisions under uncertainty. Instead, we delay. We wait for more 
information even when that information will not affect our decisions 
(Klein, 2009, p.146).  
 
Making decisions in child protection can have an enormous impact on 
children but decisions are often made on the basis of evidence that is 
not entirely conclusive. This temptation to defer decisions to collect 
more information even when it was unlikely that the new information 
would make more clear cut was noted in a study of children where care 
proceedings had taken two years or more (Beckett and McKeigue, 
2003).  
 
The second type of operational strategy that was observed were ‘speed 
practices’ (Broadhurst et al., 2010).  The consequences of the 
timescales and the volume of work were that they created a sense of 
urgency that lead to early categorisation. This process of early 
categorisation was highlighted at an early stage of my fieldwork in the 
City teams:  
 
Soon after I arrived, Manager C came over to me and handed me a 
referral relating to a young woman who alleged she was being 
forced into a marriage overseas. She said, 'Have a look at that and 
tell me what you think'. Other managers had simply let me observe 
quietly so I immediately felt anxious that I was 'put on the spot' and 
that I was being set a test, particularly as the manager was aware of 
my background as a former practitioner who had become an 
academic. I engaged with it because I didn’t want to appear 
defensive. The referral involved a complex set of circumstances 
around a family that lived across two continents and were there 
were concerns about religious and cultural practices that had 
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resulted in a s.47 investigation being initiated in her previous local 
authority before she moved into the current area.  
 
Having spent twenty minutes analysing the case, I went over to her 
at her desk and started talking to her about my tentative 
formulations about the relationships within the family and what may 
be going on for the family. I had drawn a detailed genogram and 
started talking that through after a minute or two, she stopped me 
and asked, 'Is it section 17 or a section 47?', i.e., whether it met the 
legal threshold for a child in need (section 17, Children Act 1989) or 
the higher threshold for child protection (section 47, Children Act 
1989). When I started to talk about the case more, she repeated the 
question. I hesitated, feeling that I should understand the case 
properly before making a decision. She explained that she had 
initially thought that it was a section 47 investigation because this is 
what had been initiated by the previous local authority but she had 
realised that the change in circumstances meant that it was now a 
section 17 (Observation notes, day seven, City teams).  
 
Though initially disarmed, I came to realise that she was telling me 
about the framing of the case that she was using to process the volume 
of referrals that the team received. What was clear was that the 
manager’s approach was designed to produce a timely response, but I 
felt confused about how to interpret it. One way to interpret this was a 
clash between my understanding and that of the manager is that I was 
adopting a psychosocial approach, whilst she was adopting a legal 
approach. Indeed, it could be seen as an epistemological clash about 
what types of knowledge should be valued in real-life decision making. 
In this reading, what the manager was communicating to me was that 
my more abstract approach, which valued understanding every aspect 
of the family and their situation, was neither necessary nor helpful in a 
fast moving environment.  
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An alternative but not mutually exclusive interpretation is that the 
manager was using an operational strategy to reduce the complexity of 
the case to a series of choices that could be made through an 
algorithm. This strategy enables the manager to manage the cognitive 
and emotional complexities through a form of algorithmic reductionism. 
On this reading, the manager was reducing a complex case down to an 
algorithm of key decisions within a set procedure. In essence, from her 
perspective I was seeking to address the wrong question for the current 
stage at which the referral was. The decision that had to be taken was 
framed in an either/or choice (s.17 or s.47). Indeed, the manager 
seemed to have presented it as an interesting 'tricky case' because her 
initial impression proved to be challenged (the previous authority had 
opened it as a s.47 but she judged that a s.17 was appropriate 
currently). The use of an algorithmic approach had several benefits for 
practitioners and managers. Firstly, they simplified the complexity of 
each case by reducing the information into a series of choices. 
Secondly, they reduced the anxiety of the practitioner, who could draw 
upon external justification for their choices. Such categorisation work 
has been described as an important and inevitable part of the decision 
making process (Platt and Turney, 2013). The Victoria Climbié inquiry 
(Laming, 2003) recognised this process of categorisation, but criticised 
what was described as the tendency for practitioners to categorise 
cases at too early a stage of the assessment process because 
miscategorisation can be difficult to detect at later stages. 
 
Another operational strategy that was generally employed by local 
authorities before the fieldwork started was the use of standardised 
responses. For example, before the fieldwork started, there was a 
change in police policy whereby all incidents of domestic violence 
where a child was in the house were reported by the police to local 
authority children's social care. Like many other authorities, the City 
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teams were overwhelmed by the levels of referrals that they would 
previously have been unaware of and responded by having what was 
known as the 'three strikes' policy. This meant that the first two 
incidents were responded to by the service sending out a standard 
letter stating that they had received a notification from the police and 
would take action if further notifications were received. A home visit for 
an initial assessment only was triggered only when a third referral was 
received. However, like many local authorities, the City teams realised 
that a standardised response was unworkable because some initial 
referrals were too serious to not trigger an investigation and the letters 
could increase the risk to the victim (Stanley et al., 2011).  
 
 
 
4.4  Theme two: 'An accountable service'  
 
This consisted of two subthemes that related to the impact of high 
profile child deaths and the anxieties around decision making in child 
protection.  
 
4.4.1 Subtheme 1 - 'The shadow of child deaths'  
 
Another consistent theme across the interview data was an emphasis 
on accountability. The period of the fieldwork was shortly after the Peter 
Connelly case, which resulted in the public vilification of individual 
workers and managers in the tabloid press (Jones, 2014).  
Approximately a quarter of participants (4 out of 17) explicitly mentioned 
Baby Peter and other high profile child deaths during their interviews, 
ranging from a recently qualified practitioner to an experienced 
manager. Their responses varied, ranging from identifying with the 
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social worker, Maria Ward, to distancing themselves from the mistakes 
made or seeing the case within the wider context of the child protection 
system in English.  
 
One social worker described a strong sense of identification with the 
social worker, Maria Ward:   
 
The context in which we practice social work in the UK is very 
hostile, particularly to social workers in the event of something going 
wrong. I asked [my team manager] one day for information about 
Baby Peter and Maria Ward, what happened and, while he was on 
annual leave went through all the information, what was happening, 
what was done, the visits that Maria Ward did and things like that.  
At the end I finished and you think, completely different mind-set on 
that story.  When the media reports, it reports as if nothing was 
done.  If it was done, it was not enough.  But when you read the 
actual information from the files, problems were identified, several 
visits were identified dealing with the a very resistant family which is 
very good at covering up. You only go there for a visit for ten 
minutes, you can’t spend all day.  You’ve got a caseload of 20 
cases.  If you give all your time on one child, you are going to kill the 
other 19.  So it’s balance.  Go there, have an hour, as long as we’ve 
done quite reasonable work.  So at the end of the day, if you look at 
it critically, and say, “Oh, it’s sad the child died. It’s sad these things 
that happened.”  But the criticism the social worker got, was it really 
justified? (Emmanuel, interview sixteen, experienced practitioner, 
City teams). 
 
Other practitioners seemed to distance themselves from the practice 
and demonstrate that they would not make the same mistakes:  
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Baby P case, extremely interesting. So that was one issue that they 
tended to believe the mother's account because Baby P himself was 
too young to give a clear account of what was being done to him.  I 
think they made one key error.  And that was ignoring the fact that 
the doctors were saying "We think this is probably NAI", where the 
mum was saying it was just accidental and he's clumsy, and the 
injuries kept happening and yet they put him back into the home and 
left him there.  And that is crackers… the thing that would've saved 
the skins of all those people is all saying "Ah, it's like you go 
through, you walk through the airport and you say 'Ha ha ha I've got 
a bomb in here', and you spend the next two months in prison, 
basically the airport is evacuated dah-de-dah.  A doctor writing on a 
piece of paper 'I think this is probably NAI' should have the same 
impact on you as a social worker as that kind of statement in the 
airport (Andrew, highly experienced practitioner and manager, 
interview ten, City team).  
 
When another practitioner was asked about how parents engage, she 
used the Peter Connelly case as an example of parental deception:  
 
Interviewer: So when a family engage with you more, would you give 
their account more weight? 
Amy: I think that if they are more open then this would give what 
they are saying more weight. But equally, you have to be wary of 
people who are almost too willing to engage with you. This could be 
a smokescreen for something else. It’s ‘playing the game’, like Baby 
P. The mother was incredibly good at fooling people and telling them 
what they want to hear.  Perhaps she needed to in order to get them 
off her back… (Amy, interview one, experienced practitioner, City 
teams).  
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A third response was to view the Baby Peter case within a wider context 
of the child protection system in England:  
 
I think it’s the culture, or maybe because of the Baby P case I found 
that we are more careful about our assessment, making sure that 
when we cover all the areas, we’ve spoken to this and this and this 
person.  Maybe the 'cover our back' culture may give us more of a 
pessimistic view (Josie, interview four, less experienced practitioner, 
City teams).  
 
…other professionals tend to go a long way with protecting 
themselves sometimes if everything goes far, at the expense of the 
families to ensure the children are safe (Emmanuel, interview 
sixteen, experienced practitioner, City teams).   
 
One manager in the local authority children's teams made an 
observation that the dominant perception of paperwork as 
demonstrating accountability promulgated under a Labour government 
was being replaced by a perception of paperwork as bureaucracy under 
the coalition government:  
 
'Bureaucracy is bad', 'accountability is good'.  The actual act you 
carry out - typy typy into computer, put thing in post, send it to family 
- is absolutely identical.  So, get rid of what used to be called 
'accountability', now it's called 'bureaucracy' (Andrew, highly 
experienced practitioner and manager, interview ten, City team) 
 
The fear of negative media coverage was not confined to the national 
tabloid press. A practitioner described how a family who were squatting 
in a garage came to the attention of the local press:  
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Senior management had been made aware that there was some 
press involvement with the case and had gone to look at the file. I 
had literally been with the family all day and left late. When I arrived 
back the next day, I was told ‘why isn't it on the system?’ That put 
the wind up my sails and made me feel very anxious indeed. You do 
feel that you're being watched and your practice is being scrutinised. 
I do keep my notes up to date because it keeps them off my back. 
The fear drives you to that (Amy, interview one, experienced 
practitioner, City teams). 
 
This practitioner described how managers had questioned why she had 
not updated the case files and described feeling anxious that she was 
being ‘watched’ and ‘scrutinised’, leading to her now keeping all of her 
files updated because ‘the fear drives you to it’. This will be discussed 
more in chapter 7, where accountability cultures will be explored.  
 
 
4.4.2 Subtheme 2 - The anxiety of decision making 
 
The second subtheme explores the anxiety that was provoked by 
decision making within the City teams, which is linked with the previous 
subtheme about the impact of high profile child death inquiries on 
everyday practice. There were certain decisions that only a manager or 
service manager could make, such as decisions involving financial 
resources, whether a case was child in need or child protection (section 
17 or 47 of the Children Act 1989), whether a case could be closed or 
not and so on. However, these formed only a small proportion of the 
decisions involved at every stage of working with a family. For the 
majority of the often small decisions, it was problematic as an observer 
to distinguish when a decision genuinely required the involvement of a 
manager. Initially, I had anticipated that this would become clear as the 
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fieldwork progressed. At the end of the fieldwork, I came to the 
conclusion that this uncertainty and confusion was not just within myself 
as an observer, but appeared to be part of the organisational culture.  
 
It was commonplace during the observations to hear practitioners 
talking on the phone to family members or other professionals and to 
state that they would have ‘speak to their manager’ about a decision. 
One of the possible interpretations is that practitioners were responding 
to pressure from referrers and agencies by introducing an additional 
barrier that deflected the pressure. Whilst this may be true at one level, 
there was also evidence that it permeated the relationships between 
practitioners and managers. For example, it could take the form of 
practitioners subtly withholding their own view, as demonstrated in the 
following observation:  
 
The team manager asked a social worker “What is happening with 
the [X] case?” The social worker said that she had spoken to the 
school and the teacher had been concerned about the child. The 
team manager asked “So what do you think we should be doing?” 
The social worker responded by describing the information received 
in more detail. After several minutes, the team manager said, “So 
what do you think we should be doing?” The social worker appeared 
tense but went back to describing the information received. After a 
few minutes, the team manager stated what the social worker 
should do and whom she should contact. The social worker 
appeared relieved and strode off to start the tasks (Fieldwork notes, 
day 7).  
 
This subtle act of withholding a view created a vacuum that was filled by 
the manager in the decision-making process. One way of interpreting 
this is through psychoanalytic concepts used to understand 
organisations, as it can be seen as an example of what Menzies Lyth 
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described as the social defence of upward delegation, where staff 
reduced the anxiety of decision making by forcing decisions up the 
hierarchy in order to disclaim responsibility (Menzies, 1960).  
 
Like many inner city local authorities, a high proportion of the 
practitioners within the overall service had been trained overseas, 
mainly in the USA, southern Africa, Australia or New Zealand. This 
provides an interesting comparative perspective and practitioners were 
able to offer their impressions of working within British local authority 
settings:  
 
When I first arrived, everyone said, ‘I need to see my manager’.  I 
need to discuss this with my manager, and social workers were not 
making recommendations, not saying ‘this is what I think, this is my 
recommendation’.  I was told, “It’s the culture”… (Areta, experienced 
practitioner, interview two, City teams). 
 
I’ve not practised in the UK before so I’ve never seen workers spend 
so much energy trying to cover themselves. One of the ways that 
they do it is by not taking responsibility and making the managers 
take responsibility for decisions. It doesn’t work, because every 
inquiry that I have read has blamed the worker (Jeanette, 
experienced practitioner, interview eleven, City teams)  
 
In the City teams, the majority of the observed use of upward delegation 
was undertaken by less experienced practitioners. This appeared to be 
linked to a lack of confidence in their judgment so upward delegation 
was more likely to reduce anxiety. There were no examples of this 
social defence being used by highly experienced practitioners. Indeed, 
it is following their own judgment that serves to reduce their anxiety. For 
example, three highly experienced practitioners (interviews 2, 8 and 12) 
described how they had learnt to trust their own judgment, so they felt 
  
132 
safer when they contributed to decision making. One expressed it in the 
following way: 
 
Ultimately it’s my responsibility to convey to my manager in the most 
clear way and effective way possible, you know, what my views are 
on it.  Ultimately at the end of the day yes, your manager does have 
the last say in regards to whether or not you know it should close or 
continue.  But I think it’s up to you as a worker if you feel strongly 
about something, you need to also push for it and make clear that 
you’ve given your reasons for why you wanted to close or not to 
close…   
   And if after all of that they still decide to not go forth and back, at 
least I know and allow me to…okay not always sleep at night, but at 
least I know I’ve done everything within my power to ensure that you 
know that child is safeguarded…     
    You know as a social worker you don’t really have like unlimited 
powers and whatever.  So I mean you just need to do what you can 
and if that’s not good enough, that sucks.  But it’s not really that 
much that you can do to change it (Christina, interview eight, 
experienced practitioner, City teams). 
 
Another experienced practitioner described how she took a range of 
approaches depending upon how certain she felt that a particular 
course of action was necessary;  
 
I know in my supervision, most of the time I tell the cases, I say 
what’s happened, what needs to happen, this is what I think, this is 
where I think it should go. I will ask for the supervisor’s feedback. 
Other times, where I want a certain decision, I would discuss the 
case and influence my manager to see it from my perspective 
(Areta, experienced practitioner, interview two, City teams). 
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This is different to Menzies Lyth’s original study, where upward 
delegation was used as a social defence generally by staff across the 
same grade who may have different levels of experience. In the City 
teams, there was some evidence that this approach was matched by 
managers who were less likely to be tolerant towards highly 
experienced practitioners who attempted to use upward delegation:   
 
More experienced workers will be able to give you a better picture 
on average and will come into supervision already with a view, they 
will come to supervision already with a plan. They've already got a 
plan, right, so it's not "Oh no, oh what do you think we should do?"  
Some experienced workers do that and I just want to whack them 
with something.  "You've been in this job 10 years, you've met the 
family.  This is one of 10 cases that you've got.  I've never met the 
family.  This is one of 150 cases that I supervise so you tell me the 
plan.  And I'll tell you if I think it's a good plan" (Andrew, highly 
experienced practitioner and manager, interview ten, City team) 
 
A common feature of everyday practice in the City teams was checking 
decisions with others. This usually took the form of informal 
consultations by practitioners with their managers, who appeared to 
welcome practitioners consulting them about a wide range of issues, 
including relatively minor ones. Some participants had worked within 
other settings and were able to share their initial impressions of working 
within statutory settings.  For example, a student social worker with 
previous experience of working in the voluntary sector described 
checking with her practice educator about whether she could ring a 
health visitor that she had met the previous day at a core group:  
 
…in this sector it’s like - even sometimes making a phone call is a 
decision you can’t really make by yourself. You have to check and 
then that has to be checked. It makes you do feel in some ways as a 
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student quite protected because you’re not really responsible for 
making those decisions.  But in another way it’s like, surely I’m able 
to make a decision having met the people first hand and having 
done all that work… one thing that I really have noticed working in 
the statutory sector is how difficult it is to make even quite minor 
decisions and then it leads on to feeling panicky when you do.  It’s 
like, oh, you know, should I make this phone call?  Do I need to 
check on this?  Do I need to check about ringing this person or, you 
know, whereas previously in other positions it would have just been 
an automatic thing that you would have taken on, without question… 
But it feels like everything has to be accounted for.  Every kind of 
decision has to be a right one and, you know, I can’t - I mean I don’t 
actually know what could be the comeback from phoning a health 
visitor but I think it’s just part of the culture that people have got 
used to (Nicola, less experienced practitioner, interview thirteen, City 
teams). 
 
This captures a culture of pervasive accountability that will be explored 
in chapter 7. It also highlights how the process of checking reduces 
anxiety but also reduces the sense of responsibility and limits 
knowledge and skills development. Although the example involved a 
student social worker, similar examples involved qualified workers. 
Indeed, one team manager stated:  
 
Social workers, one thing they do definitely do is have consultations 
continually because it is a job that you need continual reassurance.  
No matter how experienced you are you still ... I think you could be a 
service manager and you still need to be reassured by someone if 
there’s a case that’s particularly difficult” (Sadie, highly experienced 
practitioner and manager, interview fourteen, City teams). 
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This is reminiscent of Menzies Lyth's social defence of reducing the 
impact of decision-making on any one person by the use of checks and 
counterchecks. This was true not only for high-risk decisions, such as 
the administration of medicine, but for '…all kinds of decisions, including 
many that are neither important nor dangerous' (Menzies, 1960, p.104). 
 
At the time of the fieldwork, the Social Work Task Force recommended 
the introduction of ‘consultant social workers’ through Advanced Social 
Work Professional status in order to recognise high levels of expertise 
and to retain highly experienced social workers in practice (Social Force 
Work Task, 2009). During the individual interviews, practitioners and 
managers are asked about their views on this recommendation and 
there was surprisingly little support for the concept, mainly centred on 
concerns about how this role would fit into traditional management 
structures. One of the issues raised was that people in the consultant 
social work roles would have greater discretion, but this would leave 
them more vulnerable. One practitioner described it in the following 
terms:  
 
There is some security in the sense that decisions are not made 
solely by individuals and that’s somehow the processes are there 
clearly within the structures that we have now for somebody to 
scrutinise these guys and apparently say ‘look actually you’ve done 
this but you may have missed this,’ and I think once you remove 
that, one, a lot of people feel a lot more exposed… As it stands, I 
make the suggestion and somebody ratifies it’s, so it’s not just me. 
And if you become an independent consultant it’s you, so you’re 
more exposed and you make a mistake it’s down to you, and I think 
people will be a lot more vulnerable there…well at least the feeling 
will be you’ll be a lot more vulnerable (Richard, highly experienced 
practitioner, interview twelve, City team). 
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The practitioner described how they made a suggestion for a particular 
course of action and this was ratified by others. This reduced anxiety 
because it shared the responsibility for the decision and therefore the 
potential blame if the outcome was negative.   
 
In her original study, Menzies Lyth focused upon the way that ritual 
behaviour serves as a defence against anxiety. If it has been agreed 
within the organisation that a particular way of undertaking a task is the 
‘correct’ way, then no choice is required and workers can feel that they 
are safe from blame and criticism if they follow it irrespective of the 
consequences of those choices. Just as one way of making hospital 
beds is chosen and regarded as the only ‘correct’ way in the original 
study, there were similar examples in child protection social work.  
 
In the City teams, one of the clearest areas for ritual task performance 
was the use of child protection procedures and the psychological 
functions that they perform. This was best described by a practitioner 
who trained in a South African country and had worked in the City 
teams for two years:  
 
There is one thing that I have been learning and seeing in my 
development as a social worker, apparently because of the criticism 
that professionals get when something goes wrong with the child.  
Professionals have tended to develop this back covering attitude, 
where to them it’s not about the child being safe, it’s about me being 
safe, when something wrong happens to this child.  So the approach 
is now to make myself the good guy and this one the bad guy. “If 
something happens to this child, where I did one, two, three, I have 
sent a referral, I have done one, two three.  This is all I’m supposed 
to do.”  So it’s about their own concern about his or her own 
professional life and public scrutiny… to cover themselves and 
ensure they remain safe should something go wrong. I don’t think 
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that needs to take precedence over doing the actual work that is 
supposed to have been done. Because sending a referral and 
notifying social services alone will not make a child safe. There is 
more that needs to be done, there is more work that needs to be 
implemented.  But apparently that doesn’t seem to stick quite well in 
people’s minds.  So in the process of covering themselves… the 
child becomes the victim of the whole scenario (Emmanuel, 
experienced practitioner, interview sixteen, City teams). 
 
During the fieldwork observations, the guidance and policy formed an 
implicit backdrop to everyday practice that had become embedded in a 
shared language within the teams rather than being explicitly cited. 
There were few examples of practitioners or managers consulting the 
child protection procedures and these usually took the form of drawing 
upon the threshold guidance in the procedures to justify a potentially 
unpopular decision, such as not accepting a referral or providing a 
service that the referrer was expecting. The following extract from 
fieldwork notes outlines an example of using policy to justify allocating a 
'low priority' to a referral: 
 
The team manager showed me a self-referral from a 13-year-girl 
who contacted the local authority and alleged that she has been hit 
by her mother. When the girl was asked, she stated that she did not 
have any physical marks or bruises. The team manager showed me 
an excerpt from the local child protection procedures she kept on 
her desk, which was a rubric used to standardise thresholds and 
responses. She showed me the procedures and states, "Look there, 
according to the rubric, it was an allegation of physical abuse 
without physical injuries to a mobile child, therefore it was low 
priority. Of course, a pre-mobile child would receive a high priority 
response because they are so vulnerable" (Fieldwork notes, day 1, 
City teams).  
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My initial view was that the manager offered this account because she 
wanted to demonstrate that all her decisions were justified using the 
child protection procedures. However, in subsequent observations, she 
did not refer to policy or procedures when discussing referrals that had 
been accepted and there were several other examples where I 
overhead conversations with referrers that had very similar content, i.e., 
where the referral had been rejected or allocated as low priority. Where 
the referral was accepted, no reference to the procedures was 
observed. This would suggest that an important purpose of invoking the 
child protection procedures was to defend against possible criticism or 
challenge for unpopular decisions. 
 
It was interesting to note the social defences that were not present. 
There was little or no evidence of the social defences related to 
responsibility and accountability, such as the splitting up of the 
practitioner-client relationship and the purposeful obscurity in the formal 
distribution of responsibility. It would appear that these were not present 
because the current organisational systems ensured that they were not 
available to practitioners and managers. This is because these 
defences were used in previous child death inquiries, most clearly in the 
Victoria Climbié Inquiry, where local authorities were criticised for 
having insufficiently clear lines of accountability (Laming, 2003). This 
has been addressed to some extent in subsequent legislation, policy 
and guidance, which has reduced the potential for these social 
defences to be employed because they are felt to have a significant 
impact on the task of safeguarding children.  
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4.5  Summary  
 
In this chapter, the aim has been to provide an account of the City 
teams that provides an organisational context for the sense-making 
processes that will be explored in later chapters. The City teams were a 
service characterised by high workloads, tight and inflexible timescales 
and a strong accountability culture. The pressures came from the time 
pressures related to national time limits, the level of referrals that the 
service received and the pervasive nature of the accountability culture.  
 
This left social workers and managers with the twin challenges of 
managing the workload and managing their anxieties. In order to 
manage the workload, City practitioners and managers used a range of 
operational strategies that aimed to either reduce demand upon the 
service (operational defences) or to complete work within timescales by 
creating shortcuts (speed practices). Operational defences included 
disputing responsibility if other local authorities were involved, a 'robust' 
approach to challenging referrers, the ‘normalising’ of referrers’ 
concerns (parental behaviour was reframed as being part of a wider 
continuum of ‘ordinary’ though imperfect behaviour) and strategic 
deferment (sending the referral back to the referrer to ask for more 
information). Speed practices included early categorisation and 
algorithmic reductionism (reducing the complexities of a case to a 
series of either/or decisions) and standardised responses. These were 
very similar to the speed practices identified by Broadhurst et al., (2010) 
in their study of the ICS system in five local authorities.  
 
In order to manage their own emotions, practitioners at times engaged 
in a range of social defences that reduced anxiety and helped maintain 
psychic equilibrium but at the cost of practitioners disowning their own 
authority and distorting relationships between workers and managers. 
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The defences that emerged most strongly were the constellation related 
to decision-making; upward delegation, ritual task performance and 
reducing the weight of responsibility by checks and counterchecks. The 
defences that were not observed were also discussed and the reasons 
for this were explored. The role of procedures within the service was 
examined and it was argued that they functioned primarily to help staff 
manage anxiety rather than to inform practitioner thinking.    
 
The next chapter will focus upon the Sycamore service, an NHS court 
assessment service that undertook a similar task but in a contrasting 
organisational setting. This will be followed by chapter six, which 
examines commonalities in the psychological processes that individual 
practitioners engaged in across both sites, and chapter seven, which 
examines the differences and how they affected practitioner sense-
making.   
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Chapter 5 - the Sycamore service 
 
 
This chapter is the second of four findings chapters. This chapter will 
examine the work of the second research site, the Sycamore court 
assessment service. As with the previous chapter, the aim of this 
chapter is to enable the reader to gain a sense of how the organisation 
operated through 'thick description' of everyday life, in which behaviour 
is described within its wider context to enable it to become meaningful 
to an outsider. It will focus upon social and emotional aspects that are 
relevant to the research question in order to provide a deeper 
understanding of the setting within which sense-making took place. 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section will provide 
a description of the Sycamore service and will examine everyday 
activities and processes. The second section will explore the shared 
nature of sense-making, which will be developed through examining an 
extended excerpt from observation notes. This will be followed by a 
third section that will explore how expertise was used as a basis for 
authority within the Sycamore service and how this authority was 
understood within the triangular relationship between the family, the 
local authority and the court.   
 
 
5.1 The Sycamore service  
 
The Sycamore service was an NHS court assessment service that 
received referrals from local authorities or directly from courts to provide 
expert assessments of families to inform court proceedings. The 
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referrals usually involved children who were subject to family court 
proceedings and where the court was making long-term decisions about 
whether children should return home, be placed with other family 
members or for adoption/long term fostering. The assessments 
requested commonly included psychiatric, psychological or 
psychotherapeutic assessments of parents, children or other caregivers 
as well as more general assessments of parenting. 
 
The Sycamore service was part of a range of services offered by the 
NHS mental health trust. The other services included mental health 
services for children, adolescents and adults as well as professional 
education in the mental health field. The service had a suite of offices 
within the main NHS mental health trust building, comprising of clinical 
rooms to see family members and offices for staff members.  
 
Each referral was normally accompanied by a Letter of Instruction from 
the court that identified specific questions that the court wanted the 
team to answer. This was accompanied by a court bundle that could 
frequently be several hundred pages long detailing the history of the 
case. Once the referral was accepted, there would be a series of 
meetings with the family that could also involve the local authority. The 
team would meet frequently to discuss family sessions and plan future 
sessions. At the end of the assessment process, the team would have a 
formulation meeting where the team met to finalise an overall account 
of the family that would be written as a detailed report for the court.  
 
The Sycamore service had a multi-disciplinary team with clinicians from 
social work, child and adolescent psychiatry, clinical psychology, 
psychoanalytical psychotherapy and systemic psychotherapy. There 
were seven senior clinicians, two administrative staff and approximately 
ten clinical associates. I have used the term 'clinical associate' as an 
umbrella term to denote a range of student or assistant roles including 
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assistant or trainee psychologists, student social workers, practitioners 
qualified overseas who were on placements to gain experience and 
students on professional doctorates that incorporated clinical 
placements. All of the clinical associates had an academic or 
professional qualification in their profession either from the UK or their 
home country and the majority had experience within mental health and 
social care. Whilst the senior clinicians were permanent members of 
staff, clinical associates usually joined the team on a time-limited basis.  
 
Clinical associates occupied roles with titles such as assistant 
psychologist, trainee clinical psychologist or family support workers. 
The most common qualification that clinical associates had was a 
degree in psychology and many were gaining experience to apply for 
further training in clinical psychology, psychotherapy and social work. 
All of the practitioners in the service were called ‘clinicians’ and the 
leadership function was shared within the senior management team, 
which consisted of seven senior clinicians who were responsible for 
leading their own clinical team and holding their own cases. The senior 
clinicians had similar roles as generic case holders with particular 
specialisms dependent upon their clinical background. For example, 
some Letters of Instruction from the court requested a formal psychiatric 
diagnosis, which was the domain of the psychiatrist or a formal 
assessment of a family member's attachment style, which was usually 
the domain of the clinical psychologist with support from clinical 
associates. There was a single staff member who had overall 
management responsibility for accepting referrals, managing finance 
and liaising with external agencies. This was a dual role, as the 
postholder was also a senior clinician who held a leadership role in a 
clinical team. This role appeared to be primus inter pares, a central 
coordinating role within a peer group of senior clinicians.  
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During the fieldwork period, I observed team discussions of seven 
families who were being assessed as well as general team meetings 
and observing everyday life in the staff room. This involved observing 
almost all of the senior clinicians (six out of seven) and a majority of 
clinical associates (seven out of ten). This was followed by seven 
interviews (four senior clinicians, three clinical associates). Having 
provided a description of the key features of the service, the key themes 
from the observational and interview data will be examined. The three 
key themes of 'space for thinking', 'overwhelming families' and 
'expertise as authority' will be examined in detail.  
 
 
5.2 Theme one - Space for thinking 
 
A prominent theme was 'space for thinking', which refers to 
opportunities that practitioners had to discuss cases and share sense-
making in their work with families. In the Sycamore service, there 
appeared to be a strong emphasis upon shared sense-making which 
was expressed in the working practices of team meetings to discuss 
ongoing assessments. For example, a typical assessment day would 
consist of morning and afternoon sessions with the family interspersed 
with team discussions at the beginning, middle and end of the day. This 
emphasis on shared sense-making was captured by one clinical 
associate:  
 
 
It is quite helpful to know that you can bring problems that you’re 
experiencing to that sort of space.. I think with this work, group 
supervision is often more helpful for me anyway because it there are 
just so many minds reflecting on what’s going on that it’s quite useful 
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in that way (Tina, clinical associate and less experienced 
practitioner, interview eighteen, Sycamore service). 
 
In order to gain a sense of these everyday sense-making activities 
within the team, it would be helpful to examine an extended excerpt 
from my observation notes: 
 
Main meeting room, day nine, 9.30am. It was the third family 
assessment day for the Y family. The day began with a pre-session 
team discussion meeting before the family session. This was held in 
the large meeting room, which served as the main room for seeing 
families and team discussions. At the centre of the room was a circle 
of padded chairs, bordered by a large play area with soft mats, a 
brightly-coloured rocking horse and boxes of children's toys. Along 
one wall was a long, one-way mirror that connected to an 
observation room next door where practitioners could observe 
sessions.  
 
The assessment of the Y family was in the mid stages and the family 
had attended two previous assessment days. The family were a 
White British family with two girls aged 4 years and 18 months. The 
18-month-old girl had sustained injuries that were thought to be non-
accidental and a fact finding hearing to establish whether there was 
culpability for either parent was to be held in several weeks’ time. 
The local authority social worker allocated to the case had known 
the family for a while and had informally indicated that she thought 
that the mother was the most likely suspect on the evidence so far.  
 
The senior clinicians leading the team were Sarah, a clinical 
psychologist, and Louise, a senior social worker. They were 
supported by four clinical associates, which consisted of Rebecca, a 
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trainee clinical psychologist, Olivia, a family support worker and two 
assistant psychologists, Luisa and Tina.  
 
Sarah (clinical psychologist) said, ‘Today, we’ve got the whole 
family! Contrary to mum’s predictions, Dad has come in today and 
he has also brought his parents’.  
 
Louise (senior social worker): ‘That’s interesting. Mum said that he 
wouldn’t be able to get the time off work. We must clarify about her 
name again. When I rang her, she said, ‘Hello, Mrs Y here’. I was a 
bit confused because this is her maiden name, not her married 
name. I clarified this and she said that she was going back to her 
maiden name. When I asked why, she said, ‘Oh, it was the social’. I 
was rather confused. It is interesting that she has changed her name 
back but is still using Mrs. I don’t know whether she knows how to 
play it and she’s positioning herself as, ‘Well, if you want me to get 
rid of him, then I will and I’ll do it alone’. So she’s positioning herself 
as being independent. But she’s done a half-way house and taken 
back her own name but kept the ‘Mrs’. I don’t know whether she’s 
being compliant with the local authority to get them off her back’. 
 
Sarah (clinical psychologist) said, ‘Yes, it does seem strange. We’re 
going to be seeing Dad's parents today, which is helpful. His father 
is apparently called Oscar, which suggests that he comes from a 
‘good’ family, in the sense that you don’t get many Oscars on the 
estate’ (general laughter). 
 
Luisa (assistant psychologist) said, ‘I’ve not seen dad before. I’ve 
just seen him and I got the feeling that he is gay, I don’t know why’. 
 
Rebecca (trainee clinical psychologist) said, 'We did the adult 
attachment interview [a structured interview that assesses 
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relationship styles] with mum last week and it was hard work. She 
found it difficult to retrieve memories when we asked her for 
examples that showed the qualities she'd given for her parents’.   
 
Sarah (clinical psychologist) said, ‘X [Well known attachment 
theorist] would say that at the beginning, an A type would say that 
they can’t remember anything about their childhood and can have 
difficulty retrieving memories but you’d warm to them as the 
interview develops’.  
 
Rebecca (trainee clinical psychologist) responded, 'I didn’t find that I 
warmed to her'.  
 
Sarah (clinical psychologist): ‘Me neither. Later on, I wondered 
whether she was a C. Type Cs make a call for you to become 
involved, to elicit help. She did a bit of that, but not in a way that I felt 
I could respond to. I just felt annoyed. But that might just be my own 
compulsive self-reliance! (Laughter). (To Rebecca) We need to book 
a time to code the interview. When she was asked her to describe 
her relationship with her father, she said ‘abusive’. That was the one 
word that she could think of. But when she was older, she went to 
go and live with her father. She already told me about an aunt who 
was lovely and ‘she could always go there’. But she lived with her 
father instead. So something doesn’t make sense. She described 
him as being violent, but it doesn’t fit with her choosing to go to live 
with him when she was older when she had a nice aunt she could 
have gone too’. 
 
Louise (senior social worker): 'Yes, it doesn't fit together. There’s 
also something quite provocative about her. Last week, she said that 
she was relaxed with her husband, she could "burp and fart" in front 
of him. Perhaps that’s a bit too much information!’ (laughter). She 
  
148 
may be testing dad by burping and farting in front of him, but then 
she is also doing it to us by telling us about it’.   
 
Chris (Assistant psychologist) added, ‘Yes, and when she talked 
about having affairs with other men, she didn’t seem that interested 
in them and made sure that her husband found out’.    
 
Sarah (clinical psychologist) said, ‘So that would fit with the idea of 
provoking him and trying to get his attention. Maybe she wants him 
after all, but it is him who’s not interested. (To Luisa) Perhaps your 
comment about thinking that dad was gay may suggest a reason, 
though I didn’t get that impression myself. I find my thinking 
changing as things develop. Each assessment is unique to each 
family, but it also needs to fit into the spectrum of the families that 
we see here. There are several things that need to be considered 
together. Mother says that she wants to change, though it's unclear 
whether she can do this in the children's timescales. Then there is 
the nature and severity of the injuries. And the presentation of the 
children. This is not a family where they’re hiding things and trying to 
pull the wool over our eyes in a straightforward way. We heard last 
week about mother's affairs with other men and the burping and 
farting. The family has been open about everything apart from the 
injuries. So we're interested in how they present with each other and 
what it tells us about their relationships’. 
 
This was followed by a discussion about the practicalities of the 
different sessions today. It was agreed that Sarah would meet with 
the mother and maternal grandmother, Louise would meet with the 
father and his parents whilst the two children would have a session 
with Rebecca and Tina. 
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Reflective commentary 
 
This extract has been chosen because it is reasonably typical of the 
group discussions over the twenty-two days of observation and 
highlights many features of ‘case talk’ within the Sycamore service. 
During the discussion, reference was made to theory through the 
explicit use of concepts drawn from attachment theory, which was the 
most frequently used theory observed across the observations. This is 
consistent with other ethnographic studies of the assessment of families 
in child protection settings (White, 1997; Holland, 1999). Other 
theoretical concepts observed across the case discussions were drawn 
from family therapy and psychiatry, e.g., depression, personality 
disorder, ADHD. In this discussion, attachment theory was used to 
locate the mother's relationship style within a typology, which included 
how the assessor emotionally responded to her, i.e., her  
countertransference. The concept of countertransference refers to the 
emotional response of the practitioner to the client and has been the 
subject of debate within psychoanalysis. Heimann (1950) argued that 
the practitioner’s emotional response provided valuable clinical 
evidence that could inform the work, whilst Melanie Klein was 
concerned that this approach could give too much weight to the 
subjective feelings of the practitioner (Rycroft, 1995). The senior 
clinician supported such use of the countertransference by reference to 
a well-known authority in the field, who had indicated 'rule of thumb' 
patterns that help practitioners identify particular attachment styles in 
practice (‘an A type would say that they can’t remember anything about 
their childhood and can have difficulty retrieving memories but you’d 
warm to them’). This identification of a pattern in the parent’s behaviour 
combined with the emotional responses evoked in the practitioner could 
be seen as compatible with the ‘pattern spotting’ undertaken by 
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experienced practitioners described in naturalistic decision making 
(NDM) (Klein, 1999, 2009). The same practitioner later demonstrated 
caution in her use of the countertransference (‘Type Cs make a call for 
you to become involved, to elicit help. She did a bit of that, but not in a 
way that I felt I could respond to. I just felt annoyed. But that might just 
be my own compulsive self-reliance!) This shows an awareness that 
some ‘data’ (the emotional response of the practitioner) has alternative 
explanations (her own personal values and experiences) and should be 
treated with caution. This use of the countertransference was used in 
parallel with the formal assessment of attachment through the use of a 
structured instrument.  
 
Viewed from a dual process model perspective, such formulations drew 
upon intuitive judgments (System 1) and formal theory combined with 
critical self-awareness (System 2), which formed an important feature of 
case talk across the observational data. During the ongoing 
assessment sessions, these processes appeared to happen 
spontaneously and dynamically, providing a dynamic flux of 
suggestions and intuitive judgments that were generated and evaluated. 
The group process focused upon generating intuitive judgments 
(System 1) that were then subjected to analytic evaluation (System 2). 
Practitioners appeared to share their intuitive judgments without 
censure at the early stages and there was a process of the ‘survival of 
the fittest’, in which some intuitive judgments were taken up and 
developed because other team members felt that there was some value 
in them whilst others were ignored. For example, one of the clinical 
associates shared her impression that the father was gay and was 
honest that she was not sure where this impression had come from. 
Others did not take up and develop the observation initially so it could 
be inferred that they did not share this impression, but I did not detect 
any sense of censure for having suggested it without a clear evidential 
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basis. This was later revived as a potential explanation in the story 
building process because it has some potential explanatory power, i.e., 
it would offer a potential explanation to the perception that he showed 
little interest in his wife. So, although Sarah’s System 1 intuition 
contradicted that of Luisa (‘I didn’t get that impression’), it was reviewed 
when it offered a contribution towards the story that was under 
construction (‘mum’s trying to get dad’s attention but he’s not 
interested’). This flux was commonplace as practitioners moved 
between intuitive (System 1) and analytic (System 2) thinking.  
 
Whilst this process of testing hypotheses was occasionally an explicit 
and directly challenging process, this was the exception. What was 
more common was an implicit and non-confrontational process, which 
appeared to encourage practitioners to share their intuitions freely. At 
the early stages, the priority appeared to be generating intuitive 
(System 1) hypotheses to explore and the final stages were 
characterised by analytic (System 2) evaluation. The tendency that was 
most reliably observable was that the team discussions featured 
predominantly System 1 thinking at the beginning of the assessment 
when the team were generating possible hypotheses that could lead to 
an overall story, whilst System 2 thinking was most dominant towards 
the end of the assessment, where the strongest hypotheses were 
examined from an evidential perspective according to the extent that 
they offer a cogent explanation of the information available.  
 
In the final stages, a formulation meeting was held in which there was a 
more focused discussion that concentrated upon developing and 
agreeing a final account and recommendation that would be written as 
the assessment report. At this stage, the discussion tended to feature 
more analytic (System 2) features because formulating the final story 
about the family required the team to develop an overall account that 
explained the key features in a way that would be defendable in a court 
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arena. These processes could be seen as consistent with models of 
theory building and testing within the social sciences, which suggest 
that we move from an initial stage of examining data towards a second 
stage of theory testing as a means of establishing a robust model that 
best explains the available data. More specifically, it appeared to be 
consistent with the story model of jury decision making described in 
chapter two, which found that jurors constructed a plausible storyline 
from the evidence that they had heard and then decided which party’s 
account is closer to their storyline (Pennington and Hastie, 1993; 
Hastie, 2008).  
 
As well as this explicit use of the countertransference, practitioners also 
discussed their emotional responses more widely, particularly when 
these were uncomfortable. For example, when the clinical associate 
stated that the mother's discussion of 'burping and farting' was 'too 
much information', she was greeted with general laughter within the 
team. One potential interpretation was that the practitioner was 
disclosing a mild sense of disgust, an emotion that can be common in 
child protection but practitioners can feel uncomfortable to admit to 
(Ferguson, 2011). The shared laughter in response may be other team 
members giving her social permission to admit a forbidden emotional 
response or even admitting that they had a similar response. 
 
Overall, the team appeared to be struggling to make sense of complex 
and conflicting information in order to piece together an overall account 
of the family. There were important pieces of information that were 
missing, such as whether the child's injuries were definitely non-
accidental and, if so, who was responsible. Other pieces of information, 
such as the nature of the mother's relationships with her husband and 
her father, were conflicting and confusing. The comment by the senior 
clinician that her thinking was changing as things developed is 
interesting given that one of the identified weaknesses of practitioner 
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thinking in child protection is for practitioners to be unwilling to change 
their mind despite growing evidence that their original assessment is no 
longer accurate (Munro, 1999).  She goes on to comment that each 
family was unique but also fitted within the spectrum of families, which 
appears to be compatible with the naturalistic decision making (NDM) 
model of practitioners drawing upon their repertoire of experiences 
(Klein, 1999). Indeed, it was commonplace during team discussions for 
practitioners to explicitly draw comparisons with previous families that 
they had worked with inside and outside of the Sycamore service. This 
will be explored in more depth in the next chapter, where this will be 
examined as pattern recognition and story building.  
 
In the excerpt, there was a lively discussion with most team members 
contributing, though to varying levels. There was some degree of 
hierarchy related to role, in the sense that the senior clinicians did the 
majority of the talking and formed the axis around which the 
conversation was shaped, but there appeared to be space for the 
clinical associates to share their thoughts and impressions.  The 
approach of inviting and valuing clinical associates' input in discussions 
about families was seen consistently across several different teams, 
which suggests that it is an embedded aspect of the organisational 
culture. 
 
Most senior clinicians appeared to be aware of how these power 
differentials could distort team discussions and made some effort to 
reduce their effects. For example, Peter’s meetings involved him asking 
the least powerful members of the team first and this was mirrored in 
other teams in a more deliberate way. It could be inferred that the 
intention was to ensure that less powerful members had a say and 
received the message that their contribution was valued.  
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It was difficult to separate the influence of how experienced a 
practitioner was from their hierarchical position since there was a 
considerable overlap, i.e., in a group discussion, it is likely that the most 
experienced practitioners would contribute more and be more likely to 
lead discussions. Therefore, it was problematic to disengage the 
influence of experience and position. 
 
The teams were multi-disciplinary and another potentially important 
factor is that practitioners had different professional trainings. When I 
presented some early findings at a conference, a key question was 
whether practitioners who had professional trainings that placed greater 
emphasis on evidence-based practice, e.g., medicine and psychology, 
engaged in group discussions in a different way. Such questions are 
difficult to answer in a small-scale ethnographic study because it is 
difficult to ascertain whether individual differences between practitioners 
related to their professional training or other factors, such as personality 
and personal interests. However, I subsequently reviewed the 
observational data and there were no observable patterned differences 
in the ways that practitioners from different discipline engaged in the 
group discussion process. Whilst specific domains such as psychiatric 
diagnosis or the use of structured instruments were the legitimate 
expertise of specific disciplines, the same process of engaging in 
intuitive judgments (System 1) followed by analytic evaluation (System 
2) was consistent across participants. 
 
 
5.3  Theme two - Overwhelming families 
 
The work with families was often emotionally demanding, particularly as 
the final assessment report could play an important role in the decisions 
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made by the court. At times, the work could become overwhelming and 
it is important to consider how practitioners managed the emotional 
demands involved. In order to understand this within the context of the 
organisational setting, it may be helpful to examine an extended excerpt 
from a family assessment that was the most emotionally challenging of 
those observed during the fieldwork. Whilst it can be argued this is 
therefore not typical of the families seen within the service, examining 
an extreme case could be helpful in identifying the underlying 
processes to be explored more clearly (Yin, 2009). The issue of 
whether such processes also operate in mid-range cases will be 
examined.  
 
Example: The eloquent mother  
 
When I arrived, the team were in the clinical office. As I walked into 
the office, Sarah (senior clinician) said, ‘Gosh, you should have 
been in the meeting that we have just had!’ She explained that they 
had just had a partnership meeting with a parent and the local 
authority. She said, ‘It was a really difficult meeting and several of us 
wanted to cry’, she said. The clinical associate sitting next to her had 
tears in her eyes and she said, ‘I did cry’. Louise (clinician) also was 
tearful and said, ‘I cried too’. 
 
Sarah said, 'The mother was very eloquent. Louise and I both have 
young children so when she said that she wasn’t sure whether she 
would ever bath her children again, it was so poignant'. Louise 
added, 'We are human, we have feelings. I’m not just a clinician'. 
Sarah said that the local authority social worker had 'just sat there 
slumped and looking like she was not listening' (She mimics 
slumped body language) (laughter). 
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We moved into the main meeting room and Louise sat down with 
tears in her eyes. She took a deep breath and appeared to be trying 
to stop herself crying. Then she said in a defiant voice, ‘No, I AM 
going to cry. I think that I’m only expressing what others are feeling’. 
Colleagues made supportive noises, which appeared to indicate 
agreement. Sarah said, ‘The mother wasn’t angry. She talked about 
her sense of having done everything that the local authority had 
asked of her but that it wasn't going to make any difference'. Louise 
added, 'It brings home to you how the child protection system is not 
always helpful. It can be damaging and cause problems. The mother 
has changed so much and has done everything that the local 
authority has asked of her’. This was met with murmurs of 
agreement from other team members. 
 
Sarah: ‘Getting this upset happens very rarely in our line of work. 
That we work with parents where you feel that you want to cry. It has 
only happened once previously for me, in the 1990s. I’ve felt sorry 
for parents. Like Ms X, when the social worker was talking to her 
and she was agreeing that it was best that she gave up her child. I 
have worked with parents whose children had died and that is the 
only thing that I can imagine that is worse. At least in this scenario, 
parents can hang onto the hope that their child might look for them 
in ten or fifteen years’ time’. 
 
Louise said, ‘I don’t feel that I am over-identifying with the mother’. 
 
Sarah: ‘We seem to have had a few social workers who seem to be 
what the French would call, ‘antipathetique’, very antipathetical 
towards the parents. The problem is that there is so little evidence 
basis for reunification. We don’t know enough about the outcomes 
for children who are returned to their parents. There was one study 
in the US that said that two years was the optimal time because that 
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is a good period of time for parents to change and for children to get 
something good out of foster care. That is for older children, not for 
young children'  (Observation notes, day 14, Sycamore service). 
 
 
 
A reflective commentary   
 
This excerpt provides the clearest example of how the team struggled 
with the emotional demands of the work. It had been a very difficult 
meeting and the practitioners appeared to be grappling with 
overwhelming and conflicting feelings. The two senior clinicians had 
children of a similar age and the mother's described the prospect of 
losing her child very poignantly. Louise was the most articulate in 
conveying the struggle between being a dispassionate clinician and 
feeling a genuine emotional response to the situation ('We are human, 
we have feelings. I’m not just a clinician'). She struggled most visibly 
with the emotions involved and repeatedly discussed this in a way that 
suggested that she felt she had to justify showing an emotional 
response ('‘No, I AM going to cry. I think that I’m only expressing what 
others are feeling’) and stating that this would not overwhelm her sense 
of professional judgment ('I don’t feel that I am over-identifying with the 
mother’). This disjuncture between an individually felt emotion and the 
emotional expression required by a professional role was identified by 
Hochschild’s (1983) conception of the managed heart. What appeared 
to be implicit is the belief that having an emotional response was 
unprofessional, leading to fears of being judged as biased and lacking 
objectivity.  
 
In their accounts, this was contrasted with the local authority social 
worker who 'just sat there slumped and looking like she was not 
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listening’ and described as 'antipathetique'. Having not observed the 
meeting, it is not possible for me to comment on the accuracy of these 
observations. If they were accurate, this behaviour can be interpreted in 
a range of ways. One interpretation may be that the social worker’s 
emotional disengagement enabled her to defend herself against the 
pain of the mother or the potential emotional exhaustion of working with 
the family over an extended period or it may be more practical reasons, 
such as being tired or preoccupied with other cases. What was 
significant was that this perception by the Sycamore staff served to 
contrast their sense of being emotionally overwhelmed with the 
'antipathetique' (unsympathetic, oppositional) response of the local 
authority social worker. 
 
I had previously been in a group discussion where team members had 
expressed the view that the assessment of the mother was probably 
going to be negative and I wondered whether the emotional reality of 
what this would mean for the mother was suddenly very vivid and this 
had provoked feelings of guilt. When I presented this extract in the 
institutional observation group, there was a discussion about whether 
the Sycamore practitioners were distancing themselves from the harsh 
realities of this judgment and the resulting feelings of guilt through the 
use of splitting and projection. The Kleinian concepts of splitting and 
projection describe how an individual can rid themselves of unwanted 
and anxiety-provoking aspects of their experience (Ruch, 2010). Klein 
(1946) argues that splitting begins in infancy, in which the infant 
experiences the good and bad aspects of their caregiver as separate 
entities as a means of protecting itself against the anxiety-provoking 
reality that positive and negative aspects are integrated. In adult life, 
splitting is the tendency to polarise good and bad feelings and, in the 
case of the Sycamore team, refers to team members attributing positive 
aspects to themselves and attributing negative aspects to the local 
authority social workers through a process of projection. The defence 
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mechanism of projection refers to the process whereby an individual or 
group denies an unwanted feeling, action or attribute and then falsely 
attributes it to another: 
 
Projected aspects of oneself is preceded by denial, that is, one 
denies that one feels such and such an emotion, has such and such 
a wish, but asserts that someone else does. (Rycroft, 1995, p.139) 
 
In this case, it refers to the Sycamore team members attributing harsh, 
uncaring attributes (‘not listening’, 'antipathetique') to the local authority 
social worker, enabling them to own the 'good' caring feelings and 
retain a positive sense of themselves in contrast to the 'bad' local 
authority.  
 
This excerpt was chosen because it was an extreme rather than a 
typical example. It is important to explore whether the underlying 
processes identified are also present in more everyday case 
discussions. What was striking as an observer is that the emotional 
responses were different to any of the other observed families during 
the fieldwork. It was more common for family members to become 
angry, which provoked a range of responses within practitioners, 
usually annoyance, sympathy and fear depending upon how forcefully 
the anger was expressed. In this situation, practitioners appeared to 
have feelings of intense sadness provoked by the mother that were 
overwhelming at times.  
 
These defence mechanisms of splitting and projection were seen 
across the observations, but in less extreme form. These centred on the 
relationship with the local authority social workers, who were routinely 
portrayed in negative ways during case discussions. For example, in 
one case discussion, a senior clinician questioned the local authority's 
decision to seek interim care orders on the children, stating:  
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This family wouldn’t meet threshold in many local authorities but the 
children are on ICOs. It makes you wonder about social work 
training. The form filling is okay, but social workers need to be able 
to form a relationship with families. You get a lot more when you 
form a good relationship with the family. I don’t know what they get 
taught on social work courses (Observation notes, day 10, 
Sycamore service). 
 
What was challenging to identify was whether and to what extent the 
clinicians' perceptions of local authority staff were distorted by these 
processes of splitting and projection. It is possible that my presence 
may have influenced this exchange, as the senior clinician was aware 
that I was a social work educator and she may have been indirectly 
expressing her frustration to me. Similarly, the social worker responded 
by describing her own sense of disappointment at her social work 
training, which she felt had not prepared her for the work that she was 
doing.  
 
The only example that did not fit this pattern was a difference of opinion 
between two senior clinicians when they were interpreting the behaviour 
of a local authority manager. During a meeting that Sycamore staff had 
with both the family and the local authority staff, the father became very 
angry and aggressive towards the social worker. This had happened 
previously and the team manager was present to provide support. The 
team manager said to the father that she would ring the police if he 
became more aggressive and she held up the phone towards him with 
999 already typed in. This incident was discussed in two meetings that I 
attended by two different senior clinicians. On the first occasion, the 
senior clinician described this action as 'provocative' and 'unhelpful'. On 
the second occasion, this action was described by another senior 
clinician as 'containing', in the sense that it encouraged the father to 
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'contain his own anger by facing him with the consequences of his 
actions'.  In this example, a positive interpretation of the local authority 
manager was offered alongside the more dominant view of local 
authority staff as unthinking, uncaring or oppositional. 
 
These processes of splitting and projection were observed more 
frequently across the observational data than the social defences 
utilised within Menzies Lyth's model discussed in chapter two. There 
were several possible reasons for the comparatively low use of social 
defences. Firstly, the nature of the assessments in the Sycamore 
service meant that practitioners did not work within detailed procedures. 
Therefore the social defence of ritual task performance was not 
available to them in the same way as the City practitioners. Whilst the 
City practitioners undertook statutory investigations within national 
guidelines, Sycamore staff completed intensive and in-depth expert 
assessments that enabled them to exercise considerable discretion. 
Secondly, less frequent use of upward delegation was also likely to be 
related to the profile of team members, which was divided between less 
and highly experienced staff. There was one occasion when a less 
experienced clinical associate was asked a difficult question by a family 
member and responded that she would 'have to speak to' the lead 
clinician (Day 12). However, this appeared to be a genuine situation 
where the clinical associate's lack of experience and seniority meant 
that it was appropriate for her to refer it to the lead clinician, rather than 
a denial of her authority and agency. Similarly, several of the social 
defences worked by enabling the practitioner to deny their personal 
agency but the nature of the Sycamore service as an expert 
assessment service precluded being able to use these defences.  
 
 
As an institutional ethnography, the primary focus for the application of 
psychoanalytic ideas has been on the institutional observation, rather 
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than wider aspects of practice. However, psychoanalytic insights have 
been included at other points where appropriate, e.g., in the discussion 
of the case of the ‘eloquent mother’ in this chapter’. When examining 
the use of defences against anxiety, it is important to note the nature of 
responsibility and accountability in the Sycamore service as this has an 
important bearing on the nature and extent of the anxiety provoked by 
the work itself. Sycamore practitioners did not have direct responsibility 
for the safety and well-being of children, which was held by the local 
authority social workers. Instead, they had responsibility for providing 
expert assessments that would inform the decisions made by the court. 
It could be argued that this was a significant responsibility, as Sycamore 
practitioners were aware that the courts would give considerable weight 
to their recommendations. However, they were also aware that public 
accountability was primarily on the local authority that held the case and 
the local authority would receive the brunt of the blame if things went 
wrong.  
 
In summary, practitioners tended to use splitting and projection as a 
means of getting rid of difficult and unwanted feelings rather than using 
more institutional defences. This was most clearly seen in the 
projections onto the local authority social workers and managers and it 
was interesting that what was projected onto local authority staff 
included feelings and behaviours that were commonly ascribed to the 
families that were being assessed, such as being 'unfeeling', difficult, 
oppositional or incompetent. These enabled Sycamore staff to 
experience themselves as the opposite - sensitive, thoughtful, insightful 
and reasonable.  
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5.4  Theme three: Expertise as authority    
 
A third prominent theme was 'expertise as authority', which refers to 
implicit and explicit claims that were based upon expertise as a source 
of legitimation. At one level, this is implicit within the nature of the 
service, since it is a specialist service acting as an expert witness in 
court proceedings. However, this sense of authority as expertise was 
deeply embedded within the organisational culture of the service and 
the wider organisation and influenced internal and external 
relationships.  
 
In order to understand how the service fitted into wider systems, it is 
necessary to examine the role of the expert witness within the child 
protection system. The expert witness is brought in to inform the 
judgments of the court and they are the only type of witness who are 
able to offer opinion rather than just reporting facts (Wall and Hamilton, 
2007). This is on the basis that they have expertise in their field that 
enables them to contribute to the court's deliberations and they are 
required to adopt an impartial approach, offering their expertise in the 
service of the court rather than any particular party to the proceedings 
(Kennedy, 2005). 
 
The role of the expert witness could be highly challenging as evidence 
was tested through a process of cross-examination. When the 
Sycamore service filed their report as part of court proceedings, they 
were aware that the legal representatives for the parties would carefully 
scrutinise the document and the senior clinician would be cross-
examined about its contents. As one senior clinician, Peter, stated: 
'Everything that we do is scrutinized by barristers and when you’re in 
the witness box for six hours, you feel this' (Peter, observation notes, 
day four). This reflects the experiences of a well-established expert 
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witness, Dr Roger Kennedy, who advises that, 'even the most 
experienced professional can occasionally come away from court 
feeling battered and bruised' (Kennedy, 2005, p.7). 
 
Given the adversarial nature of the English legal system, each party has 
a vested interest in trying to ensure that the opinion of the expert 
witness furthered its case.  Stevenson (2012) describes how different 
parties in the proceedings can use processes such as cross-
examination to 'colonise' the evidence of expert witnesses in ways that 
reconstruct what has been said. He argues that, as an expert witness, it 
can be difficult to convey the complexities and uncertainties of individual 
cases within a court process that values certainties and must receive a 
definite decision, citing a classic text by King and Piper (1995):  
 
The law’s demand for decisiveness and finality for winners and 
losers, for rights and wrongs to be identified and exposed to the 
public gaze in order to further its normative objectives tend to force 
legal judgments out of the mouths of child welfare representatives, 
there is no room for a suspended judgment (King and Piper, 1995)’ 
(Stevenson, 2012, p.322).  
 
Courts are faced with very difficult decisions that have been described 
as 'judgments of Solomon' (Kennedy, 2005; Beckett et al., 2007; Taylor, 
2007). These judgments are at times not being about the best option for 
children, but choosing the 'least worse' option (Kennedy, 2005).  The Rt 
Honourable Lord Justice Thorpe describes the process of a judge 
weighing up a case in the following terms, 'The judge must move 
through fast-running and possible even deep water before he reaches 
the banks of conclusion' (The Rt Honourable Lord Justice Thorpe, 2003, 
p.304). 
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Courts have the burden of dealing with complex cases where there can 
be considerable risk and uncertainty. Faced with difficult decisions, it 
would be understandable for courts to hope that expert witnesses can 
use their expertise to reduce the uncertainty. However, there is a 
potential danger that expert witnesses become idealised in unrealistic 
ways. One highly experienced practitioner expressed this in the 
following way;  
 
The risk with talking about experts is that it, in common parlance, its 
pejorative use is a way of minimising anxiety coming from a sense of 
worry about ‘what if’, or the sorts of very anxiety proven questions 
that we’re faced with here about the safety and protection of 
children.  And if one was an expert, then it would appear that one 
could say unequivocally, without question or doubt, that this will 
keep them safe and this is where the risks are (Peter, senior 
clinician and highly experienced practitioner, interview 22, Sycamore 
service). 
 
The practitioner articulated his uneasiness about hopes that the expert 
can eliminate the uncertainty and therefore the anxiety that comes from 
making a difficult decision. Another practitioner discussed how local 
authority staff may have unrealistic hopes that the Sycamore service 
would be able to conduct a detective-style investigation that would 
reveal what the local authority staff had been unable to find out:  
 
Usually in my most honest moments, what I want to say to them is 
… look, you’re giving this family to us as some kind of dumping 
process in your anxiety, and we’re not gonna come up with any 
miracle answers; you’re after a 'whodunnit'; we’re not gonna give 
you answers to that; what we’ll do is trawl through all of the 
information and think about it and formulate it; we’re not gonna 
come up with anything new; we’ll just help you piece together all the 
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different bits in a way that shows a way forward for the child and to 
get them on to a better trajectory… and can the parents do that?  So 
that’s all we do; it’s not rocket science, but it’s complex; it’s difficult 
and it’s highly informed by research and all that, so I suppose it is 
rocket science. But it’s not this miraculous stuff that I think people 
think experts do, it’s just quality thinking. Just quality thinking 
[laughter] (Michael, senior clinician and highly experienced 
practitioner, interview 24, Sycamore service). 
 
The local authority social workers who refer families to the Sycamore 
service may recognise that expertise is required, but they may also 
resent the authority that the court invests in an expert witness service. 
This is captured in the following comments by a senior clinician:  
 
We often have very able, fluent, confident social workers coming to 
the [Sycamore], presenting a care plan which they’ve really thought 
a lot about.  The fact that they’ve come here at all probably suggests 
that they’ve thought a lot about what might be needed.  And with 
that piece of commissioned work comes an ambivalence and a 
knowledge that they’re paying a lot of money for someone else to 
say something which they probably could say, if not completely, then 
in part themselves, which may not differ much from their own 
formulations.  And that’s quite tricky, I suppose (Peter, senior 
clinician and highly experienced practitioner, interview 22, Sycamore 
service). 
 
A sense that local authority social workers may have mixed feelings 
was expressed by another clinical associate:  
 
Many of them [local authority social workers] respect the different 
approaches, the expertise and they feel a burden has been taken off 
their own shoulders and that they have people who have you know a 
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way of analysing what’s there in the surface and why it’s happening 
and how we can help. But it could be the other way around 
sometimes they can be defensive' (Luisa, clinical associate and less 
experienced practitioner, interview nineteen, Sycamore service).  
 
This conveyed a sense that local authority social workers may feel that 
the involvement of the Sycamore service was a relief ('a burden has 
been taken off their own shoulders') but they may also feel defensive 
that their own expertise was being questioned.  
 
Within the Sycamore service, there was an awareness of a potential 
idealisation of the expert witness role and the need to bring certainty to 
the court process. For example, a senior clinician Michael made the 
point in a team discussion that it was very easy to get caught up in 
these idealisations. He stated that courts could be very 'seductive' 
places in the sense that one can be seduced into doing and saying 
unwise things that are beyond one's remit and expertise. As he said, 
'When you are in the Royal Courts of Justice and everybody is hanging 
onto your every word, it is difficult to retain your usual caution and not 
step outside your strict role'. Another senior clinician, Simon made a 
similar point when he joked in a case discussion about spending all day 
in court where 'everyone is listening to and writing down every word that 
you are saying, then you go home and your wife and children take no 
notice of what you say' (Observation notes, day one, Sycamore 
service). 
 
One senior clinician, Louise, contrasted how the court valued her in her 
current role as an expert witness with how she was treated when she 
was a local authority social worker.  
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I will be included in discussions, you know, those ad hoc discussions 
where they are saying we’re considering this and we are just drafting 
a letter instructing, can I just come in and ask you ‘what is your 
opinion if we make this recommendation?’  I don’t think I would have 
ever been considered to be part of those discussions, to be able to 
speak on behalf of my clinical team, to feel that I have got the 
confidence and a right and the ability to speak on behalf of my multi-
disciplinary team in terms of what we might be able to offer, what we 
think and even, it sounds ridiculous, even just to have people look at 
me and talk to me, the solicitors who will have an informal chat.  I 
don’t think that I would have been given the time of day, even as an 
experienced front line social worker, you are sort of like scum on the 
bottom of someone’s shoe.  It’s a shame really because I think there 
is a lot of really good front line social workers and I think I was fairly 
good when I was a senior practitioner, and it was quite frustrating 
that you felt that people didn’t even care really about what you were 
saying. (Louise, clinician and highly experienced practitioner, 
interview twenty, Sycamore service).  
 
She described how the court placed far greater weight upon her opinion 
as a member of the Sycamore service that it had when she was a local 
authority social worker. This was consistent with data from the City 
teams which conveyed this sense of local authority social workers 
feeling undermined because the court valued expert witnesses more 
than local authority practitioners. This is captured in the following 
comments by a manager from the City teams:  
 
It could be due to the change in the court process since the Children 
Act came in, whereby social workers are no longer the most 
important expert in the courtroom.  First thing you do, before you get 
into court, first thing happens is oh yes, I think we need a report, 
who shall we have?  Ah well, eminent psychiatrist Dr. So and So, 
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highly recommended, waiting list of only two years.  And the social 
worker is there, their report is, they've spent ages writing it, court 
looks at them, very interesting, chuck it away.  Right, what's the 
psychiatrist got to say?  Doesn't do anything for the confidence of 
the profession (Andrew, highly experienced practitioner and 
manager, interview ten, City team).   
 
This attitude of 'so-called expert' did not appear to be confined to either 
the City teams or the Sycamore service. A clinical associate at the 
Sycamore service who was also a highly experienced senior manager 
in local authority children's services described how expertise was 
understood:  
 
…experts are commonly seen by others as people with lots of letters 
after their names.  I think that there is a lot to be said for that in 
terms of academic grounding and theories and theoretical sort of 
frameworks and stuff like that.  I think that yes, referring someone to 
the [prestigious NHS service], means that they are being provided 
with a specialist orthopaedic service, rather than your [local] hospital 
type services in the locality, if I can put it that way or general 
hospital. I think there is something more that can be gained, I think, 
by going to an expert.  So, from a field work perspective I think that 
social workers forget that they're experts.  They're not encouraged 
to think of themselves as experts actually (John, clinical associate 
and highly experienced practitioner, interview 21, Sycamore 
service). 
 
The comment that local authority social workers did not see themselves 
as experts and are '...not encouraged to think of themselves as experts' 
is particularly interesting. It captures an important aspect of the position 
of local authority social workers within the English child protection 
system. This has been recently highlighted by the Munro review of child 
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protection, which has argued that the current child protection system 
has overemphasised procedural adherence at the cost of professional 
expertise and discretion (Munro, 2011a).  
 
To summarise, the expert status that was accorded to the Sycamore 
service led to contradictory projections in which they experienced 
themselves as both idealised and denigrated through envious attacks. 
In order to understand the nature of these envious attacks, it is helpful 
to discuss the nature of envy within organisations. Whilst envy has a 
considerable body of work within the psychoanalytic literature on intra 
and inter-personal relationships, its manifestation in institutions has 
received little attention (Obholzer and Roberts, 1994). It can be argued 
that this is because the psychoanalytic literature has focused on social 
defences within institutions (Jaques, 1955; Menzies, 1960) and envious 
attacks do not fit easily within this approach.  
 
The understanding of envy within organisations has been developed by 
Kane (2012), who draws up the more recent literature about shame. 
She argues that envy has traditionally been viewed as an innate, 
destructive impulse within Kleinian approaches, but more recent 
literature has focused upon the precipitating features behind the 
envious attack, focusing upon the experience of shame (Kane, 2012). 
Morrison and Lansky (2008) state that behind envy there is always a 
precedent shame, in which envy is understood as a comparative and 
self-conscious emotion lying “downstream”, as it were, from shame’ 
(Morrison and Lansky, 2008, p.186). They go on to argue that 'this 
sense of shame involves an act of comparison that must be against a 
self felt to be inferior, lacking or in some way defective’ (Morrison and 
Lansky, 2008, p.181).  
 
Kane thus argues that conceiving of an envious attack as a potential 
defence against unconscious feelings of shame brings it within the 
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social defences approach. She also asserts that this helps us to 
understand a related phenomenon, the expression of contempt, 
because it enacts the devaluing attack at the heart of envy, since the 
object which is devalued need not be envied any more (Klein, 1957).  
Adopting this approach, envious attacks are not only a protest about the 
preferment of others but a sense of diminution of our own sense of self. 
Consequently, the envious attacks on ‘so-called experts’ can also be 
thought of as a means of defending against a potential experience of 
shame and being diminished by the enhanced status of another.  
 
While the previous section focused on the emotional demands of the 
work with families and the anxiety about decision making that this 
provokes, this section has focused upon the demands of dealing with 
the idealising and denigrating projections that they received in their role. 
In the previous section, it was noted that the defences of splitting and 
projection were seen across the observations of the Sycamore team 
and these centred on the relationship with the local authority social 
workers, who were routinely portrayed in negative ways during case 
discussions. One of the ways of interpreting this would be to suggest 
that the projections between Sycamore practitioners and local authority 
practitioners had a reciprocal quality at times. In the particularly 
powerful example discussed, this was seen quite starkly and the 
projections of the Sycamore practitioners  ('we are sensitive and 
thoughtful, they are unfeeling and thoughtless') mirrored the denigrating 
projections that they received. 
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5.5 Summary  
 
In this chapter, the aim has been to provide an account of the 
Sycamore service that provides an organisational context for the sense-
making processes that will be discussed in later chapters. The theme of 
'space for thinking' was explored as an important aspect of the 
organisational culture. It was argued that group discussions were 
central to the working practices of the service. In these discussions, 
practitioners appeared to be struggling to make sense of complex and 
conflicting information in order to piece together an overall account of 
the family. They did this through generating intuitive judgments that 
were taken up if other team members felt that they had merit and 
developed in the process of building up the story of the family being 
assessed.  
 
Such formulations, which drew upon intuitive judgments (System 1) and 
formal theory combined with critical self-awareness (System 2) were an 
important feature of case discussions across the observational data. In 
these group meetings, the discussions featured intuitive thinking in the 
form of practitioners' sharing their intuitive impressions, thoughts and 
judgments as part of a shared story building process. In this process, 
these intuitive judgments went through a process of analytical 
evaluation because formulating the final story about the family required 
the team to develop an overall account that explained the key features 
in a way that would be defendable in a court arena. 
 
The second theme, 'overwhelming families', examined examples of 
where families threaten to emotionally overwhelm the team. Sycamore 
practitioners were exposed to the distress of families and at times 
identified with family members who were experiencing a range of 
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emotions, including fear, anger, guilt and shame. Practitioners managed 
their own emotional responses through discussing them but on 
occasion by using splitting and projection in order to retain a sense of 
being 'good' in contrast to the 'bad' City practitioners. It was argued that 
practitioners responded to the emotional challenges presented by 
families by using the defences of splitting and projection, most 
commonly by attributing uncaring, unthinking qualities to local authority 
social workers. 
 
The third theme, 'authority as expertise', explored how expertise was 
used as a basis for authority within the Sycamore service and how this 
authority was understood within the triangular relationship between the 
family, the local authority and the court. It was argued that the authority 
conferred to expert witnesses could lead to unrealistic expectations 
about their abilities to reduce uncertainty and contributed towards a 
culture of envious attacks by local authority staff.  
 
The next chapter will examine commonalities in the psychological 
processes that individual practitioners engaged in across both sites. 
This is followed by chapter seven, which examines the differences and 
how they affected practitioner sense-making. 
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Chapter 6 - Sense-making processes in 
child protection  
 
 
Having examined the two research sites in the previous chapters, the 
focus of this chapter will be the first research question, which examines 
the common processes that practitioners use to make sense of their 
work with families. It will be informed by the key debates in the literature 
on professional sense-making that were identified in chapter two. The 
emphasis will be on commonalities between both sites, whilst 
differences will be examined in the next chapter that explores the 
second research question concerning the impact of organisational 
settings on sense-making processes. 
 
This chapter consists of three main parts. The first part will explore the 
initial process of receiving a new referral and meeting the family in order 
to understand how practitioners started to engage in sense-making. The 
second part will examine the dilemma of how practitioners engaged in 
sense-making when things stopped making sense, i.e., when the 
different accounts that practitioners received from referrers, family 
members and others did not agree. The third part will focus on how 
practitioners managed situations with families where they suspected 
that family members were engaging in deliberate and systematic 
deception, which was a commonly reported dilemma.  
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6.1 Theme one: Building a story  
Sub-theme 6.1.1: Sense-making as pattern 
recognition and story building 
 
In the beginner's mind there are many possibilities, in the expert's 
mind there are few (Suzuki, 1970, p.xiv). 
 
The first stage began when a referral was received. For the fieldwork 
teams, the referral was most commonly received from the police, 
schools, NHS staff or anonymous referrals whilst the court assessment 
service received referrals from local authorities or solicitors. At this 
initial stage, the referral information and other information that was 
available was reviewed by a manager or senior practitioner to identify 
what the concerns were and to plan the next stages. Rather than seeing 
specific pieces of information in isolation, these experienced 
practitioners described looking for patterns in the information provided:  
 
I’ll make sure I familiarise myself with whatever information we 
already have on the system which, in terms of gathering information 
and making some initial judgments, that is very valuable. I’d look to 
whether there are patterns forming (Amy, interview one, 
experienced practitioner, City teams). 
 
From my perspective, it’s not just the referral that comes in but then 
looking back at the history of our contact and the chronology and 
links so looking at patterns…I guess it’s just all about patterns 
(Faith, interview three, experienced practitioner, City teams). 
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The initial stages of reviewing referral information were usually 
undertaken by the most experienced staff members, who formulated 
initial hypotheses that were passed on to less experienced practitioners. 
A senior clinician in the Sycamore service gave a developed account of 
this process of pattern recognition:  
 
Certainly with the more senior people, you’re wanting them to have 
the pattern recognition stuff, the ability to organise, start to create 
categorical sequential links, that start to produce meaning. So I think 
about us as small, furry creatures on the floor of the forest who, in 
order to survive, had to be able to pick up changes in the pattern of 
shadows in the surroundings, that would tell us that there’s a 
predator, or we were all the time looking down the trail, looking for 
patterns which might warn us of what was ahead…  those are really, 
really important skills.  People who are just starting off in this area 
don’t necessarily have to have them because, as a team, you only 
need a few analysts… you need a lot of data gatherers, and you 
need a few analysts who can synthesise it and see the key patterns 
(Simon, senior clinician and highly experienced practitioner, 
interview 23, Sycamore service).  
 
This rich data extract makes several points. Firstly, it suggests that the 
early stages of the process are predominantly led by intuitive (System 
1) rather than analytic (System 2) processes. Secondly, it is not an 
emotionally neutral process and portrays the assessor as responding to 
cues that may indicate potential risk and danger. Thirdly, it is a skilled 
process that requires experienced practitioners who are able to 
distinguish between genuine risks ('predators') amidst all of the 
background information ('shadows'). 
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This process of spotting patterns in order to start to construct a 
meaningful story about the family was compatible with Simon's (1992) 
classic definition of intuition as adopted by Kahneman and Klein (2009):  
 
The situation has provided a cue: This cue has given the expert 
access to information stored in memory, and the information 
provides the answer. Intuition is nothing more and nothing less than 
recognition (Simon, 1992, p.155).  
 
Pattern recognition heuristics were used by practitioners who drew 
upon their previous experience to understand new information. For 
example, during the early fieldwork in the City teams, a manager 
offered to let me sit next to her when she was going through the 
referrals:  
 
The manager was working through the referrals that had been 
received. The first referral was from a school who were concerned 
about a 9-year-old boy. She said, “It says that he’s got poor school 
attendance, he’s got an ‘unkempt appearance’ whatever that means, 
and he seems ‘preoccupied’ with his mother, who’s a single parent. I 
see that and immediately think, has mum got mental health 
problems? If so, he’s worried about her, doesn’t want to be away 
from her so he’s not attending school properly and she’s not able to 
look after him day to day so he’s ‘unkempt’. It could be something 
else but it’s worth looking out for” (Day two, City teams).  
 
This took the form of pattern recognition and story building in a way that 
enabled practitioners to start to form an overall account of what was 
happening in the family. A key dimension was the level of practitioner 
experience and the three categories of practitioner experience were 
developed through analysing my data rather than imposed before data 
collection. The three categories are less experienced (less than 12-18 
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months experience), experienced practitioners (18 months - 5-6 years 
experience) and highly experienced practitioners (more than 5-6 years 
experience). Given the small sample sizes, the time periods given are 
approximate and larger sample sizes would be needed to enable 
greater precision. The first stage was explicitly identified by practitioners 
themselves in their interviews. For example:  
 
I’m a lot more confident now to challenge a case as to where it 
should go because I’ve been here just under two years now but in 
my first year and a half, you pretty much just did what they told you 
to do… (Areta, experienced practitioner, interview two, City teams).  
 
‘I would say that at the beginning of the 14- or 15-month period, I 
would have tended to see the information that was given to me by 
another professional in a referral or information that was held on the 
system and tend to take that as.. I would have given more weight to 
that than I would necessarily have given to what the family said, if 
they were saying something different. That was my inexperience at 
the time, I guess’ (Amy, experienced practitioner, interview one, City 
teams). 
 
As well as lacking confidence, two another features of this stage that 
practitioners described was experiencing difficulty in challenging family 
members (Interview four, City teams) and other professionals and in 
becoming overwhelmed by information (Interview one, City teams).  
 
As practitioners moved into the next stage of the ‘experienced 
practitioner’, there were three areas where practitioners changed. 
Firstly, experienced practitioners had increased levels of confidence, for 
example:  
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… a more experienced worker obviously you know they might come 
and check a few things with you, but you know you’re reasonably 
confident that they know what they’re going out to do and check this 
out and come back and able to give that feedback (Sadie, highly 
experienced practitioner and manager, interview fourteen, City 
teams). 
 
Secondly, experienced practitioners were more able to plan ahead and 
anticipate potential problems. For example, one manager stated that:  
 
[Experienced workers] will be thinking of a plan. We will have given 
them a plan, but they will be thinking of improving that plan and how 
that plan will work in practice.  They'll already be thinking that.  So 
they'll be thinking "Where do we go and see this - if this is a one 
where you immediately go out, they'll be thinking "What's the time?  
How close is it to 3:30, could we go out and see this child at school?  
Am I going out on my own or am I meeting up with a police officer?  
What are we gonna do about the issue of parental consent, are we 
talking to the parent now, or are we gonna wait until we're at the 
school, and give them 30 seconds notice so they can't get to the 
school first and tell the child to shut up and not say anything."  All of 
that stuff.  Now the latter, right, you will very rarely find a freshly 
qualified worker who that springs into their mind (Andrew, highly 
experienced practitioner/manager, interview ten, City teams). 
 
Thirdly, experienced practitioners had greater ability to spot gaps in 
information.  
 
I think that obviously the more experienced worker would be able to 
look at the referral, see the information and maybe identify what the 
concerns and risks are and maybe gaps in information actually.  
Information that’s not there, whether it’s a full referral or 
  
180 
inappropriate referral, might have to go back to the referrer to get 
more information as a starting point (Nancy, highly experienced 
practitioner/manager, interview fifteen, City teams).  
 
The key features were that practitioners gained confidence and were 
more comfortable in their role, including challenging family members, 
managers and other professionals.  
 
Whilst this first transition was identified by participants, the second 
transition was identified by myself as the researcher. When interviewing 
participants who had more than 5-6 years experience in a local 
authority child protection role, I observed that they talked about the role 
at a greater depth than those in the experienced or less experienced 
categories and generally showed an understanding that got beneath the 
surface of everyday understandings of child protection practice.  
 
Rather than focusing upon specific risk factors in isolation, more 
experienced practitioners described understanding these in the wider 
context of the individual family. One very experienced practitioner 
described this in the following way:  
 
In my mind, domestic violence in family A may have a completely 
different impact on the child than in family B.  Or it might be 
extremely dangerous in family C, depending on, you know, 
experience tells us when you have the combination of domestic 
violence, substance misuse and mental health, those are the most 
dangerous of cases that you can have. More dangerous than direct 
physical abuse, because nearly every serious case review that’s 
gone bad, evidence is that those three factors have been playing 
quite a role (John, clinical associate and highly experienced 
practitioner, interview 21, Sycamore service).   
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This quote describes an approach that goes beyond simply identifying 
individual risk factors to integrate more nuanced intuitive pattern 
recognition skills with formal analytic knowledge about how specific risk 
factors can interact. This can be contrasted with another practitioner 
who described how she struggled the first time she worked with a family 
with complex needs:   
 
But it was difficult to … there were so many interplaying factors that 
affected how available mum and dad were to give the sort of 
parenting that they needed to.  It was difficult for me to form an 
overall analysis… I felt quite bogged down with all the information 
that I had by the time it got to doing the Conference report. I think I 
could make sense, I think, of most things in isolation… (Amy, 
experienced practitioner, interview one, City teams). 
 
The practitioner described feeling mired ('bogged down')' with all of the 
information that was available. Whilst she could make sense of all of the 
individual pieces in isolation, she could not see the overall picture and 
what it meant. The skills of pattern recognition are not only about being 
able to see links between the available information but also being able 
to spot missing information. One manager argued that, as practitioners 
gain experience, they become better at identifying what information was 
missing: 
 
…the more experienced worker would be able to look at the referral, 
see the information and maybe identify what the concerns and risks 
are and maybe gaps in information actually.  Information that’s not 
there, whether it’s a full referral or inappropriate referral, might have 
to go back to the referrer to get more information as a starting point 
(Nancy, interview fifteen, highly experienced practitioner/manager, 
City teams).  
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In both settings, the quantity of information provided in referrals varied 
widely and having too little or too much information provided challenges 
to this pattern spotting process. At one extreme, an anonymous referrer 
reported to the City teams that they heard 'a child screaming loudly' at 
an address but had no information at all about the family (Observation 
notes, day 12). The other extreme was a referral to the Sycamore 
service that came with a court bundle with over seven hundred, 
doubled-sided pages of single-spaced text (Observation notes, 
Sycamore service, day 32). 
 
The problem of having too much information was particularly 
challenging because there may be so much information that 
practitioners felt overwhelmed by it. A less experienced clinical 
associate from the Sycamore service expressed it in the following way:  
 
We have to limit somehow you know the time that we are focussing 
on and what we want to see from when to when so we don’t get lost 
with all the background information... (Luisa, clinical associate and 
less experienced practitioner, interview nineteen, Sycamore 
service). 
 
More experienced practitioners tended to find extensive information less 
overwhelming because they had learnt to selectively focus rather than 
regarded all information as equally important. One social worker who 
had seven years of experience described how his understanding had 
developed during that time:  
 
I remember when I was qualified, I was quite worried about whether 
I was actually learning what was right and what was wrong…  What 
was true and what wasn’t true, basically. However, as time 
progressed, I go and take the referral with me and I go and see the 
family and actually, from that visit, you can obviously understand the 
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whole family dynamic.  And you know where you’re gonna go from 
there and you know whether this family will progress to core 
assessment to child protection conference or to court.  You can 
sense it, from that, where the kids will go to.  Where before, I just 
have to interview them again and again and again, you know, 
[laughter]… So, at the moment I am quite, really confident, when I 
actually see the family and gather information quickly. I can actually 
interview them much better than before. I know what I’m trying to 
find out.. I think sometimes in the past, when I was newly qualified, 
there were a million questions in that referral that you needed to ask 
the family, which gives you the picture.  Where now I actually ask 
them every relevant question in that incident, and I know that I’m 
confident I have mastered every area that I need to to find out 
information from the family. .. My manager was quite happy, she 
said, “Every question comes into my mind, you have asked them’ 
(Kadin, highly experienced practitioner, interview five, City teams)  
 
The practitioner stated that when he was newly qualified, everything 
seemed important (‘there were a million questions’) and it was easy to 
become preoccupied with whether specific pieces of information were 
true or not. As he became more experienced, he selectively focused on 
a narrower range of information and was able to see it in the context of 
the individual family that he was working with. He also had a repertoire 
of previous cases that he could compare with the current family in order 
to predict the likely outcomes. This is consistent with previous studies of 
how novices and experts view information differently. In a study of 
professional judgment, experienced auditors and student auditors were 
given extensive information (Ettenson et al., 1987). Whilst the students 
tried to integrate all of the information and no single cue was dominant, 
the experienced auditors focused upon one type of information source 
and other sources had a secondary impact. The experienced auditors 
demonstrated higher levels of accuracy, consistency and consensus. 
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Similarly, Sutcliffe and Weick (2008) argue that information overload 
impairs our judgment because we become distracted by all of the 
irrelevant cues. 
 
Practitioners in both settings commonly developed strategies for sifting 
through extensive case files. This was particularly challenging in the 
Sycamore service, where families often had extensive histories and 
practitioners rarely read through all the information before they met the 
family. A highly experienced practitioner in the Sycamore service 
described his approach:  
 
Well I’ve got it down to a bit of a fine art, in that I know what to read 
and what not to read in the initial stages.  The late stage is the 
process of reading everything, to make sure you haven’t missed 
anything.  The initial stage it’s reading things like social worker’s first 
statement; any expert reports; the chronology; any fact finding 
judgments; summaries by the lead solicitor, so you can thin those 
out usually to five or six key documents (Michael, senior clinician 
and highly experienced practitioner, interview 24, Sycamore 
service). 
 
The practitioner described how reading these key documents at the 
early stages before meeting the family enabled him to be able to 
orientate himself before he met the family. He added that he did read 
everything, but only in the final stage in order to check that he had not 
missed any information.  
 
Several practitioners described that it was difficult to absorb an 
extensive amount before meeting a family because the information was 
too ephemeral, too disembodied and disconnected from the 'flesh and 
blood' family. Meeting the family made subsequent reading of the case 
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files more lively, memorable and digestible. One senior clinician in the 
Sycamore service described the following approach to the problem: 
 
Now that is a really logical way to start, by reading the papers, 
having said that, I rarely do that. Mostly I read the Letter of 
Instruction [a letter agreed by all parties at court with a summary of 
the case and the list of key questions], I get a sort of feeling for the 
case, and then I don’t read anything more, and then I go off and 
meet everybody, and I try and do it a bit by the seat of my pants.  I’m 
very experienced so I’m good at sniffing in the right places.  If 
people don’t mention things that are important in my interviews, I 
see that as highly significant.  But I find that I do a better interview 
with very few preconceptions in my mind... (Simon, senior clinician 
and highly experienced practitioner, interview 23, Sycamore 
service). 
 
This highly experienced practitioner suggested that his understanding of 
the case was informed by his emotional responses ('I get a sort of 
feeling for a case').  So far the emotional aspects have been discussed 
as arising spontaneously and at times being actively unhelpful, e.g., 
less experienced workers feeling anxious and intimidated when they 
hear about new families. However, more experienced practitioners 
actively used their emotional responses to inform their sense-making. 
The following extended excerpt in which a practitioner described a 
home visit was typical of the accounts given by experienced 
practitioners: 
 
These are town houses, they’re really nice, there are good schools 
in that area.  So when I was walking towards it I thought well, a real 
strength here, she has secured this housing, lucky her. The closer I 
got to walking through her little driveway area was what a wreck it 
was, that just boxes on the ground and an old rusted bike, a door 
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looking like it had been scraped and maybe kicked, and where if you 
had walked just a few feet back, if you look at the whole thing you’d 
go “oh such nice council housing”, you get closer and closer, ring 
the doorbell, opens it and first thing is really…decay, old, ugly green 
carpet on the stairs that needs first of all washed, second, replacing, 
but just...raggedy, and the walls deteriorating.  And there had been 
complaints about the house before. But it was tidy and clean, which 
in the assessments we do, that’s good enough, and it is for me too. 
But you could just read her depression in that house, you could just 
read it.  I’m sure she had put in an effort knowing I was coming that 
she…that it was clean, and it was, it was clean, but you only had to 
look at the walls where the children had taken crayons to the wall, 
just dirt on it, just in a decayed state.   
I: How old were the children, were they quite young or? 
R: One and six.  And just seeing that there was her depression, that 
she’s working poor, the windows had towels on them not curtains, 
things that I think just reflect a scatteredness, a brokenness, and… it 
was dark… it was dark, even though there were lights on since they 
can’t take the towels down because they’re nailed on, so it’s always 
dark.  More depression… (Jeanette, interview eleven, experienced 
practitioner, City teams). 
 
This account conveys how the practitioner’s initial feeling of hope, even 
envy (‘lucky her’) at the desirable housing that the mother had secured. 
This changed as she got closer and entered the house, where her 
feelings appeared to change to disgust (‘a wreck’, ‘decay’, ‘dirt’, ‘a 
decayed state’) and a sense of hopelessness (‘a scatteredness, a 
brokenness’, ‘dark’, ‘depression’). This provided her with an immediate 
intuitive (System 1) judgment about the mother’s emotional state 
through observation of the house (‘you could just read her depression in 
that house’), which was confirmed when she subsequently explored this 
with the mother. In the face of such hopeless and despair conveyed 
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through the physical fabric of the home, the practitioner could have 
defended herself by turning a ‘blind eye’ (Rustin, 2005; Parkinson, 
2010) but instead she used it to inform her work with the family.  
 
The highly experienced Sycamore clinician above described how 
practitioners could analyse their own emotional responses: 
 
You are an instrument and you have calibrated yourself through 
hundreds of interviews, and you know that, I don’t know, this family 
makes you really cross, or this family makes you feel really 
depressed, or feel really hopeless, and you think, “Why is that?  I 
know that this is unusual; compared with most interviews I don’t feel 
like that”, and you need to be able to observe that, again with some 
acuity and to be able to record it in quite a modest way, not...  It’s a 
different order of fact from, you know, the hard facts of the history, 
the slightly softer observations.  Now you’re looking into yourself and 
saying, “There’s something unusual about...  I’m picking up 
something unusual here”.  And it’s important – it tells me something; 
although it’s going on inside of me, it tells me something really 
important about the family.  So you need to develop a way to 
apprehend that and to be able to express that in a way that doesn’t 
sound too self-preoccupied, or up your own arse, that you can 
communicate with others  (Simon, senior clinician and highly 
experienced practitioner, interview 23, Sycamore service).  
 
The practitioner described how his pattern recognition covers not only 
how he understood specific pieces of information ('the so called hard 
facts') but also extended to patterns in his own emotional responses 
compared with other families that he has assessed. He felt that such 
information was often regarded as contentious in two respects. Firstly, it 
was of a different order to the 'hard facts of history' and the 'slightly 
softer observations'. Secondly, he was aware that practitioners who 
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presented their own emotional responses as data risk being viewed as 
self-preoccupied ('up your own arse'). Nevertheless, he was clear that 
such information could be very important in understanding families that 
were being assessed. Such explicit use of one's own emotional 
responses was more visible in the Sycamore service, which is likely to 
be influenced by the explicitly psychological frameworks used within the 
setting. The influence of the wider organisational setting will be explored 
in greater depth in the next chapter. 
 
Such heuristics were imperfect in the sense that the previous cases that 
they drew upon could have a superficial resemblance to earlier cases 
but be significantly different in other ways. However, more experienced 
practitioners had a greater awareness and were less susceptible to 
overconfidence. 
 
Even within a small sample, there was variation between practitioners 
at every level of experience that related to factors such as motivation, 
communication skills and general reasoning skills. Consequently, 
experience appeared to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
expertise and was only one factor in a wide range of factors that 
influenced how practitioners engaged in sense-making. In the interview 
sample, there were less experienced (5 participants), experienced (9 
participants) and highly experienced practitioners (10 participants). In 
my own assessment, not all of the participants had the key features that 
were characteristics of their experience level. In the experienced 
practitioner category, there was one participant out of 9 who did not 
have the features and in the highly experienced practitioner category, 
there was one out of 10 that did not have the characteristic features of 
that experience level. However, the key features were observed in the 
majority of participants in the less experienced (5 out of 5), experienced 
(8 out of 9) and the highly experienced practitioners (9 out of 10). 
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Although the pattern recognition and story building processes generally 
appeared to enable experienced practitioners to process information 
quickly and effectively, these were not the only sense-making 
processes that were in play. Practitioners were also vulnerable to using 
heuristics that lead to systematic and predictable errors described in the 
heuristics and biases approach. For example, there was some evidence 
that practitioners were susceptible to making overly positive 
assumptions when family members worked in the health and social care 
field. In one example, the family member was a maternal grandmother 
who worked in children’s services in another local authority:   
 
The social worker explained to me that the 2-year-old girl was 
placed with her maternal grandmother after the mother was detained 
in a psychiatric hospital two days ago. The grandmother worked for 
another local authority in children's services and when she collected 
the child, she gave her stepson's address and added that he worked 
in the mental health field.  Yesterday, the social worker contacted 
the grandmother to arrange to visit, but she said that she would 
need to speak with her stepson in order to get his permission and 
would ring her back. However, the grandmother never rang the 
social worker back. When the social worker went to the stepson's 
address this morning, he explained that he did not know where she 
is living. The social worker immediately telephoned the 
grandmother, who she was very angry that the social worker had 
spoken to her stepson. The social worker said that she would 
organise a foster care placement and told the grandmother that she 
need her to come in order to 'surrender' the child. She had spoken 
with the grandmother at nine o'clock in the morning and now it was 
four o'clock in the afternoon and the grandmother had not arrived. 
The social worker said she was surprised that the grandmother was 
a local authority worker herself but was behaving this way 
(Observation notes, day five, City teams).  
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Another example discussed previously was an allegation by a 
neighbour that a mother and her lesbian partner were shouting at a 
child in an abusive manner (interview seventeen, City teams). When the 
social worker visited the two women, who were both health and social 
care professionals, the child was at an after school club. They explained 
that their neighbour was intensely homophobic and had made previous 
malicious allegations. They refused consent to agency checks because 
they were concerned that this may prejudice their registration with their 
professional bodies. The practitioner had to leave before the child came 
back home and reported back to his manager, who said that the case 
should be closed. The practitioner felt that he should go back to 
interview the child, but the manager explained that the mother and her 
partner had given a convincing account and the pressure of new 
referrals meant that there was insufficient time.  
 
In both examples, the family members worked in health and social care 
settings and this appeared to influence practitioners to view them in a 
more positive light than would be justified by the evidence available. 
This can be seen as an example of the halo effect, which refers to the 
influence of an overall evaluation of a person on evaluations of their 
individual attributes, i.e., we are more likely to regard a person that we 
like as trustworthy, even when we have insufficient information to base 
this upon (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977).  
 
Practitioners had formed impressions about the family members early 
based upon limited knowledge and were surprised when contradictory 
evidence came in. In the first example, the practitioner responded 
quickly and made alternative plans whilst in the second example, the 
closure of the case meant that it would only be reappraised if a new 
referral came in.  
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This is interesting in the light of Munro's (1999) analysis of child death 
inquiries, which found that practitioners were vulnerable to confirmation 
bias, which meant that they were slow to revise their original opinions 
and tended to ignore contradictory evidence. The limited data available 
in this study would question this tendency, since the practitioner in the 
first example responded quickly when new information was available 
and there was no new information available in the second example. 
However, the difference can be at least partially explained by Munro's 
study being solely of child death inquiries rather than a general sample 
of child protection cases. If so, this would raise questions about the 
extent to which a study of exceptional cases can be generalised to 
everyday child protection practice. This will be discussed further in 
chapter 8. 
 
Another heuristic that was observed was the Semmelweis reflex, which 
refers to the tendency to automatically reject new evidence that 
contradicts a paradigm (Hardman, 2009). A commonly expressed belief 
within both settings was that children should be believed and that, when 
parental deception was suspected, talking with children was the ‘best 
hope' of getting at what actually happened: 
 
The mum says I no longer have contact with this person, I would 
straight out ask the child.  If the child hasn’t specifically been drilled 
on that issue, he may tell you the truth.  If there is no reason for the 
child to mislead, you can bet it will be the truth (Andrew, highly 
experienced practitioner/manager, interview ten, City team).  
 
If you want to engage what the parents’ behaviour is and how that’s 
impacting on the child and they are deceitful and they are not telling 
you the whole truth, the child is the only one that you’re going to get 
those answers from in order to assess the risk.  To me, if you have 
deceitful parents, it’s about the child always ... You really need to 
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build a relationship, you need the child to trust you because you’re 
not going to get it from the parents.  The only way you’re going to 
get it is from the child (Sadie, highly experienced 
practitioner/manager, interview fourteen, City teams).  
 
Children's accounts could be used as a means of establishing detailed 
information that can corroborate or challenge parental accounts. For 
example, one manager discussed how he asked children about their 
daily routine to check against the parent's account: 
 
You go through the kind of things that kids like talking about, then 
you home in on certain other things. Who are your friends at school?  
There's little clever questions.  Who are your favourite people? One 
I used to like was if the child is old enough to tell the time, I want to 
go through your average day, a day at the weekend and a day - 
right, it's 7:15 in the morning, what are you doing, are you still in 
bed?  Are you getting up?  Okay, now it's quarter to eight, what're 
you doing?  Where's everyone else in the house?  Are you looking 
forward to having your breakfast?  What are you gonna have for 
breakfast? Dah-de-dah all the way through the day (Andrew, highly 
experienced practitioner/manager, interview ten, City team).  
 
The only examples of practitioners not believing children were when 
children gave accounts in which they claimed that abuse had not taken 
place. For example, one City practitioner described investigating an 
allegation of the over-chastisement of a nine-year-old boy:  
 
You could tell just by the words that [the child] was using and the 
things that he was saying that he was proper like coached, you 
know like you could see that he was trained to the max, but he was 
not making any disclosures whatsoever.  But you could just get a 
feel from him, just by the way you know dad was talking about 
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discipline and how he feels you know, “in my country this is how we 
do this, and this is fine, blah, blah, blah.  However I realise that I’m 
not supposed to do that here, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah.”  But I 
mean it’s just like comments that he makes and the fact that the way 
that like a 9-year-old responds to certain questions, you just like 
okay yeah this doesn’t really make any sense and it just doesn’t 
sound right (Christina, experienced practitioner, interview eight, City 
teams).   
 
The examples of conflicts between accounts that practitioners found the 
most perplexing and disturbing were where children and young people 
made allegations that were found to be implausible, e.g., they had 
made allegations that the other evidence suggested were untrue 
(external inconsistency) or where their accounts contradicted 
themselves (internal inconsistency). This happened on two occasions 
where practitioners from different teams provided similar accounts of 
referrals where an adolescent girl (a 13-year-old in the first referral and 
a 15-year-old in the second referral) made allegations that a family 
member had sexually assaulted them. In both cases, the young people 
had made statements that were found to be highly inconsistent with 
other evidence. Such is the power of the core belief that 'children should 
be believed' that the practitioners were shaken and disturbed by this. 
Indeed, when I discussed this finding with a practitioner colleague, they 
asked me whether it was wise for me to include these findings as they 
are a little too controversial and may imply that I am ‘denying’ the 
realities of child abuse.  
 
One way to interpret this from a heuristics and biases perspective is to 
see it as an example of a Semmelweis reflex, which refers to the 
tendency to reject new evidence that contradicts a paradigm (Hardman, 
2009).  It could be argued that this response was the mirror opposite of 
a pre-Cleveland response to children making allegations of sexual 
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abuse, when professionals commonly found such allegations 
unbelievable and professional interpretations focused on why children 
may make up such claims (Butler-Sloss, 1988). In either scenario, the 
Semmelweis reflex operated to ensure that responses were based upon 
paradigmatic beliefs that may certain claims unbelievable. From a 
sociological perspective, it could be seen as consistent with the 
hierarchy of plausibility that White (1997) found in her ethnographic 
study of local authority children's teams. She found that when 
practitioners were exposed to competing accounts of events, there was 
a hierarchy in which the accounts of certain groups of informants were 
privileged over other groups. She found that children were placed 
highest in the hierarchy, followed by professionals, mothers, resident 
fathers and non-resident fathers and other male caregivers (White, 
1997). Indeed, she found that this belief in children's testimony was so 
strong that it had an 'almost consecrated correctness' (White, 1997, 
p.207). In many respects, there are considerable similarities between 
the two interpretations in which children’s allegations are responded to 
according to a strongly held set of beliefs.  
 
A final heuristic that was found was the availability heuristic, which is 
the tendency to overestimate the likelihood of events that can be 
retrieved from memory more easily, which can be influenced by how 
unusual or emotionally charged they may be as well as how recent they 
are. This will be discussed in chapter 7 as it was strongly linked to the 
organisational setting.  
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Sub-theme 6.1.2 - ‘Paper versus flesh and 
blood families’ 
 
After the referral and other information had been gathered and 
reviewed, the next stage was to meet the family. For the City teams, the 
initial assessment normally took the form of a single home visit. In the 
Sycamore service, families usually attended a series of sessions in the 
assessment centre.  
 
A number of practitioners discussed the potential for there to be 
discrepancies between the family described in the referral (the ‘paper 
family’) and the family that they encountered at the first meeting (the 
‘flesh and blood family’). A clinical associate in the Sycamore service 
and a student social worker in the City teams described their early 
experiences of hearing referral information:   
 
Oh my first, my first time, the first, first time that I was in the team 
meeting they were discussing about cases, and I was like ‘Oh my 
God, what job is that?’ [Laughter]. I hope the next family that we will 
be talking about is going to be something, you know not that bad not 
that…The anxiety, it’s awful and you think 'oh God is it going to be 
like this, all the time it’s going to be like this'? [Laughter] (Luisa, 
clinical associate and less experienced practitioner, interview 
nineteen, Sycamore service). 
 
 … sometimes in the papers it could be kind of, wow, kind of the 
most sensational facts are there and it’s like, “Oh my goodness do I 
actually want to see these people, what’s it gonna be like,”  And it 
can be quite intimidating and then when you actually, I mean in my 
experience anyway, when you actually see them actually they are 
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just people and it’s not, you know, the fear’s kind of gone (Nicola, 
interview thirteen, less experienced practitioner, City teams). 
 
The practitioners described feeling anxiety when they first heard the 
'sensational facts' of the cases. Practitioners from both sites described 
situations where the referral contains information that suggested high 
levels of risk that did not appear to reflect the family that they 
subsequently met: 
 
…other times you go out, what you have on paper is not what you 
get there.  Looking like these are two different families, what the 
history is telling me, what the file is telling me is totally different 
when you go there, this is not as bad… (Tanya, experienced 
practitioner, interview six, City teams).  
 
I had noticed you tend to hear like obviously all the concerns, so you 
get quite this negative picture built up I think at the beginning. But I 
think after a few families, I’ve started to kind of really actively try and 
reserve judgment a bit because it’s – especially because with the 
background information you get, often with children, adolescents, 
there’s always this really negative picture built up and you have this 
thought, “Oh goodness, what’s it going to be like when they come 
here?” But I think every time it’s been and I’ve learnt that it’s 
normally a lot more negative than the actual person that you meet 
and you’re pleasantly surprised (Tina, clinical associate and less 
experienced practitioner, interview eighteen, Sycamore service). 
 
Another practitioner described how the increased use of ICT systems 
and multi-agency networks meant that there was a considerable 
increase in the availability of information at the referral ('paper family') 
stage and expressed concern about decisions being made before 
meeting the family (the 'flesh and blood family'):  
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…with every referral you get a whole heap of information.  I think my 
worry about that is that too much information sometimes leads to the 
wrong decisions being made… as a social worker you need to be 
informed by information, obviously, but you need to not be overtaken 
by it either.  One cannot form a judgment until one has seen the 
landscape, the family, the child, the experience, the culture.  And the 
danger of getting, oh, so-and-so in the family has a criminal record 
for burglary and this person; there was been domestic violence 15 
years ago.  The more of that you get before you’ve actually done 
anything leads you to make judgments that you wouldn't otherwise 
necessarily make (John, clinical associate and highly experienced 
practitioner, interview 21, Sycamore service).  
 
He argued that it was only when the practitioner had visited the family 
and 'seen the landscape' that they could understand the context of the 
individual family. Otherwise, they may make judgments on the basis of 
referral information that could be misleading.   
 
However, some practitioners described the opposite experience of 
dealing with referrals which appeared straightforward but further 
investigation revealed more extensive and complex problems:   
 
I can think of times when the information that was presented to me 
in a referral has been… not necessarily a true reflection of what is 
going on for that family. Or perhaps they only one part of the bigger 
picture and it’s not until you as the social worker get in and start 
working with the family that you realise that ‘yes, that might be a 
presenting problem, but there is something bigger going on here’ 
(Amy, interview one, experienced practitioner, City teams). 
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. ..often you’ll be asked to look into one thing and actually discover 
that it’s much more complicated with something else going on that 
you wouldn’t have even known about if you hadn’t had your attention 
drawn to it' (Faith, interview three, experienced practitioner, City 
teams). 
 
Is what's specifically identified as the problem really gonna be what 
we’re gonna be dealing with?…  Are we looking at, you know, a 
bigger picture on this case? (Jeanette, interview eleven, 
experienced practitioner, City teams).  
 
Then the others you go there saying “oh no, what we have is 
nothing”, actually there is more going on here then they have given 
us. Just a cover of what is going on, the outside. When you go and 
dig deeper you find there is more and more going on (Tanya, 
experienced practitioner, interview six, City teams).  
 
… once you are able to dig little bit deeper… you know you uncover 
a lot of things that they were hiding from you (Christina, experienced 
practitioner, interview eight, City teams). 
  
Such referrals can be described as 'iceberg' referrals, where the 
presenting problems are symptomatic of more extensive problems that 
are not visible to the referrer. Whilst the former case involves 
practitioners meeting the family and feeling less anxious, iceberg 
referrals involve the opposite experience of growing anxiety as more 
extensive and complex problems are revealed.   
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6.2 Theme two: When the story stops 
making sense  
 
One of the most significant challenges to practitioner sense-making 
processes were conflicts between the different accounts that 
practitioners received from referrers, family members and other 
agencies, which was reported by the majority of practitioners (21 out of 
24 interviews). Two sub-themes, 'an evidential approach' and 'families 
playing the game' will be explored.   
 
Sub-theme 6.2.1: An evidential approach  
 
In both settings, practitioners tended to expect a certain amount of 
disagreement and the initial approach was usually a pragmatic 
‘checking out’ of accounts, which included gathering and checking 
information from the referrer, family members and other agencies 
involved with the children. For example, one practitioner from the City 
teams described getting referral information from the police or schools 
that provides a ‘snapshot’ but recognising that this may conflict with the 
family’s account: 
 
.. a referral is from a school or the police.. quite a good trustworthy 
source so one would assume that one believes them, but at the 
same time they’ve only got a snapshot… So I guess checking the 
two stories against each other and finding out what the exact facts 
are, what things that everyone agrees on and then if there are things 
that there is disagreement about how to cross check that with 
another service (Faith, interview three, experienced practitioner, City 
teams). 
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Practitioners from all levels of experience described the importance of 
an evidential approach, in which they focused on discrepancies in the 
information they received. However, a consistent finding across the 
interview and observational data was that experienced practitioners 
were more likely to adopt a more sophisticated evidential approach. 
This had three features; a more active evaluation of information 
received, the use of triangulation to corroborate evidence and an 
emphasis on observation.  
 
The first feature of this approach is to actively seek to corroborate 
information and to evaluate the reliability of sources. For example, an 
experienced practitioner described how she had previously made 
assumptions about the reliability of sources when she started child 
protection work: 
  
I would have tended to see the information that was given to me by 
another professional in a referral or information that was held on the 
system and tend to take that as… I would have given more weight to 
that than I would necessarily have given to what the family said, if 
they were saying something different' (Amy, interview one, 
experienced practitioner, City teams). 
 
She went on to describe how she no longer assumes that referral 
information from professionals is accurate and reliable. In the inquiry 
report following the death of Victoria Climbié, Lord Laming 
recommended that practitioners should have a 'respectful uncertainty' 
towards information received. He argued that practitioners should 
critically evaluate information received and keep an open mind, rather 
than simply being 'passive recipients' of information (Laming, 2003, 
p.205). Whilst Lord Laming was referring to information received from 
family members, practitioners described adopting a similar attitude 
towards a wide range of information that they received. Another 
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experienced practitioner described a case she was working on and 
argued that, although there was a temptation to prioritise information 
from referrers over information from family members, it was important to 
keep an open mind:   
 
The hospital now thinks that the injuries may be non-accidental, but 
they didn't think so at the time and they discharged the child. And 
there have been other occasions where they have got it wrong. It is 
tempting to think 'a doctor has said this so it must be true'. But we 
have to be open to the possibility that they have made a mistake. 
We can't just take the view that when a parent says it, it is their 
'story', but when a doctor says it, it is 'evidence’ (Faith, experienced 
practitioner, day three, observation notes, City teams). 
 
She went on to state that she had learnt to be more sceptical because 
she had experiences where the referral information was simply incorrect 
or was just one part of a bigger picture.  
 
The second feature of a more sophisticated evidential approach was 
the use of triangulation to corroborate evidence. One highly 
experienced practitioner offered the following definition of triangulation:  
 
So I might say, “This chap can’t stop blaming everybody else and 
seems to feel hopeless and helpless”, and he might have a test 
done that looks at locus of control, and he comes up very highly for 
external locus of control, and even better if the psychologist who did 
this test didn’t know about my observations before she did this.  So 
she is using her tool, which is standardised... I’m using my sort of 
hunches and experience and gut feeling; each has got its drawbacks 
and its strengths, but the fact is that we both found the same thing  
(Simon, senior clinician and highly experienced practitioner, 
interview 23, Sycamore service). 
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Another experienced practitioner stressed the importance of using 
triangulation to draw upon a range of sources to ensure that information 
is tested:  
 
It’s about a multitude of sources, I don’t just use one I observe on 
the one occasion…for me it’s about corroborating whatever view, so 
it’s fine you can say one thing or present one thing but I don’t take it 
on face value, it has to be substantiated either through the school, 
other agencies that are working with them. For instance, somebody 
says to me, ‘..I’m not in a relationship with his father anymore, 
however I can see that.. you’ve got two more kids together, I’m 
sorry’ (laughter) (Richard, highly experienced practitioner, interview 
twelve, City teams). 
 
The third feature of this more sophisticated evidential approach is that 
experienced practitioners were more likely to see observation as 
important and use it as a source of triangulation: 
 
I think observation is where it all begins… if you start off with an 
incomplete set of data because your observations aren’t sufficiently 
sensitive, inevitably, however well you organise and analyse the 
information, you very easily come to spurious conclusions because 
the observations were incomplete. So certainly the skill that all the 
team members need to share is those observational skills  (Simon, 
senior clinician and highly experienced practitioner, interview 23, 
Sycamore service). 
 
I think the observation thing is huge (Sadie, interview fourteen, 
highly experienced practitioner/manager, City teams).  
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More experienced practitioners demonstrated a greater emphasis on 
integrating their own observations as a source of evidence:  
 
A parent may say, “I’m very interested in my child’s education.  I 
think it’s very, very important,”. Where a less experienced 
practitioner might say, “Okay.  Yes, that’s good,” a more 
experienced practitioner would be, “Right okay, let me quickly 
glance around, can I see any school pictures up on the wall or can I 
see anything on the fridge or whatever?  Can I see a text book out? 
… I think the more experience you get the easier it is to walk into a 
house and look at pictures on the wall or look at maybe older kids 
that have graduated and think and draw conclusions from 
observations, not just what the parents are saying”  (Sadie, highly 
experienced practitioner/manager, interview fourteen, City teams).  
 
When I go to the home, you know, look at the basic set-up of the 
home, look at the basic food, clothing, shelter, that type of stuff I 
then look at family dynamics.  That really helps me assess a lot 
(Jeanette, experienced practitioner, interview eleven, City teams).   
 
…if she [the mother] talks about how close the family is and they go 
out to parks and they go onto outings, so I normally ask them for 
photos. So I’ll say, “Oh, show me some of the photos that you have,” 
and that, so when we’re working we’ll go into, “Oh, that’s a great 
park,” added “.. of course, the child has to confirm it as well. The 
child has to confirm that, “Yes we do this,” and, “Yes, we do that”  
(Areta, interview two, experienced practitioner, City teams).   
 
..I don’t know if this is right or not [laughs] ‘cause often it’s to do with 
your gut instinct a little bit so you’ve gotta be really cautious about 
double checking but I think a huge part of what I look for instinctively 
is probably to do with the perception of the kid and the subtleties of 
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what they’re saying about how they see the child… (Faith, 
experienced practitioner, interview three, City teams).   
 
The final practitioner makes an interesting point about following her 
intuition but being cautious by 'double checking' it with analytical 
reasoning. The evidential approach was expressed in its purest form by 
a practitioner from a medical background who gave a highly 
sophisticated account of a hierarchy of evidence: 
 
And then it’s all the sort of how you synthesise all of those things, 
the so-called hard facts, the softer observational facts and then 
the… You know how in like evidence-based practice, they have like 
this kind of hierarchy – the best hyper-scientific evidence, the meta 
analysis of a series of randomised control trials, and you go down 
from there – I think that actually, when the Court is valuing the input 
of an institution like this, they’re interested in everything, but you 
need to be quite discerning; you need to be able to say to them, 
“Look, I’m pretty positive about this, I’ve...”  Obviously you can’t 
present a meta analysis, but you can present maybe triangulated 
evidence.  You can say, “There’s evidence for this from this 
perspective, and from this perspective, and from this perspective”, 
and while all of them have their weaknesses in areas in the way that 
we’re looking, it’s pretty fucking amazing if they all say the same 
thing and there isn’t something important there’ (Simon, senior 
clinician and highly experienced practitioner, interview 23, Sycamore 
service).  
 
This account is likely to have been influenced by his medical training 
and used the language of that discipline. My response when reviewing 
this account was a sense that the child protection field has so few 
examples of the kinds of 'hyper-scientific' evidence available in other 
fields of medicine and that practitioners work with much 'softer' 
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evidence. There were no examples of social work practitioners using 
such an explicit formulation of the hierarchy of evidence, but the 
distinction between 'the so-called hard facts' and 'softer observational 
facts' and the use of triangulation to test evidence were implicit in case 
discussions and informal case talk in both settings.  
 
 
Sub-theme 6.2.2: Families 'playing the game'  
 
In both sites, there was a common tendency for practitioners to assume 
that families would want to minimise negative information and 
accentuate positive information, which several practitioners described 
as 'playing the game':  
 
It’s quite a scrutinising assessment process… it’s not a surprise if 
parents appear quite defensive and I guess you could term it playing 
the game but kind of trying to appear better than they are on paper 
perhaps (Tina, clinical associate and less experienced practitioner, 
interview eighteen, Sycamore service). 
 
This was commonly regarded as a normal reaction to a stressful 
situation. This is consistent with the observation by Tuck (2013, p.7) 
that professionals are often reluctant to make negative judgments about 
a parent, particularly if they regard the family as disadvantaged and 
socially excluded. However, practitioners also described being aware of 
this tendency:  
 
I think I am somebody that, I’m a naturally empathetic person so I 
kind of see the best in people even when I know they’ve done 
something really horrible so I’ll see the best in people and I’ll want to 
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believe them. So I think because of that, because I am aware of that 
myself I am also very cynical of anything that anyone says. So even 
if I’m like this is a lovely person, they seem to be totally on the 
money, lovely, yeah speaking the praises of the child, blah, blah, 
blah, they’re saying all the right things, I’ll still assume that I’m just a 
gullible fool! (Faith, experienced practitioner, interview three, City 
teams). 
 
One strategy used by families when they first met the social worker was 
to emphasise positive aspects but concerns were expressed that this 
focus on positives could be a potential means of distracting attention 
away from concerns: 
 
Sometimes they’ll respond really focused on the, “Yeah but they’re 
doing well in school” or whatever which is nice but that can 
sometimes be a diversion technique…they might genuinely be 
positives but actually you’re just focusing on it to draw my attention 
away from what I should be focusing on (Faith, experienced 
practitioner, interview three, City teams). 
 
Parents eagerly, they eagerly want to tell you about the good things 
that are happening. They are eagerly wanting to show the education 
and how they’re going in and achieving and they’ll pull out their 
reports and all their achievements… They want to please you and 
they want to tell you what you want to hear. They know what to tell 
you (Areta, experienced practitioner, interview two, City teams).   
 
Some people tell you what you want to hear, but it’s about you 
making sure that you can substantiate it (Richard, highly 
experienced practitioner, interview twelve, City teams). 
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One of the most commonly parental strategies described was a family 
member portraying himself or herself as open and willing to engage with 
the practitioner. Whilst this could be genuine, practitioners kept an open 
mind:  
 
I think that if they are more open then this would give what they are 
saying more weight. But equally, you have to be wary of people who 
are almost too willing to engage with you. This could be a 
smokescreen for something else. It’s ‘playing the game’, exactly like 
Baby P. The mother was incredibly good at fooling people and 
telling them what they want to hear.  Perhaps she needed to in order 
to get them off her back (Amy, experienced practitioner, interview 
one, City teams). 
 
[Parents] can be very welcoming, very open but open to an extent, it 
meets what they want, then when you start opening other things, 
other areas, oh no that is when they turn.  Appearance of being 
engaging but passively engaging that is what I just think; I think 
those are the more risky ones […]  They are more risky in that they 
will only let you in on their terms (Tanya, experienced practitioner, 
interview six, City teams). 
 
 
Even when the professionals found the family member's account 
convincing, they could remain cautious. For example, two experienced 
practitioners at the Sycamore service described a mother they were 
working with who had engaged well and been highly motivated. One 
practitioner described her in positive terms as someone whom it was 
'enjoyable to work with' and the other practitioner agreed, then added, 
‘But she has spent all of her life in the care system, she knows how we 
work. So this may be her strategy' (Day 22, observation notes, 
Sycamore service). He felt positive feelings towards the mother but was 
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suspicious that she may be engaging well with professionals because 
she knew this was the best way for her to achieve a good outcome for 
herself. 
 
There were examples of parents who had long histories of local 
authority involvement who tried to present professionals with over-
optimistic accounts, which could be described as 'It'll be different this 
time' stories. In the City teams, a student described a mother who 
wanted to offer an unrealistically positive story: 
 
[The mother] had been through the whole process previously of 
having children removed from her care so it was like she had 
developed a story of what she thought would change people’s 
perceptions. She kept telling everything that was different this time, 
her life was stable, how she’d been in contact with her previous child 
and that was her dream, to get this child back, how everything was 
going to be different this time.  You know, maybe seeing what her 
previous issues had been and making sure that she’d found a way 
of accounting for how things would have been different, but sadly it 
fell apart quite quickly (Nicola, less experienced practitioner, 
interview thirteen, City teams).  
 
The accounts were usually implausible to practitioners, but they often 
found it difficult to ascertain whether the family members genuinely 
believed what they were saying or were engaging in more cynical 
manipulation.  
 
There was a continuum between family members engaging in mild 
forms of managing self-presentation to more intentional and systematic 
forms of deception. This could include family members disclosing 
negative information in a pre-emptive way in order to try to offer a more 
positive account if they think that the matter is likely to come to light 
  
209 
anyway. For example, one practitioner in the City teams described a 
stepfather who was proactive in disclosing that there had been local 
authority involvement in relation to a child by a previous relationship 
(interview thirteen, City teams). The stepfather claimed that it was all a 
misunderstanding because the child had brittle bone disease but it 
subsequently came to light that he had a criminal conviction for 
assaulting the child. 
 
Whilst practitioners expect a certain amount of disagreement or 
dissonance, most were alert to indications that this could be systematic 
deception on the part of families. Practitioners tended to expect that 
families would want to present themselves in the best light, but 
demonstrated an awareness that this could go beyond this into the 
territory of parental deception, where family members may be engaging 
in systematic and deliberate deception.  
 
 
6.3 Theme three: Truth and lies: 
Suspected parental deception as extreme 
case  
 
You're dealing with people who are working in a secret world.  Child 
abuse does not take place out in the open, it’s secret (John, clinical 
associate and highly experienced practitioner, interview 21, 
Sycamore service). 
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Parental deception refers to deliberate attempts by family members to 
provide false and misleading information to professionals. I have used 
the term 'parental deception' for the sake of simplicity, though there 
were occasionally examples of other family members engaging in 
deception on the parents' behalf. The focus will primarily be upon 
deception in family members' verbal accounts and it is not intended to 
be a comprehensive account of how parents may engage in deceptive 
strategies, which may include behaviour such as stage managing home 
visits or aggressive behaviour designed to unsettle practitioners 
(Ferguson, 2010, 2011; Tuck, 2013). It was a commonly reported 
problem in both sites and there is evidence that it is a more widespread 
problem. For example, a series of analyses of serious case reviews 
commissioned by the government identified deception by families as a 
recurring theme (Brandon et al., 2008, 2010, 2012). It is of particular 
interest to this study because it can be seen as a limiting or extreme 
example that presents significant challenges to the sense-making skills 
of practitioners.  
 
Practitioners described a wide range of deceptive behaviours, ranging 
from very crude attempts to quite elaborate forms of deception. One 
practitioner described how parental deception can simply be rather 
chaotic and even have a compulsive quality: 
 
Some people just tell you straight, well tell you based on what 
they're thinking at the moment, and don’t consider the issue of 
consistency of statements very much.  There are other people who 
all you can say is if this person said something that is an indicator 
that it's most unlikely to be true.  There are people who almost on - 
who will say untrue things even when that benefits them in no way 
or has no bearing on anything.  And we meet people like that.  So 
the information they tell you might not be of much use in terms of 
helping you describe reality in terms of what goes in your initial core 
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assessment.  But it can help you describe the person telling you it 
(Andrew, highly experienced practitioner/manager, interview ten, 
City team). 
 
Another practitioner used irony to describe how family members can 
present implausible challenges to negative information about them by 
portraying themselves as victims of misinformation and 
misunderstandings:  
 
Some people will attack the detail, and they can recite the evidence 
that the local authority will be submitting, but there are mistakes and 
misunderstandings in every element, and you know, it ends up that 
really, through an amazing string of coincidences, they’ve been 
totally misunderstood. And that sort of sense of irony that’s coming 
into my response is because they seem to lack this ability to step 
back and look at the big picture.  How could it be that there are sort 
of fifteen or so mistakes that are all pointing the same direction, in 
this case?  But it’s the person who clearly is able to fool themselves, 
who speaks about their behaviour in a way that would, to any 
reasonable listener, betray quite a lot of concerns and so forth, but 
it’s quite clear that they aren’t concerned or worried about their 
behaviour. So these are the sort of ‘no regrets’ types.  And if they’re 
lying, it’s not very good lying, it’s not very really sort of effective lying 
(Simon, senior clinician and highly experienced practitioner, 
interview 23, Sycamore service).  
 
At the other extreme, some parents engaged in quite elaborate forms of 
deception that went beyond isolated lies to constitute an elaborate 
social identity that was presented to professionals:   
 
I had a child protection case where mum was a drug user, like heavy 
drug user.  However the family seem to have like slipped through 
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the nets because to me she was one of the most high functioning 
drug users I have ever met in my whole entire life.  She’s very…she 
can compartmentalise everything in her life.  I mean outside she 
was, you know, she was a member of the PTA and supervised the 
swimming lessons and her kids were…her children were intelligent, 
well presented, always went to school on time, you know, never 
raised any concerns.  She was a crack user.  So she would have 
like these air purifiers in the home and stuff… (Christina, 
experienced practitioner, interview eight, City teams). 
 
In response to suspected parental deception, practitioners described a 
range of strategies or ‘tricks of the trade’. There was a tendency for 
experienced practitioners to feel more confident and to have developed 
strategies for challenging parents in less confrontational ways. One 
recently qualified worker described how she would be aware that a 
parent may be engaged in dishonesty, but found it uncomfortable to 
directly challenge the parent because this broke social conventions: 
 
In the ideal world, I should challenge them.  But, in reality I do 
struggle and am still struggling with, you know, feeling I shouldn’t be 
too intrusive.  I should be polite, I shouldn’t ask too much about their 
private life…  So, I think I still have to gain experience in terms of 
how to bring up and challenge a parent diplomatically (Josie, less 
experienced practitioner, interview four, City teams).  
 
Similarly, an experienced manager contrasted how she responded to 
suspected parental deception when she first qualified compared to how 
she currently responded: 
 
I know when I first qualified, “Okay right, this isn’t quite right,” and 
often I’d left, had a thought about it and thought, “No, that’s not right.  
I’ve got to go back,” and wasted another visit where it wasn’t 
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necessary, but because I didn’t have the confidence… to say, “Well 
no actually, I didn’t like the answer to that, can you explain more?”  
So I’ve had to phone and say, “Can I come back?” because you 
think about it and you prepare your challenges more or you prepare 
your questioning more and go back.  Whereas 10 years’ experience 
you know, “Right okay, that doesn’t sound right.  I’m not going to 
come back next week because I’ve got 10 cases to come back to 
next week, I will challenge there and then" (Sadie, highly 
experienced practitioner/manager, interview fourteen, City teams).  
 
The manager then described how the less experienced workers that 
she supervised sometimes did not challenge parents and she felt that 
this was because they were concerned about how family members may 
react: 
 
I do find sometimes with the less experienced workers, it’s another 
visit, “Did you ask this?  Did you ask this?” and  I don’t actually think 
it’s, “No, because I forgot.”  I think sometimes there is an element of, 
“Well, she did say that, but I didn’t really know whether to push it or 
whether to take it any further because I didn’t know her reaction“. 
But I suppose, as you go on, and see more and more parents, you 
get the confidence (Sadie, highly experienced practitioner/manager, 
interview fourteen, City teams). 
 
Another practitioner who had been qualified for almost 18 months said 
that when she started out, she would have taken any inconsistencies in 
parent's accounts to her manager for advice rather than challenging the 
family member immediately. She added that she now felt able to 
address it with the family member at the time:  
 
I don’t think that ‘challenge’ is necessarily the right word, but I would 
bring it up in a calm and diplomatic way: “You did say ‘A, B and C’ 
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earlier and now you’re saying ‘X, Y and Z’. Could I just clarify this? I 
need to take some notes. Are you saying this or are you saying 
that? (Interviewer agreement and laughter). You can tell something 
from the person’s response. Everybody’s accounts can change over 
time and sometimes people can genuinely get things muddled up in 
their head. But if you take someone to that point and say, ‘Could you 
just clarify that for me?’... there is almost a bit of ‘playing dumb’ in 
there… ‘Maybe I didn’t write that down right’. You can judge a lot 
from people’s response to that. If they get a bit flustered about that, 
it indicates that they are trying to hide something and pull the wool 
over your eyes (Amy, experienced practitioner, interview one, City 
teams). 
 
Experienced practitioners described a range of strategies such as 
'playing dumb' (above) to work with suspected parental deception, 
which one manager described as the 'tricks of the trade'. For example, 
one practitioner described a similar strategy of 'playing dumb' during a 
home visit where there were concerns about neglect and poor home 
conditions:  
 
[The mother] doesn’t have the ability to clean the house consistently 
and everybody around her and in the family, even her children are 
saying that she lives in a pig sty but you turn up and everything 
looks beautiful, immaculate, clean and tidy but then you’ll find out it 
was friends that cleaned up the place, not her… we’ll question her 
and say, “Gosh! When did you start cleaning?” and, “How long did it 
take you?” And half the time, they don’t know how to respond, they 
don’t know how to answer it, so you really have to be in the game of 
social work for a long time to master some of these skills and 
knowledge (Areta, experienced practitioner, interview two, City 
teams). 
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Another strategy was to draw upon observational data. For example, a 
practitioner in the Sycamore service who had considerable experience 
as a local authority manager, described the following approach to home 
visits:  
 
You already plan with the other social worker that they’ll want to use 
the toilet when they're there, so they can go upstairs… check that 
out.  Quite a lot of families sit in the kitchen, so you’ve got a good 
eye line.. they open the fridge door when they get the milk out and 
you can have a look in the fridge’ (John, clinical associate and highly 
experienced practitioner, interview 21, Sycamore service).  
 
Such covert methods are ethically questionable because they are not 
transparent and did not demonstrate an authoratitive approach 
(Ferguson, 2011), but they illustrated how practitioners managed the 
intrusive nature of their work. In summary, experienced practitioners 
reported greater confidence in challenging suspected parental 
deception and had developed strategies or 'tricks of the trade' that 
helped them. The common theme amongst these strategies were that 
they enabled practitioners to challenge family members in ways that 
were less confrontational. 
 
 
6.4. Summary and discussion 
 
In this chapter, the process of professional sense-making that 
practitioners engaged in was explored. In summary, practitioners 
engaged in sense-making processes that were led by intuitive (System 
1) judgment and evaluated by analytic (System 2) reasoning. In the 
early stages, sense-making processes were predominantly driven by 
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intuitive processes, understood as pattern recognition and story building 
that drew upon their repertoire of experience. Analytic processes were 
secondary, acting as a check on the suggestions and judgments 
generated through intuitive processes. Such sense-making processes 
were compatible with the dual process model, which describes the 
interplay between intuitive (System 1) and analytic (System 2) 
reasoning (Evans and Frankish, 2009).  
 
The intuitive (System 1) judgments came from two main sources. 
Firstly, they came from experienced practitioners engaging in skilful 
sense-making that drew upon their previous experience in order to spot 
patterns. When experienced practitioners reviewed the initial 
information that they received about families, they commonly described 
looking for patterns in the information that helped them to start to 
develop a story about the family. At the referral stage, receiving too little 
or too much information provided different challenges for practitioners - 
too little information was anxiety-provoking and too much information 
was overwhelming. As practitioners gained experienced, they 
developed ways of managing the volume of information and commonly 
focused on a smaller number of key sources of information. 
Experienced practitioners were also more able to spot missing 
information, usually because they were engaged in more sophisticated 
pattern spotting that compared current information with a previous 
repertoire of similar experiences. Practitioners described commonly 
experiencing a difference between the family described in the referral 
information (the 'paper family') and the family they met (the 'flesh and 
blood family'). More experienced practitioners came to expect this and 
the most commonly reported difference was that the flesh and blood 
family was less anxiety-provoking than the paper family. However, there 
were some referrals, known as 'iceberg' referrals, where the problems 
identified in the referral were symptoms of deeper and more complex 
problems. These processes of pattern recognition and story building by 
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experienced practitioners were compatible with a recognition primed 
decision making (RPD) model, which describes how experienced 
practitioners see patterns when they start to see particular cues that link 
together and this leads them to look for further cues based on the 
accumulated experience (Klein, 1999, 2009).   
 
However, the second source of intuitive judgments was cognitive 
vulnerabilities identified by the heuristics and bias approach that lead to 
systematic errors arising from the use of everyday heuristics that were 
not linked to professional experience and expertise (Kahneman, 2011). 
The heuristics and biases that were found were the availability heuristic, 
the halo effect, confirmation bias and the Semmelweis reflex. 
 
Emotional responses could sometimes hinder, e.g. feeling anxious 
when there was too little information, but they could also help. 
Practitioners in both sites described paying attention to their emotional 
responses, though Sycamore practitioners were more likely to be 
confident on drawing upon their own emotional responses as additional 
'soft' information and including them in the pattern recognition process. 
This is likely to be because the psychological paradigm that the service 
works within is more likely to regard such responses as acceptable, 
though practitioners were wary of presenting this data too prominently 
in court reports. More experienced practitioners described comparing 
their emotional responses to a current family with their previous 
responses to a variety of families that they had worked with, which 
seemed similar to pattern recognition processes.  
 
One of the most commonly-reported challenges to sense-making 
processes were conflicts and inconsistencies in the different accounts 
that practitioners received. Practitioners generally responded with a 
pragmatic approach that involved checking the different accounts. 
Whilst less experienced practitioners tended to assume that referral 
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information from professional sources were accurate, more experienced 
practitioners were more likely to keep an open mind to the possibility 
that information from referrers may be incorrect or only part of the 
overall picture. Experienced practitioners were more likely to adopt a 
more sophisticated evidential approach. This had three features; a more 
active evaluation of information received, the use of triangulation to 
corroborate evidence and an emphasis on observation.  
 
Practitioners described the most challenging cases as those where 
there is suspected parental deception. There was a distinction between 
family members presenting themselves in the best possible light 
(‘playing the game’) and engaging in active and intentional deceit 
(parental deception). Whilst the former was regarded as understandable 
and therefore acceptable to some degree, the latter was regarded with 
considerable concern. Experienced practitioners reported greater 
confidence in challenging suspected parental deception and described 
a range of strategies or 'tricks of the trade' to work with suspected 
parental deception. The common theme amongst these strategies was 
that they enabled practitioners to challenge family members in ways 
that were less confrontational. 
 
The emphasis in this chapter has been on the commonalities in sense-
making processes between both sites. In the next chapter, the focus will 
be on the second part of my research question, the impact of 
organisational setting on these sense-making processes. 
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Chapter 7: Sense-making within 
organisations  
 
 
This is the final of four findings chapters. Chapters four and five 
examined the two research sites in detail and chapter six focused on 
the sense-making processes that practitioners engaged in across both 
sites. The aim of this chapter is to respond to my second research 
question, namely, in what ways contrasting organisational settings 
influenced practitioners’ sense-making processes. Whilst the previous 
chapter focused upon commonalities in sense-making processes 
across both sites, this chapter will examine how differences in 
organisational setting had an impact on practitioners' thinking.   
 
This chapter is centred on three main themes. The first theme, 'time to 
think', explores how timescales and opportunities for reflective thinking 
shaped practitioner sense-making processes. The second theme, 
'space to think’, undertakes a similar analysis related to the 
opportunities for reflective thinking. The final theme, 'cultures of 
accountability', examines how organisational understandings of 
accountability affected levels of anxiety and social defences within the 
two settings.  
 
 
7.1 Theme one: ‘Time to think’  
 
The first theme in the comparison between the two sites was the 
availability of ‘time to think’, which refers to the timescales available to 
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practitioners to work on a case before they had to produce a final 
assessment report. The difference in timescales was an important 
factor that influenced practitioner sense-making processes on the two 
sites, which was evident across observational and interview data.  
 
The influence of time limits was a strong theme in the City teams and 
this was discussed in depth in chapter four. In the City teams, the 
principal focus of the work was initial assessments, which were 
completed within the time limit of seven working days. In chapter four, 
interview data highlighted how practitioners consistently stated 
described these time limits as having an impact upon their work with 
families and observation data confirmed how this sense of urgency 
permeated their everyday activities. 
 
In the Sycamore service, by comparison, the pressure of timescales did 
not feature as a significant theme. The usual timescale for a parenting 
assessment was at least six weeks or longer, though sometimes court 
timescales meant the assessment was more urgent. Although the court 
fixed dates for reports to be filed, there was some degree of negotiation 
depending upon their availability, the complexity of the case and other 
factors. Although the timescales could be taxing, there was little 
indication that practitioners felt this significantly compromised the 
quality of their work, merely presented challenges to it. Whilst there 
were time pressures to compete their assessments, there were no 
examples of practitioners describing this as problematic in the 
interviews nor were there examples of it being a visible influence in the 
observational data.  
 
The contrast between the two settings was discussed by a Sycamore 
practitioner who had come from a local authority social work 
background, who started by describing her previous local authority 
experience: 
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In fieldwork when you go into supervision, it's a case of, "Right, 
you've got 50 cases...". There is no time to think about things 
(Louise, senior clinician and highly experienced practitioner, 
observation notes, day two, Sycamore service). 
 
In the individual interview that took place several months later, the 
same practitioner returned to this topic when she described her 
previous experience working in local authority children's teams:  
 
I remember the sense of it being like A&E, just a sense of being 
continually bombarded with referrals and requests to attend to 
something, someone and you quite often, sort of sense of blurred 
boundaries in terms of what you are thinking about, what you are 
focusing on and the difficulty really to stop and think.  And now 
having had the experience of working in this kind of setting, I think 
the absolute void between the two types of my, two aspects of my 
role, are two different contexts (Louise, senior clinician and highly 
experienced practitioner, interview twenty, Sycamore court 
assessment service).  
 
This excerpt relates to a different local authority than the City teams, so 
must be treated with caution. However, the description of local authority 
children's teams as like 'A&E', where practitioners are 'continually 
bombarded with referrals' conveys many similarities with my 
observations of the City teams. There were two sub-themes that related 
to the contrast in timescales between the research sites, which will be 
examined in turn. These were pressures for the investigation to be 
reduced to fit the time limits and the threshold for an acceptable story. 
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7.1.1 Sub-theme: Pressure for the investigation 
to be reduced to fit the time limits 
 
Assessments in both settings had to be completed within timescales so 
the depth of the assessment had to be tailored to the time available. 
However, this was experienced more acutely in the City teams because 
of the significantly greater pressure of referrals combined with shorter 
and more rigid timescales. Given that there were a fixed number of 
workers to investigate referrals and rigid time limits in the City teams, 
one potential area of flexibility was the depth of the assessment. 
Practitioners described how the time limits meant that initial 
assessments typically consisted of a single, one-hour home visit: 
 
We’re forced to go out for an hour maximum to go and see these 
families and try and get as much information (Areta, experienced 
practitioner, interview two, City teams). 
 
The rigid time scales that we have, especially with initial 
assessments, means you sometimes don’t have the opportunity to 
see them more than once…  You can see them once, speak for the 
child alone on one occasion and do checks with other agencies and 
then try and make a decision on that, which sometimes I don’t think 
is enough time really…  I always feel that even with like initial 
assessments, we don’t have the time.  You just don’t have the time. 
(Christina, interview eight, experienced practitioner, City teams). 
 
Such limited direct contact with families was experienced by 
practitioners as problematic and even by the families themselves:  
 
There’s written complaints, they write and say, ‘you were with me for 
45 minutes and you judge my life?  You didn’t listen to my story, you 
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only asked the questions you needed to fill out the information', 
those are weekly complaints (Jeanette, interview eleven, 
experienced practitioner, City teams). 
 
When conducting an assessment, it is always necessary to decide at 
some point that there is sufficient information in order to complete a 
‘good enough’ assessment. Within the City teams, there was some 
evidence that staff engaged in optimistic thinking as a means of 
justifying less information gathering, particularly when time and 
resources were limited: 
 
I think the timescale does, yeah, have an impact on how we view the 
information ‘cause sometimes we tend to, “Okay, maybe lets be a bit 
more optimistic so that we could do less investigation and give it in 
seven days.” [Laughter]  Sometimes I find that I do try to observe the 
managers, you know, their opinion if they think, “Okay maybe we 
shouldn’t be doing too much investigation, don’t try to, you know, 
call the doctor, the GP or nurse or health visitor.  Just send them a 
letter.  If they don’t respond to you don’t go and keep digging (Josie, 
interview four, less experienced practitioner, City teams). 
 
If you really take a forensic approach, it is very much down to how 
do we know what we know and if you’ve got this allegation what do 
you need to do in order to be less uncertain about what’s happened. 
You need to make your enquiries and sometimes I think managers 
based on the huge number of referrals we get in, often make 
decisions that perhaps some people would regard as quite risky in a 
sense that they can’t know for certain when they’re saying NFA [No 
further action]' (Jonathan, experienced practitioner, interview 
seventeen, City teams).  
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It was interesting to note that, when there was a shortage of time, the 
first task to be sacrificed was often time spent with the family and 
particularly children:  
 
If I have to produce an assessment and there are managers at your 
back saying that, “You have to produce it before this and this day, I 
have to sign it off.”  Then my focus would definitely not be focusing 
on playing with the child and seeing them.  And if I have questions to 
go to see them again, yeah.  I mean I have no time to see them 
again, or I have no time to go back to the family, “Look, actually I 
have more questions to ask you.”  No, I’m not going to do that 
because I have to finish the report, set time to type it up actually, do 
all the paperwork instead of prioritising, no I have to go back and 
see them again… although sometimes I know that I need to, but I 
can’t  (Josie, less experienced practitioner, interview four, City 
teams). 
 
This could be understood in several different ways. Firstly, the time 
limits mean that the assessment task has been conceived more as 
collecting information rather than genuinely seeking to understand 
children's experiences. Parton (2008) argues that social work practice 
has become increasingly less concerned with the relational and social 
dimensions of the work and more with the informational dimensions. 
There is evidence from previous studies that this prioritisation of written 
assessment over face-to-face work with families was a more 
widespread trend. For example, the ethnographic study of the 
Integrated Children’s System (ICS) discussed in chapter two found that 
practitioners reported that they spent between 60-80% of their time 
doing ofﬁce-bound work (Broadhurst et al., 2010; White et al, 2010). 
 
A second and possibly complementary interpretation is that 
practitioners, consciously or unconsciously, sought to defend 
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themselves against children's painful experiences by distancing 
themselves from the child, and the existence of fixed time limits 
provided a 'legitimate' rationale for this. A clinical associate at the 
Sycamore service who was also a local authority manager described 
the challenges of genuinely seeking to understand the experiences of 
children:  
 
In a sense of, you're always trying to understand the child’s 
experience, even if the child is talking to you about something that 
happened to them at the hands of the parents, you're exposing 
yourself to that child’s hurt.  You internalise it somewhat, you have 
to work your way through it, you have to process it, as well as 
obviously, put it back out there, as an assessment.  So it comes in 
and goes out, but it leaves you with a residue and the more cases 
you deal with the greater the residue that you end up carrying… you 
become swamped with the residue of all these nasty things that 
you’ve deal with throughout the whole of your stuff (John, clinical 
associate and highly experienced practitioner, interview 21, 
Sycamore service).   
 
This powerful account identifies how emotionally painful it can be to 
seek to understand children's experiences and helps explain why 
practitioners may avoid engaging in the process to avoid 'carrying the 
residue' that can lead to feeling emotionally 'swamped'. This goes part 
of the way to explaining the disturbingly frequency and well-
documented references to practitioners not having meaningful contact 
with the child in inquiries and serious case reviews (Brandon et al., 
2008; Ferguson, 2011). For example, Ferguson (2005) describes how 
the professionals involved with Victoria Climbié did not discuss feelings 
such as disgust and fears for their own wellbeing in staff supervision 
and so they were never properly acknowledged in order to be worked 
through. This raises questions about how such experiences are 
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'detoxified' in child protection settings and the role of supervision will be 
explored in section 7.2.  
 
 
7.1.2  Sub-theme: Threshold for an acceptable 
story 
 
In chapter six, it was argued that practitioners in both sites were 
engaging in sense-making processes that involved pattern recognition 
and story building. The assessment process was complete when 
practitioners felt that they had built an adequate story that explained the 
information available about the family, which was presented in a written 
report.  
 
In the City teams, fluctuations in referral levels placed high demands 
upon the service. Given the rigid time limits and a fixed number of 
workers to investigate referrals, a potential area of flexibility is the 
threshold for what counts as an acceptable story. In the previous 
chapter a neighbour referral was briefly discussed concerning the 
children of a mother and her lesbian partner who were accused of 
shouting at their children in an abusive manner (interview seventeen, 
City teams). When the social worker visited the two women, who were 
both health and social care professionals, the children were not at 
home. The couple gave a 'very, very plausible' account of how they had 
experienced long-term harassment from the neighbour who was 
intensely homophobic and had made previous malicious allegations. 
They refused consent to agency checks because they were concerned 
that this may prejudice their registration with their professional bodies 
and the practitioner had to leave before the children came back home. 
When the worker returned to the office, the duty manager decided to 
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close the case despite the fact that the children had not been seen and 
agency checks had not been completed. The practitioner felt that he 
should go back to interview the children, but the manager stated that 
there was insufficient time and they had enough to close the case. He 
described arguing with his manager:  
 
We need to actually see the children.  It's an absolutely basic 
element of child protection. It's just almost kind of coming to a 
conclusion too quickly.  There’s so much pressure on timescales 
that we’re losing sight… it’s so easy to lose sight of how are you 
coming to the conclusion that you’re coming to.  How are you 
making the decision that you’re making? (Jonathan, experienced 
practitioner, interview seventeen, City teams).  
 
He concluded that pressure of referrals could influence what gets 
regarded as an acceptable story that would justify categorising a 
referral as 'no further action':  
 
I find it frustrating sometimes because it feels like depending on how 
stressed or how busy are at any one time, people’s threshold for 
what’s an acceptable story or what’s acceptable for closure or NFA 
[no further action] varies (Jonathan, experienced practitioner, 
interview seventeen, City teams). 
 
This example could be understood in different ways. Firstly, from a 
heuristics and biases perspective, it could be seen as an example of the 
halo effect (Kahneman, 2011). The halo effect refers to the error of 
knowing individual attributes of the family member ('they are health and 
social care professionals', 'they are a lesbian couple') and inferring 
other attributes ('they are therefore unlikely to have abused their 
children'). This is combined with a negative halo effect in relation to the 
neighbour referral, in which anonymous and neighbour referrals are 
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more likely to be categorised as malicious, a finding that has been 
consistently reported (Department of Health, 1995; Broadhurst et al., 
2010; Buckley, 2003). However, another interpretation is that 
practitioners are more likely to over-identify with professional parents 
and more likely to imagine what it is like to be subject to a child 
protection investigation. In a focus group study of child protection 
practitioners, Horwarth (2010) found that practitioners acknowledged 
that they 'tended to tread more cautiously' with families from higher 
socio-economic groups (Horwath, 2011, p.1080). Participants stated 
that this did this because parents would know their rights and be better 
able to argue their case and they also recognised that they can over-
identify with the parents and expressed their own sense of anxiety at 
the thought of being subject to a child protection assessment. A third 
interpretation is that this was an example of the 'rule of optimism' 
(Dingwall et al., 1983), whereby families are expected to submit to 
external scrunity on the basis that agency staff are required to think the 
best of the parents as part of the compromises involved in the a liberal 
society. These alternative interpretations are not mutually exclusive 
('either/or') but can be multi-layered ('both/and') understandings that 
offer explanations at different levels (Larner, 2000). In this example, it 
appears that a number of cognitive, emotional and organisational 
processes worked together to create a scenario where basic child 
protection practices such as talking with children were forgotten.  
 
In the Sycamore service, by comparison, the thresholds for an 
acceptable story did not feature as a significant theme. This is likely to 
be linked to the primary purpose of the service, which was to offer an in-
depth assessment of the family. Whilst the emphasis in the City teams 
was on early categorisation, the Sycamore service attached importance 
to not getting too fixed a view of the family too early. In the Sycamore 
service, one of the themes was avoiding rushing into premature 
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narratives without allowing sufficient time to digest and discuss all of the 
information:  
 
 …not having a prefixed picture of the family in your mind sometimes 
gives you the opportunity to, you know, to go ahead and see it a 
different way as wouldn’t happen if you had already formed a 
stereotypical picture of the family (Luisa, clinical associate and less 
experienced practitioner, interview nineteen, Sycamore service). 
 
This can be understood as different approaches to intuitive (System 1) 
and analytic (System 2) processes. In both research sites, intuitive 
reasoning processes were the driving force, as practitioners engaged in 
pattern recognition and story building as they sought to construct an 
assessment. The key differences related to the different time scales and 
primary tasks. In the City teams, the primary task was to conduct 
assessments to safeguard children within short, fixed time limits. In the 
Sycamore service, the primary task was to conduct assessments to 
inform long-term court decisions within longer and more flexible time 
limits.  
 
In chapter five, the purpose of the group sessions in the Sycamore 
service was examined. Practitioners worked as part of a team to 
discuss their thoughts and to generate and evaluate hypotheses to 
explain what was happening within the family. These discussions were 
characterised by intuitive reasoning in the form of pattern recognition 
and story building and the hypotheses generated were examined using 
analytic reasoning in order to establish which were most consistent with 
the evidence and had the most explanatory potential. These 
hypotheses then formed the final account contained in the assessment 
report. This report was then subject to the scrutiny of the court process 
and would need to be defended in a court hearing. As they were 
providing an expert witness service to inform court decisions, 
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maintaining an open mind early on in the process was valued in order to 
counter the charge that they had decided the outcome based upon first 
impressions then simply collected evidence to substantiate a decision 
that had already been made. This supports the claim by Munro (2008a) 
that courts value analytic thinking more highly than intuitive thinking 
because legal reasoning requires an explicit rationale to justify the 
decision made.  
 
 
7.2 Theme two: ‘Space to think’ 
 
The second theme in the comparison between the two sites was the 
availability of ‘thinking space’ to talk about cases. This refers to 
opportunities for practitioners to discuss cases with others, including 
managers, colleagues or other professionals.  These opportunities 
could be divided into 'planned versus unplanned' spaces. Planned 
thinking spaces included formal individual supervision and group 
sessions. Unplanned thinking spaces refers to all forms of ad hoc case 
discussions, most commonly informal and reactive case discussions 
between practitioners and managers or colleagues within the office 
setting.  
 
Planned supervision took the form of individual supervision and group 
sessions. In the City teams, practitioners routinely stated that individual, 
formal supervision sessions occurred approximately every 3-6 months 
and the primary focus was on workload management. For example, one 
City practitioner described her experience of supervision:  
 
You go through the cases and your manager says, 'when is this one 
going to close, this one has been opened way too long, get rid of 
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this, close it, type it, close it, move it somewhere, do something. So I 
think those are the times you go into supervision and expect “oh no 
they are going to ask me when I am going to close this case”.  So I 
am so engrossed in when I am going to close this case at times you 
are not thinking through how much you are struggling with the case 
(Tanya, experienced practitioner, interview six, City teams). 
 
In the Sycamore service, formal individual supervision happened more 
regularly, typically occurring several times during a specific family 
assessment but the focus was similar, in that they primarily focused 
upon practical case management issues. Interestingly, it was the group 
discussion sessions that were the focus of shared practitioner sense-
making.  
 
The primary difference between the two sites was that the Sycamore 
service had planned group sessions focused upon specific families and 
there were no comparable opportunities in the City teams. Whilst the 
City teams had regular brief team meetings in the morning when they 
were on duty, the primary focus was allocating the work that was 
coming in rather than discussing individual families. It could be argued 
that meetings such as child protection conferences were opportunities 
for group discussion about a case. However, the quasi-judicial nature of 
such settings means that they are of a qualitatively different nature to 
the group discussions in the Sycamore service. The impact of 
accountability on practitioner thinking will be explored in the next 
section on cultures of accountability.  
 
The opportunities for case discussion could also be divided into 
individual versus group discussions and I had anticipated that this 
would form an important distinction. However, I found this distinction to 
be difficult to apply in real life, particularly to ad hoc case discussions 
within the office setting where the distinction between individual and 
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group discussions was blurred. For example, City practitioners came up 
to the desk where the team manager and two deputy managers were 
based to discuss a case. Whilst the discussion was between the 
practitioner and the team manager, several managers and sometimes 
nearby practitioners would contribute towards the discussion. The only 
example of practitioners having genuine individual discussions was 
formal supervision, which formed a comparatively small proportion of 
the thinking spaces that were available to practitioners in both sites.  
 
Case discussion in the City teams most commonly took the form of 
informal case discussions and tended to focus on practical case 
management issues. More in-depth discussions were observed, usually 
focusing upon understanding the behaviour and motivations of 
individual family members, but they formed a minority of the case 
discussions in the fieldwork and were more likely to be seen when 
practitioners discussed cases with colleagues rather than managers. 
Indeed, a practitioner from the Sycamore service commented that the 
local authority staff who made referrals often had limited discussions 
about cases before referring them:  
 
When there’s a referral, we engage with the referrers and the 
professional network to say, why have you done this?  Why the 
referral?  What are you after?  What’s behind the thinking?  So we 
can help them to refine those or even maybe help them start 
thinking about the case for the first time.  And often, I find, when we 
have those consultation meetings by the referral, the social workers 
and team managers will often say 'that’s the first time that we’ve sat 
and talked and thought' and I’m left thinking, 'oh my god, that’s very 
worrying' (Michael, senior clinician and highly experienced 
practitioner, interview 24, Sycamore service). 
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When practitioners do have the opportunity for case discussion, it can 
support practitioners to become more confident about their judgment 
because it has been thought through. One Sycamore practitioner stated 
that she had confidence in her assessments because she had the 
opportunity to discuss them in depth, which she contrasted with her 
experience of front line local authority social work: 
 
In front line invariably you know what you present is what you have 
thought about.  You may have had a discussion with a team 
manager in supervision but it would probably have been minimal, so 
little confidence that actually time and consideration has gone into 
what you have put down on paper and presented (Louise, senior 
clinician and highly experienced practitioner, interview twenty, 
Sycamore service).  
 
There were two sub-themes that related to the contrast in opportunities 
for thinking spaces between the two sites, which will be examined in 
turn. These were related to the opportunities for practitioners to gain a 
fresh perspective on the families that they were working with (’a second 
pair of eyes’) and to understand and manage their emotional responses 
to the work with families (‘making sense of emotions’).  
 
 
7.2.1. Sub-theme: 'A second pair of eyes'   
 
This refers to opportunities for case discussion where managers and 
colleagues provided a second pair of eyes. This can be conceptualised 
as offering analytic (System 2) thinking to check the suggestions offered 
by the practitioner's intuition (System 1). Practitioners and managers 
described one of the main purposes of supervision as being able to 
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make sense of cases and form a judgment, as well as being a second 
pair of eyes who might spot something that has been missed:  
 
As a duty manager your job is precisely to point the worker in that 
direction anyway, to make sure they don’t miss anything which they 
might otherwise have done (Interview 10, manager, City teams). 
 
I think supervision is important to help the social worker to form a 
view themselves. I mean that’s what you’re asking them to do, go 
out and give their view as a profession and a worker to go out and 
form a view and come back and can discuss that maybe. You agree 
issues, you agree or disagree or will hopefully resolve those and it 
means going out and getting more information and reviewing it, it’s 
all part of the process. You know it’s not black and white as such, so 
you should be able to discuss those issues really (Interview 15, 
manager, City teams). 
 
This was particularly important if the practitioner was struggling with a 
case:  
 
I would hope actually that the worker would be able to come and say 
that to you, I’m struggling, I’m not sure about this. This is what I’ve 
got, what do you think or what do I need to do. Go and get more 
information or you know so I think that’s important to have the 
supervision, informal supervision to check those things out and it 
gives the social worker a message that it’s okay to say that, it’s good 
practice, struggling, not sure about this one, what do you think. 
Rather than somebody struggling with that and perhaps not being 
able to check out the information really which is needed, so it’s 
about safe practice and their own safe practice really (Interview 15, 
manager, City teams). 
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However, this was not confined to individual supervision but was also 
central to case discussions, whether they were planned or ad hoc. One 
clinical associate stated that individual supervision was often quite 
orientated towards practical matters, adding that she felt that group 
discussions were often more helpful:  
 
I think with this work, group supervision is often more helpful for me 
anyway because it there are just so many minds reflecting on what’s 
going on that it’s quite useful in that way (Tina, clinical associate and 
less experienced practitioner, interview eighteen, Sycamore 
service). 
 
The value of peer discussion was highlighted by a City practitioner, who 
discussed how peer discussions were often valued in her country of 
origin. She described how she utilised this as a manager by drawing in 
the views of others when trying to make sense of cases:  
 
I’m a whiteboard person and in the office that I had back in [home 
country], the wall was covered by a whiteboard so when people 
came, I had all the stuff so I’d just go, “Okay, strength factors, risk 
factors, worries. Talk to me, just ‘ra ra ra…’ What are you worried 
about? What are your external influences?” So everything I’d put on 
the board, so whoever knocked at my door, they’d get dragged into 
it and before I answer their question, because they then, “Oh, what 
do you think of this?” So more heads; the more eyes into the case, 
the better, hopefully, the more sound plan you’ll get (Areta, 
experienced practitioner, interview two, City teams). 
 
She described using this approach in the City teams when a colleague 
had a particularly complex case and she drew together team members 
to develop a plan:  
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Whoever’s in the team at the time, I’ve called them together and I’ve 
said, “Hey, can we get together, [Mary] has got this case, can we get 
together to discuss it.  And lets put all our heads together and help 
to develop a plan for her.” So we did that, got together and we came 
up with a plan.  Brilliant. Brilliant stuff.  We did an analysis, we did 
the risk assessment, just from the information sharing, everybody’s 
feedback and then we said, “Here, take that to your manager.”  A 
wealth of experience coming together and a wealth of skill in 
sharing.  It’s a safer way of practising.  And everybody knows about 
the case.  It’s not just one person. She took it to her manager.  
Beautiful.  She really appreciated that. She goes, “Oh, this is 
something that we should do all the time.”  You know, I’m like, “Yeah 
I know that.” But, that’s not the way it works around here. I was told 
peer supervision is 'not authoritative' (Areta, experienced 
practitioner, interview two, City teams).     
 
This example demonstrates both how helpful peer discussion can be 
and how it can be threatening to the traditional, hierarchical decision-
making within local authorities. This highlights the dual role of 
supervision - it is both an opportunity for sense-making processes and a 
formal decision making process that must be recorded and accountable 
through organisational structures. The potential influence of cultures of 
accountability on practitioner sense-making processes will be discussed 
later in this chapter.  
 
 
7.2.2. Sub-theme: Making sense of emotions 
 
 
Case discussions helped not only in creating fertile space for sense-
making, but also provided practitioners with the opportunity to make 
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sense of their emotions. These two processes were intertwined 
because understanding their emotional responses often told 
practitioners something important about the case. For example, a 
clinical associate at the Sycamore service who was an experienced 
local authority manager described how he supported practitioners to be 
able to reflect upon their emotional responses:  
 
How did you feel, was the other question that I frequently say to 
social workers.  Well, how did it make you feel talking to this and 
they usually start off; if they seem in a stuck situation, they usually 
start off, but they were very plausible and then it is about sort of 
saying; yeah, but how did it make you feel?  That’s not a feeling; 
you’ve processed something, what have you processed to come to 
that? (John, clinical associate and highly experienced practitioner, 
interview 21, Sycamore service). 
 
He then gave the example of a worker doing a home visit to a mother 
with a three-month-old baby and only later realising that their sense of 
unease was related to the fact that the mother never made any eye 
contact with the baby during the hour that the practitioner was there.  
 
Earlier in the chapter, the importance of understanding the child's 
experiences was emphasised using a quote from a practitioner who 
described the danger of becoming 'swamped with the residue of all 
those nasty things you've had to deal with‘ (Section 7.1.1 above). Case 
discussion offers the opportunity to 'detoxify' these experiences as well 
as to retain a sense of emotional equilibrium. For example, one 
practitioner described working with a mother with substance misuse 
problems, which had involved her working intensively with a number of 
family members over several months:  
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I got enmeshed in their lives. Not purposefully but it’s just because 
of the fact that you’re spending a lot of time with them. You have a 
lot of history. You get a lot of information from this family. So you 
become so enmeshed but sometimes you need to just step back 
and have an overview picture and supervision I think helps you to do 
that. And I mean I think it’s absolutely essential in you being able to 
not just manage your caseload but just keep yourself sane as well' 
(Christina, experienced practitioner, interview eight, City teams).  
 
The comment about 'staying sane' hints at the emotional challenges of 
the work and how important supervision can be in supporting 
practitioners to identify, explore and manage their emotional responses, 
including their anxieties about balancing the competing demands of 
their role. In chapter two, the concept of containment developed by Bion 
(1962, 1965) was applied to supervisory relationships within 
organisations to refer to the way that a supervisor needs to be able to 
contain both their own feelings and the feelings of the person they 
supervise in order to enable them to able to reflect upon their feelings 
rather than simply act upon them (Ruch, 2007a).   
 
However, the manager-worker relationship in the City teams was 
perceived by some practitioners as a threat rather than a resource in 
the containment of anxiety. Practitioners who consistently were not able 
to work within the national timescales could become subject to 
disciplinary measures, which began with a 'guidance' meeting before 
formal procedures were initiated. One practitioner described supporting 
a colleague through this process:  
 
I went as a support person for a colleague who was going through a 
guidance meeting … the guidance meeting was to do with work 
performance and it was about… meeting timeframes and moving 
things through.  So clearly at the other side of it there’s quality of 
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work and essentially this person’s problem that - it was a genuine 
concern for management and so I’m not disputing whatever their 
decision was to put this person on guidance but it was about - it 
seemed like the other side of that was this person was doing too 
high a quality of work so that they weren’t getting the quantity done 
(Faith, interview three, experienced practitioner, City teams). 
 
The practitioner described how she perceived that her colleague was 
subject to a 'guidance meeting' because the good quality of their 
assessments meant that they were not completed within the timescales. 
Another practitioner, who had been subject to a ‘guidance meeting’ 
herself, described how she presented positive feedback from families to 
her managers but did not feel that this was valued:  
 
…it really always came down to ‘that’s fine, you still didn’t get it done 
in time and that left the family in danger,’ and that’s…it makes my 
head spin.  I’m beyond justifying, I’m maybe I don’t get it, maybe I’m 
not a good fit (Jeanette, interview eleven, experienced practitioner, 
City teams).   
 
One of the most significant challenges for managers was that they 
struggled to contain their own anxieties at times. This was particularly 
true in the City teams, where managers were faced with managing the 
demands of high levels of referrals within limited resources and short, 
fixed time limits. For example, one City experienced practitioner 
described how managers can become overwhelmed with their own 
anxiety when several serious referrals come in at the same time:  
 
First of all they go into panic mode.  And you can see that; you can 
see that in their faces.  You can see that in their body language.  
And then they start asking you to do things.  It’s like, instead of 
thinking, they’re going, “Can you do this. And can you do that’. This 
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would get to the point of having to write down what they’ve tried to 
say and then they’ll come back and then they’ll just keep double 
checking it.  It’s a panic. It creates the social worker to panic.  
There’s no logic, there’s no brief.  Yeah there is a brief, there is, but 
it’s a panic brief of a case (Areta, experienced practitioner, interview 
two, City teams). 
 
In this example, it appears that managers struggled to be able to 
contain their anxieties and felt compelled into action as a means of 
acting out the emotions involved in a flight from thinking and feeling. 
Ruch (2007) describes 'thinking' and 'doing' as alternative modes and 
argues that there is a tendency for local authority social work to be 
characterised by organisational settings and cultures that engage in 
'doing' at the expense of 'thinking'. One key explanation that she 
presents is a change in the nature of individual supervision, which has 
been the traditional setting that offered emotional containment: 
 
The supervisory model that dominates current practice is one based 
on surveillance rather than support, with the emphasis on 
monitoring, management and narrowly conceived performance 
indicators. No longer does supervision help practitioners to connect 
their thinking and feeling (Ruch, 2007b, p.372). 
 
This model of supervision makes it more difficult for practitioners to be 
able to acknowledge, understand and work through difficult feelings and 
has implications for the safety of everyday practice, as is evident from 
previous child death inquiries and serious case reviews (Ferguson, 
2009).  This approach to supervision was echoed in a comment by a 
practitioner who described her experiences of supervision in a local 
authority team:  
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It was very much, what cases have you got, what deadlines have 
you got, when are you in court, when are you on annual leave and 
that was the crux of supervision really. And not really having any 
substance to, or a lot of scrutiny to what I was doing, either for 
myself reflecting, or for my team manager’s point of view or in a 
group, there is definitely no group stuff (Louise, senior clinician and 
highly experienced practitioner, interview twenty, Sycamore service). 
 
Rather than experiencing formal supervision as a means of coping with 
the stress of the work, it was experienced as simply another source of 
stress. Since supervision is focused on monitoring worker performance, 
it was stressful for both practitioners and managers and informal 
discussions with City practitioners suggested that there was a tendency 
by both parties to avoid supervision. A similar result was found by 
Horwath (2011) in her study of the experiences of front line 
practitioners, which found that participants were selective about what 
they took to supervision or avoided it altogether.  
 
Although individual, formal supervision is viewed as central in the 
literature, it is important to remember that it is only one forum for case 
discussion. Indeed, I was initially surprised that the individual 
supervision sessions in the Sycamore service were not more reflective 
and emotionally focused. When I discussed this with a clinical 
associate, she stated that this occurred in the group sessions rather 
than individual supervision. My assumption had been that practitioners 
would feel too self-conscious to discuss emotional responses and their 
own reflexivity in group settings, but my subsequent observation 
sessions (discussed in detail in chapter five) demonstrated to me that 
this was possible if there was an open, accepting atmosphere where 
such expression was acceptable and valued.   
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The capacity for teams to offer support to practitioners has traditionally 
been under-recognized (Ruch, 2007b). Earlier in the chapter, the value 
of peer discussions was explored as a means of enhancing practitioner 
sense-making, but they were also regarded as helpful and supportive, 
particularly when thinking through what the emotional responses meant. 
For example, one Sycamore practitioner described the advantages of 
group discussions: 
 
It’s very helpful in team meetings with other clinicians from different 
backgrounds, psychotherapists and psychiatrists because you might 
say something quite off the cuff, “Oh this woman makes me angry” 
or something and I think it’s very useful for them to try and unpick 
how one of their staff members is experiencing another person and 
it’s often quite helpful (Tina, clinical associate and less experienced 
practitioner, interview eighteen, Sycamore service). 
 
Whilst the planned and protected sessions in the Sycamore service 
offered a relatively safe and supportive environment for practitioners to 
discuss emotional responses, group discussions in the City teams were 
almost entirely on an ad hoc basis and the open plan and fast moving 
nature of the environment appeared to be a barrier to practitioners 
discussing their emotional responses in the same depth.  
 
In chapter five, the role of the group discussions in the Sycamore 
service in helping practitioners to manage overwhelming feelings was 
discussed and it was concluded that such sessions helped practitioners 
to make sense of their emotional responses. There was also evidence 
of the use of defence mechanisms such as projection as a means of 
getting rid of unwanted feelings and the use of such defences is 
undesirable because they involve distortions. However, they were less 
institutionally embedded than the social defences that were observed in 
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the City teams, such as upward delegation, checks and counterchecks 
and ritual task performance, which were discussed in chapter four.  
 
 
7.3 Theme three: Cultures of 
accountability  
 
Accountability was a strong theme in both sites, but to different degrees 
and expressed in different ways. Before discussing the differences, it 
would be helpful to explore the similarities. Both services working within 
the English child protection system and this wider context is an 
important influence in both services. In chapter one, the legislative and 
policy context for child protection was outlined and linked with the 
history of high profile cases where children were killed or seriously 
harmed. It was argued that the English child protection is 'haunted' by 
these incidents and practitioners fear this happening to children for 
whom they have responsibility (Munro, 2010; Cooper et al., 1995; 
Cooper, 2012). 
 
There were three sub-themes that related to the differences in how 
accountability was understood within the two settings. The first sub-
theme relates to blame in child protection and explore how the fear of 
being blamed affected practitioner thinking and behaviour in both sites. 
The second sub-theme relates to the stage in the sense-making 
process that accountability was applied, whether at the final stage or 
throughout the process. The third theme examines the political nature of 
accountability and locates it within a wider socio-political context.  
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7.3.1 Sub-theme: ‘Losing our heads' - Blame 
and anxiety in child protection  
 
Practitioners in both settings were acutely aware of the strong public 
reaction to child deaths and the likelihood that local authority social 
workers were blamed if things went wrong. One City practitioner who 
trained overseas was surprised by how hostile the media and public 
are:  
 
The context in which we practice social work in the UK is very 
hostile, particularly to social workers in the event of something going 
wrong (Emmanuel, interview sixteen, experienced practitioner, City 
teams). 
 
One practitioner, who had long experience as a local authority 
manager, offered an explanation for the public outcry that follows high 
profile cases:  
 
We’re paid to stop the public from knowing that this sort of stuff goes 
on.  So when the public find out about it, they get angry because 
they're denying that people do this stuff to children.  And therefore if 
it becomes exposed they’ve got to blame somebody - 'how dare you 
invade my living-room at six o’clock when the news is on with this 
horrible stuff?'  (John, clinical associate and highly experienced 
practitioner, interview 21, Sycamore service). 
 
The practitioner appears to be arguing that the public tries to keep 
painful awareness about child abuse out of consciousness by denying 
its existence. When high profile child abuse cases challenge this, 
members of the public becomes angry both about becoming aware and 
about the abuse itself. This anger is dealt with by blaming others and, 
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whilst this anger may be directed towards the perpetrators, it is also 
directed towards professionals, most commonly social workers (Warner, 
2013). He went on to argue that central government allow the press to 
blame social workers, both individually and as a profession:  
 
… from Maria Colwell in the 70s, I think that was the first big one 
and then from that point forward, every time there has been one of 
these things it’s the social workers get blamed, they get named in 
the press.  I think one paper even published an address or 
something like that (John, clinical associate and highly experienced 
practitioner, interview 21, Sycamore service).   
 
Whether this last claim was true or not, it expresses a fear of the 
general public acting out some form of harassment as 'revenge'. This 
was a common fear amongst CIty practitioners, with very few examples 
in the Sycamore service. For example, one City practitioner highlighted 
it alongside the fear of a litigation culture:  
 
We’re probably embracing a lot of the American culture of litigation 
over the slightest thing with no claims and whatever.  And also we 
just fear that people might be…your name is publicised somewhere, 
the impact on you professionally (Richard, highly experienced 
practitioner, interview twelve, City team).   
 
The culture of accountability within the City teams appeared to be 
based upon an implicit belief that mistakes would be 'fatal' to the 
practitioners involved, expressed in metaphors such as 'heads will roll' 
or that individuals will be 'for the chop'. For example, a duty manager 
described attending a strategy meeting about a looked after child who 
had made allegations of sexual abuse against the birth child of her 
foster carers from another local authority. The manager felt that the 
other local authority was not handling the situation well: 
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 It was all a bit chaotic. It doesn’t make sense. If I was [other local 
authority], I would put my best Senior Practitioner on it. If another 
child is placed with the foster carers and there is sexual abuse, then 
heads will roll fairly high up into management and they won’t work in 
social work again” (Andrew, highly experienced 
practitioner/manager, observation notes, day five, City teams).  
 
The fear of 'losing one's head' was interesting because it provides a 
metaphor in two senses. Firstly, it can refer to the fear of death in a 
professional and social sense of losing one's job and being ostracised 
from one's professional community. Such a professional 'death' could 
represent a form of public retribution in the wake of the death of a child. 
Secondly, the fear of 'losing one's head' can also refer to the fear of 
being overwhelmed and not being able to think clearly, i.e., the death of 
thinking. The two are linked, in the sense that practitioners may fear 
that if they fail to think clearly, it will lead to the death of a child and 
ultimately their own professional 'death'.   
 
One way in which practitioners can 'lose their heads' in the sense of not 
thinking clearly is when anxiety distorts the sense-making processes 
that practitioners engaged in. At the time of the fieldwork, there had 
been two recent high profile child deaths, Peter Connelly and Victoria 
Climbié. These created an emotional resonance that sensitised workers 
to situations that shared key features of those cases. For example, the 
following extract is from the observation notes of a strategy meeting for 
a seven-year-old boy who was seen as displaying ‘challenging 
behaviour’:    
 
The strategy meeting was drawing to a close and a list of action 
points was being drawn up, when a CAMHS worker added, 'The 
mother mentioned about a man who had been visiting the house..'. 
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The team manager visibly stiffened and she exchanged anxious 
glances with the social worker. 'Who is this man?' the manager said 
in a tense and seemingly annoyed voice. The community police 
officer, who knew the family well, said that he thought it was the 
boy's father, who lived nearby. The manager and social worker both 
appeared to relax. but the team manager said. 'We need to establish 
who this man is for certain. We'll put that first on the action plan'.  
   After the meeting. I spoke with the social worker and asked about 
her and her manager's reaction upon hearing the information. She 
said, 'Well, it was rather worrying. You can't be too careful about 
dodgy men visiting the house after Baby P' (Observation notes, day 
four, City teams).  
 
In this case, the sense-making process took a different turn because 
there were details of the case that mirrored those of a high profile child 
death case. Although the similarities were minor, the impact was 
significant because of the emotional resonance between the two cases. 
This can be seen as an example of the availability heuristic, where 
people judge an event (the man visiting the house being an abuser) as 
being more likely because they can retrieve another example (the Peter 
Connelly case) relatively easily (Gilovich et al., 2002; Kahneman, 2011). 
The only thing that was known about the visitor was his gender and no 
other risk factors were known. The fear that was generated was 
principally derived from a superficial resemblance to the Peter Connelly 
case, but this was sufficient for the task of establishing the man's 
identity to be escalated as a priority over other risk factors for which 
there was clear evidence. Once an alternative, low risk explanation was 
offered, the social worker and manager appeared to relax but the first 
priority was establishing this alternative explanation. 
 
There were repeated references to the anxiety about being publicly 
‘named and shamed’ in the City team but no comparable references in 
  
248 
the Sycamore service.  The most straightforward explanation is that the 
services had different primary tasks and accountabilities. The primary 
task of an organisation is defined as the task it must perform if it is to 
survive (Roberts, 1994). Whilst the overall primary task of practitioners 
in both settings was safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children, 
there were differences in their primary task and the nature of their 
responsibility.  
 
Put simply, the direct responsibility for safeguarding resided with 
practitioners from the local authority children's teams. Consequently, 
City team practitioners were not just writing assessment reports, they 
were directly responsible for ensuring the safety of the children. In 
contrast, practitioners in the Sycamore service who had immediate 
concerns about a child contacted the allocated local authority social 
worker who had made the referral because they had direct 
responsibility for the child’s welfare. This meant that, although the tasks 
seemed similar, the levels of responsibility and accountability were 
different and generated significantly different levels of anxiety. 
 
 
7.3.2 Sub-theme: ‘Pervasive accountability 
versus distanced accountability'  
 
A second difference between the two sites was that there was also a 
different structure to the accountability within the assessment process. 
In the Sycamore service, the final assessment report was scrutinised 
through the court process, which meant that their assessment was only 
examined when it was completed. The nature of the court process 
meant that the scrutiny of the final report was often intensive but this 
was at the end of the sense-making process. Prior to this, there was a 
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significant level of thinking time and space that was devoted to creating 
a robust overall account through pattern recognition and story building 
using System 1 intutive thinking and tested thoroughly using System 2 
analytic thinking. Thus, the structure of the work and the wider 
organisation served as a ‘bulwark’ against the anxiety provoked by the 
work. This accountability structure can be described as distanced 
accountability, in the sense that scrutiny was applied at the end of the 
process. For the Sycamore, this process was analogous to the 
‘sandboxing’ process in computer systems, where a part of the system 
that is being developed is temporarily protected before it goes ‘live’ in 
order to both protect it from outside interference and to ensure that it is 
ready before it interacts with wider systems. Staff in the Sycamore 
service rarely discussed accountability and when they did, it was either 
an arms-length accountability to the court or a more informal 
accountability towards the child.  
 
By comparison, the form of accountability present in the City teams was 
pervasive because every stage of the process was open to immediate 
public scrutiny. This is most clearly seen in the electronic client 
database, where digital technology increased opportunities for 
professional surveillance through the increased visibility of practitioners’ 
case records. Client records were available to be scrutinised at any time 
by team managers, more senior managers and others outside the 
immediate service, such as the emergency duty service that provided 
cover out of hours. This significantly increased the ability of managers 
to engage in surveillance of practitioners and this was something that 
they were aware of, e.g. one manager joked that, if he wanted to 'spy' 
on his staff, he no longer had to go down to the office to collect the 
paper file because he could access everything electronically (Andrew, 
highly experienced practitioner/manager, interview ten, City team).   
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Whilst there are clear arguments that this is necessary for the 
immediate protection of children, the public nature of such case records 
adds an extra dimension to the anxiety that practitioners experienced. 
In chapter 4, the practitioner who discussed a case of the family 
squatting in a garage stated that she felt that she was ‘being watched’ 
and described how fear drove her to ensure she prioritised her case 
recording in order to ‘keep them off my back’. This mirrors the 
description of parents in chapter 6, where they are being scrutinised 
and will do whatever is necessary in order to get social workers 'off their 
backs'. It is not being argued that such behaviour began with the 
development of electronic case record systems, merely that the 
increased visibility that such records enable is likely to increase the 
likelihood of its occurrence.  
 
One way in which workers responded to the anxiety provoked by the 
nature of the work was to focus their case recording upon defending 
their practice against future potential criticism. This is captured by one 
senior Sycamore clinician who discussed the reports and case records 
that they received from different local authorities:  
 
It’s really pretty, uninteresting information; the social workers record 
all the funny things that they’ve been up to, and obviously that might 
be relevant in some way to an analysis of whether the social worker 
has done the right thing, but that’s really not what I’m interested in.  
I’m interested in the kid, and so whether or not the social worker 
rang three times and blah, blah, blah, blah, I don’t really care that 
much – that’s not my job.  But you know, I feel that sometimes that’s 
taken too far and uses up too much space.  So there’s a, to some 
extent you’re searching for a needle in a haystack; you’re trying to 
find a few needles, a few key needles, a few key things that you can 
link together to make sense of this case, and there’s a lot of other 
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information which is just sort of background noise (Simon, senior 
clinician and highly experienced practitioner, interview 23, Sycamore 
service). 
 
He argued that the local authority social workers often had too strong a 
focus on accountability, which distorted their attention away from the 
child and towards defending their actions against potential criticism. 
One interpretation is that such behaviour can be seen as a form of pre-
emptive vindication, in which practitioners manage their fear of being 
held accountable by using their case recording and reports to justify 
their actions before they are criticised. If there is a mirroring process 
whereby societal perceptions of wayward and neglectful parents are 
extended to the professionals who monitor them, then it is unsurprising 
that these professionals spent a considerable amount of their time and 
energy demonstrating that they were 'good' practitioners. If so, it could 
be argued that it is ironic that such an imperative detracted from their 
ability to actually be good practitioners by drawing their attention away 
from focusing on the child.  
 
In the Sycamore service, practitioners were also careful about what 
they recorded, particularly as they were aware that their records could 
potentially be subject to a court subpoena if there was a dispute. 
However, their records were not networked and accessible to others 
outside the immediate team, so access was exceptional and delayed 
rather than routine and immediate. It is likely that other core differences, 
such as differences in primary task and responsibility, were also 
influential.   
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7.3.3 Sub-theme: ‘Accountability is political’ 
 
Another form of response to the culture of accountability within the City 
teams was more political and involved challenging the dominant 
conceptions of accountability. This operated as a counter discourse and 
tended to be offered by more experienced practitioners when they were 
discussing local authority social work practice. The politically driven 
nature of the child protection system was highlighted by a City 
practitioner who had trained overseas: 
 
Listen, I wasn’t around pre-Baby P and pre Victoria Climbié. I wasn’t 
around in that time, but from reading Lord Laming’s report and the 
recommendations and I read a book about Baby P – I read that book 
and it’s like, ‘Oh gosh!’ So that brought me up to speed as to what 
happened before and why the system is set up the way it is because 
I can’t understand why the system is set up; it’s politically driven. 
That’s how I see it. So our systems are so politically driven and I 
wonder why everything’s such a tick box exercise and why we’re so 
overwhelmed with paperwork because I’ve lost the sense of what 
real social work is and they’ve turned social work into a business 
transaction. Although they say it’s about the children, they don’t 
honestly mean that and I need to vouch for my profession and say, 
“No. You’ve got this wrong, government. You’ve got this so wrong. 
This is what social work is about: the face-to-face contact, the value 
of face to face contact with our clients and their families,” (Areta, 
experienced practitioner, interview two, City teams). 
 
Another practitioner argued that the public blaming of the social work 
profession by the media is wrong and promotes mistrust:  
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..it encourages other professions to look at the social work 
profession as something that is, usually gets it wrong, therefore to 
be challenged; therefore not to be trusted; therefore the statements 
of social workers that are put into court are not to be trusted (John, 
clinical associate and highly experienced practitioner, interview 21, 
Sycamore service). 
 
The theme of accountability being a response to mistrust of the social 
work profession was taken up by a manager in the City teams:  
 
Why should we be more accountable than architects or doctors?  
Why is that?  It's almost as if we're doing something that's inherently 
wrong or bad, and therefore we've got to be restricted, restrained, 
spied on constantly.  And it's a profession with an inferiority 
complex, social work is… What [doctors] do is regarded as 
inherently good whereas what we do is regarded is inherently 
suspect, very suspect.  Yeah, even though doctors are committing 
what would but for the rationale for the profession appear to be acts 
of extreme destruction and violence.  Doctors give people poisonous 
substances and tell them they'd better take them.  Poisonous 
substances that make their hair fall out.  Doctors approach sleeping 
people with sharp knives and cut them open from end to end and 
then start pulling bits out of them.  God almighty!  Think those 
people should be put under a bit of observation at the very least.  
What do we do?  We go out and have friendly chats. The worst thing 
that we do is we say to children, ‘You've got to live here for a while.  
And not with those 'nice' people who beat you up every day and 
don’t give you anything to eat’.  That's the worst thing we do 
(Andrew, highly experienced practitioner/manager, interview ten, 
City team).  
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The manager presented this account in a humorous way, but there 
appears to be an undertone of anger at the public perceptions of the 
social work profession. Indeed, there may have been some element of 
envy at other professions that he perceived to be regarded as inherently 
trustworthy and therefore not subject to the levels of suspicion shown 
towards the social work profession. He went on to make an observation 
that the dominant perception of paperwork as demonstrating 
accountability developed under a Labour government was being 
replaced by a perception of paperwork as bureaucracy under the 
coalition government:  
 
Bureaucracy is bad, accountability is good. The actual act you carry 
out - typy typy into computer, put thing in post, send it to family - is 
absolutely identical.  So, get rid of what used to be called 
accountability, now it's called bureaucracy (Andrew, highly 
experienced practitioner/manager, interview ten, City team).  
 
This suggests that the concept of accountability can be seen as highly 
political and, with a change of government, activities that previously 
demonstrated desirable accountability are now reframed as 
demonstrating undesirable bureaucracy. This highlights the 
interpretation of accountability as a blame allocation process rather than 
professional responsibility. 
 
It was interesting that the political nature of accountability was only 
highlighted in relation to the City team and local authority social work in 
general and there was no comparative focus within the Sycamore 
service. One explanation is that local authorities are subject to direct 
political control, whilst the expert professional status of the Sycamore 
service meant that it was not subject to political scrutiny in the same 
way. Another contributory factor is that local authority children’s 
services have been disproportionately blamed by both political leaders 
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and the mainstream media when child are harmed, which can be seen 
as a primary driver behind the politicisation of accountability within child 
protection (Jones, 2014; Warner, 2013).   
 
 
7.4.  Summary   
In this chapter, I have explored how organisational settings influenced 
practitioner sense-making in both sites and identified three central 
themes. The first theme, 'time to think', explored how timescales 
influenced practitioners' sense-making. Whilst the impact of rigid, short 
timescales was a strong theme in the City teams, it did not feature as a 
significant theme in the Sycamore service, which was linked with the 
longer and more negotiable time limits. One of the consequences in the 
City teams was that investigations were sometimes reduced to fit the 
available time limits, which was often experienced with dissatisfaction 
by practitioners and managers. There was evidence of the rule of 
optimism (Dingwall et al., 1983) and speed practices (Broadhurst et al., 
2010). When faced with challenging time limits, one of the first tasks to 
be sacrificed was time spent communicating with children, but various 
reasons for this was explored, including practitioners seeking to defend 
themselves against children's painful experiences by avoiding contact 
with the child. Another way that practitioners may manage rigid and 
short time limits was lowering the threshold on what is an acceptable 
story. Various heuristics were examined, from parents from professional 
backgrounds being viewed more positively in a halo effect to 
anonymous and neighbour referrers being routinely categorised as 
malicious. Whilst early categorisation was valued in the City teams, it 
was discouraged in the Sycamore service, which was linked with their 
different primary tasks.   
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The second theme, ‘space to think', explored how opportunities for 
reflective thinking influenced practitioners' sense-making. It was argued 
that limited shared discussion about cases acted as another barrier to 
the sense-making process. Case discussion provided practitioners with 
valuable opportunities for their intuitive judgments to be challenged by 
the intuitive and analytic reasoning of others. This enabled others to act 
as a second pair of eyes in the sense of offering alternative intuitive 
judgments and offering analytic scrutiny of existing judgments. Peer 
discussion and support was important in both settings, but it was only 
incorporated into formal decision making in the Sycamore service. In 
the City teams, peer discussion was ad hoc and was not formally 
recognised because it did not fit within traditional accountability 
structures.  
 
It is important for practitioners to be able to discuss cases to help them 
understand and manage their emotions as well as sense-making, 
though they were intertwined because understanding their emotional 
responses often told them something important about the case. 
Managers are expected to contain the feelings of the practitioners they 
supervise, but often had difficulties containing their own anxieties.  
 
The third theme, 'cultures of accountability', examined how 
organisational understandings of accountability influenced levels of 
anxiety and social defences within the two settings.  It was argued that 
practitioners were highly aware of negative media and public attitudes 
towards social workers that influenced of their sense-making, such as 
over responding to cases that appeared to share features with high 
profile cases, however tenuous these similarities were.  A distinction 
was made between distanced and pervasive accountability to 
distinguish at what stage scrutiny took place in the sense-making 
process. The Sycamore service was characterised by distanced 
accountability, where the final assessment report was scrutinised in the 
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court process, whilst the City team was characterised by pervasive 
accountability, where every stage of the process was scrutinised and 
was subject to challenge. It was argued that an overly-pervasive sense 
of accountability made it more difficult for City practitioners to retain a 
focus upon the child and encouraged case recordings that focused on a 
form of pre-emptive exoneration as a means of defending against 
anxiety.  While digital technologies have the potential to bring about 
significant improvements, they also have the potential to increase 
anxiety by increasing the visibility of practice and providing greater 
opportunities for surveillance of practitioners by managers. Finally, the 
political nature of accountability was explored as a counter discourse in 
relation to local authority social work that was offered by more 
experienced practitioners.  
 
In this final findings chapter, my aim was to examine how aspects of 
organisational structure and culture can influence practitioner sense-
making. The next chapter will discuss the conclusions, implications and 
limitations of the study as a whole and suggest future areas of research. 
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Chapter 8 - Discussion and conclusions 
 
 
The purpose of this final chapter is to establish and discuss how the 
research questions have been addressed, to identify and explore the 
importance and implications of the study for child protection policy and 
practice and to evaluate the strengths and limitations of the study. The 
chapter is structured into three parts. The first part will provide a 
summary and discussion of the key findings. The second part will 
explore the implications for a range of stakeholders and provide 
recommendations for future research. The final section examines the 
strengths and limitations of the study and provides a critical reflection 
on how the study has contributed to the literature.  
 
 
8.1. Returning to the research problem 
 
In order to discuss the findings, it is necessary to return to the original 
research problem. In chapter one, it was argued that the predominant 
focus in inquiry reports has been on failures in professional judgment, 
often leading to increased central prescription of everyday practice in 
the form of increased procedures and guidance (Ferguson, 2004; 
Munro, 2010). Since this study started, this issue has gained 
prominence through the Munro review, which recommended redressing 
the balance by reducing the amount of central prescription and 
increasing the scope for professional judgment (Munro, 2010, 2011a, 
2011b). Child protection has continued to have a high media profile in 
England, following a string of prosecutions of celebrities following the 
Jimmy Saville scandal. Social work education has been the subject of 
  
259 
two government reviews (Narey, 2014; Croisdale-Appleby, 2014) that 
were set up to address perceived weaknesses in how social work 
students are prepared for practice, alongside the government’s 
Frontline initiative to fast track graduates.  
 
The two research questions were; how do practitioners engage in 
sense-making in their everyday work and, how are these sense-making 
processes influenced by the organisational setting within which 
practitioners work? These sense-making processes were studied 
though ethnographic observations and interviews in two sites, a local 
authority children's service and an NHS multi-disciplinary court 
assessment service. Contrasting organisational settings were chosen to 
explore how this influenced practitioners' thinking when undertaking 
assessments.  
 
In chapter two, it was argued that the dominant theoretical perspectives 
that have informed previous studies of practitioner sense-making in 
child protection have been broadly sociological in nature (Dingwall et 
al., 1983; Pithouse, 1984; White, 1997; Scourfield, 1999; Holland, 1999; 
Buckley, 2003; Broadhurst et al., 2010). The current study has adopted 
a theoretical approach that has been informed by the psychological 
study of judgment and decision making and the psychoanalytic study of 
emotions within organisations.  
 
 
8.2. Summary and discussion of findings  
 
The findings can be divided into two interrelated clusters that address 
the two research questions, namely, the nature of practitioner sense-
making processes and how these are influenced by organisational 
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settings. Each cluster of findings will be outlined and discussed in 
relation to the previous literature.  
 
 
8.2.1 Individual sense-making processes  
 
The first cluster of findings related to practitioners’ sense-making 
processes. In both sites, practitioners engaged in sense-making 
processes that were characterised by quick, intuitive judgments 
followed by analytic evaluation. This dynamic interplay between intuitive 
and analytic thinking processes could be undertaken by a practitioner 
individually but was most visible during case discussions. For example, 
when an intuitive judgment was offered (‘Dad looked furious with Mum 
for how she answered that question”), the responses usually took one 
of several forms. Firstly, it could take the form of questioning whether 
the intuitive judgment is likely to be accurate (“I didn’t get that feeling”) 
or to suggest alternative intuitive judgments ('I thought Dad looked 
frustrated with your question rather than angry with Mum'). Secondly, it 
could take the form of analytic questioning of whether the intuitive 
judgment was consistent with previous information about the family (“Do 
we have any history of him being aggressive to her? Is he trying to hide 
something?”) and the hypotheses or stories that are being developed 
(‘How does the couple manage conflict? Is there a pattern of him being 
controlling? Does it fit with what we think is going on with the family?'). 
These processes are compatible with the dual process model, which 
argues that we understand complex and sometimes conflicting 
information through the interplay of intuitive judgments (System 1) and 
analytic thinking (System 2) (Evans and Frankish, 2009). 
 
These findings are similar to Taylor (2007), who found that social work 
decision making was primarily intuitive but with some fluidity between 
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intuitive and analytic modes of cognition. Interestingly, analytical 
decision making was never found to be the sole method of decision 
making in any of the cases; analytical processes were always combined 
with intuitive processes. This would support the dual process model’s 
contention that analytic thinking processes are primarily reactive, i.e., 
they are critical evaluations of judgments deriving from intuition 
(Kahneman, 2011). However, Taylor’s study did not use the dual 
process model, which is most likely because the study was completed 
before the dual process model gained prominence.  
 
 
Intuitive (System 1) judgments had two main potential sources 
(Kahneman and Klein, 2009). Firstly, the skilled pattern recognition of 
experienced practitioners based upon their previous repertoire of 
experiences that is described in the recognition primed decision making 
model (Klein, 1999, 2009). Secondly, the heuristics and biases that 
derived from the vulnerabilities in human cognitive processes described 
by the heuristic and biases approach (Gilovich et al., 2002). Each of 
these will be discussed in turn.  
 
The intuitive judgments that practitioners generated were informed by 
their previous repertoire of experience and the process took the form of 
pattern recognition and story building. When engaging in pattern 
recognition, practitioners made sense of information by spotting 
patterns and making connections. These processes are outlined in the 
recognition primed decision making (RPD) model, which identifies how 
experienced practitioners see patterns when they start to see cues that 
link together and this leads them to look for further cues based on the 
accumulated experience (Klein, 1999, 2009).  Practitioners identify 
these relevant cues that aid situational understanding and enable them 
to develop expectancies and appropriate goals and to identify a course 
of action (Klein, 1999; Hardman, 2009). These processes appeared to 
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be consistent with the Pennington and Hastie (1993) story model of jury 
decision making described in chapter two, which found that jurors 
constructed a plausible storyline from the evidence that they had heard 
and then decided which sides’ account is closer to their storyline 
(Pennington and Hastie, 1993; Hastie, 2008). 
 
The level of experience of the practitioner appeared to play a significant 
role in the development of pattern recognition and story building skills. 
Three categories of experience were identified; less experienced 
practitioners (less than 12-18 months experience), experienced 
practitioners (18 months - 5-6 years experience) and highly experienced 
practitioners (more than 5-6 years experience).  
 
As practitioners gained experience, their sense-making skills changed 
in three main ways. Firstly, they developed ways of managing the 
volume of information to avoid cognitive overload and commonly 
focused on a smaller number of key sources of information. Secondly, 
they were more able to spot missing information, usually because they 
were engaged in more sophisticated pattern spotting. Thirdly, they had 
a more sophisticated evidential approach that involved triangulating 
information using multiple sources and with an increasingly strong 
emphasis on observation.  These are summarised in figure 8.1 below:  
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Figure 8.1: Summary of key phases:  
 
Level of experience Key features 
Less experienced (Less than 18 
months experience in a local 
authority child protection role) 
 
(5 participants) 
Vulnerable to feeling overloaded by information, 
i.e., cognitive overload.  
Made assumptions about information sources, e.g., 
‘all professional sources are reliable and accurate’.  
Generally lacked confidence 
Experienced (Between 18 months 
and 5-6 years experience)  
 
(9 participants) 
More developed pattern recognition skills 
Beginning to focus on key information rather than 
treating all information as equal.  
Starting to spot missing information. 
Greater emphasis on triangulating information, 
particularly with observation.  
Highly experienced (More than 5-
6 years experience)  
 
(10 participants) 
 
Highly developed pattern recognition skills, 
particularly going beyond categorisation cases in 
terms of specific features, e.g. a ‘DV’ case, to 
recognising that each family is highly individual.   
Consistently focuses on key information rather than 
giving equal attention to all information. 
Consistently able to spot missing information 
Highly sophisticated evidential approach with 
strong emphasis on observation.   
 
 
The limited sample size means that these timescales should be treated 
as approximate and would need to be confirmed by a larger scale 
study. Although the level of experience generally had a consistent effect 
on practitioners' sense-making skills, it was not simply the case that 
experience equalled expertise.  Even within a small sample, there was 
variation between practitioners at every level of experience and this 
related to factors such as motivation, communication skills and general 
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reasoning skills. In the experienced practitioner category, there was one 
participant out of 9 who did not have the features and in the highly 
experienced practitioner category, there was one out of 10 that did not 
have the characteristic features of that experience level. However, the 
key features were observed in the majority of participants in the less 
experienced (5 out of 5), experienced (8 out of 9) and the highly 
experienced practitioners (9 out of 10). Consequently, experience 
appeared to be a necessary and important but not a sufficient condition 
for expertise and was only one factor in a number of factors that 
influenced how practitioners engaged in sense-making. Whilst 
experience did not guarantee expertise, inexperienced workers were 
less likely to demonstrate strong pattern recognition and story building 
skills because such skills required a repertoire of previous experiences 
to draw upon.  
 
It is important to recognise the limitations of self-reports, in the sense 
that participants can make claims about their abilities that may not be 
supported by observation of their practice (Forrester et al, 2008). 
Hollway and Jefferson (2000) developed the concept of the ‘defended 
subject’ to describe how participants are likely to give accounts that 
serve to defend against anxiety. In this study, two points are relevant. 
Firstly, the focus is upon practitioners’ reasoning processes rather than 
their practice skills in a wider sense. Consequently, these reasoning 
processes were observable by me as the researcher when practitioners 
were discussing cases. This is quite different from other skills such as 
the ability to engage with children, where practitioners may be able to 
give a convincing account in an interview that would not be 
substantiated by observation of their practice. Secondly, the later 
transition between the ‘experienced’ and ‘highly experienced’ category 
was not identified by the participants themselves but by myself as the 
researcher. It was through undertaking and analysing interviews with 
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practitioners in these two categories that I identified key differences in 
the ways that they thought about cases.  
 
This pattern of development has similarities to the Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
(1986) model of expertise, which presents a model of how people 
progress from being novices to becoming experts. Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
(1986) argue that novices start with a rigid adherence to rules with little 
situational awareness and progressively build up to being able to focus 
on the most important features of a situation and develop discretionary 
judgment. The final stage in their 5-stage model is the expert stage, in 
which practitioners predominantly use intuitive decision asking and rely 
upon analytic reasoning only when situations are novel or when 
decisions must be formally justified (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986). Gary 
Klein acknowledges the strong influence of the Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
model and Hubert Dreyfus was personally involved in the development 
of the RPD model (Klein, 1999). The Dreyfus and Dreyfus model has 
been adapted more widely to explain professional development by 
Eraut (1994) and applied to the nursing profession by Benner (1982). 
The contribution of this study is that it provides further evidence for the 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus model combined with the application of the dual 
process model to provide a more developed account of the relationship 
between intuitive and analytic reasoning processes. 
 
Although the pattern recognition and story building processes generally 
appeared to enable experienced practitioners to process information 
quickly and effectively, these were not the only sense-making 
processes that were in play. The second source of intuitive (System 1) 
judgments was the heuristics and biases that result from the cognitive 
vulnerabilities of human thinking processes. The ones observed were 
the availability heuristic, halo effect, the Semmelweis reflex and 
confirmation bias (Gilovich et al., 2002; Nisbett and Wilson, 1977; 
Hardman, 2009).  
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The availability heuristic is the tendency to overestimate the likelihood 
of events that can be retrieved from memory more easily, which can be 
influenced by how unusual or emotionally charged they may be as well 
as how recent they are (Gilovich et al., 2002). The clearest examples 
came from situations where practitioners saw some similarity between a 
case and a well-known child death, most frequently Peter Connelly and 
Victoria Climbié. This typically led to increased anxiety in the short term, 
even when the similarities with the case were limited or tangential.   
 
The halo effect refers to the influence of an overall evaluation of a 
person on evaluations of their individual attributes, i.e., we are more 
likely to regard a person that we like as trustworthy, even when we have 
no information to base this upon (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977). Negative 
halo effects were noted in relation to anonymous, neighbour and family 
referrals, where practitioners routinely suspected the motives of the 
referrers and were less likely to act upon the referral. Positive halo 
effects were identified in relation to two separate referrals where family 
members worked in health and social care. Their professional identity 
led practitioners to form more positive views of their attributes as carers 
and to place greater trust in them. In one case, further information came 
in that contradicted the earlier appraisal and the worker quickly 
reappraised the case rather than succumbing to confirmation bias. This 
was consistent with other observational data, particularly in the 
Sycamore service, which suggested that practitioners were more likely 
to revise their appraisals of situations where contradictory information 
was received.   
 
This is interesting in the light of Munro's (1996, 1999) analysis of child 
death inquiries, which found that practitioners were usually slow to 
revise their original opinions and tended to ignore contradictory 
evidence. The limited data available in this study would question this 
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tendency in everyday child protection. However, the difference can be at 
least partially explained by Munro's study being solely of child death 
inquiries rather than a general sample of child protection cases. If so, 
this would raise questions about the extent to which a study of 
exceptional cases can be generalised to everyday settings.    
 
Confirmation bias refers to the tendency to pay more attention to 
information that confirms our existing beliefs than information that 
challenges it (Munro, 1999; Hardman, 2009). Practitioners in both 
settings demonstrated an awareness of confirmation bias, but this was 
more explicitly acknowledged in the Sycamore service. Whilst there was 
significant pressure for City practitioners to categorise referrals early in 
order to meet tight time limits, there were opposite pressures on 
Sycamore practitioners; early categorisation left them vulnerable to 
being accused during cross-examination of having made up their minds 
early and distorting evidence to fit their early impressions.  
 
There was limited evidence of the Semmelweis reflex (Hardman, 2009), 
which refers to the tendency to automatically reject new evidence that 
contradicts a paradigm, which was found in one specific circumstance – 
practitioners’ disbelief and confusion when children or young people 
made allegations that were subsequently found to be false. In chapter 
6, two separate examples of teenagers making false allegations of 
sexual abuse were discussed along with the practitioners' struggles with 
the paradigmatic belief that children should always be believed.  
 
In summary, practitioners in both settings were vulnerable to predictable 
errors that derived from heuristics and biases (Gilovich et al., 2002). 
However, these were not observed to be as frequent as might be 
expected from the heuristics and biases research. A likely explanation 
derives from one of the main critiques of the heuristics and biases 
approach, namely, that the research uses experimental conditions that 
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artificially exaggerate cognitive vulnerabilities, e.g., through using 
inexperienced participants undertaking unfamiliar tasks designed to 
generate errors in intuitive judgment. As the study observed 
practitioners undertaking tasks in naturalistic settings that they were 
familiar with and had completed lengthy professional training to 
undertake, it should be unsurprising that they made less errors than 
observed in experimental conditions.   
 
Practitioners reported commonly experiencing a difference between the 
family described in the referral information (the 'paper family') and the 
family they met (the 'flesh and blood family'). More experienced 
practitioners came to expect this and the most commonly reported 
difference was that the flesh and blood family was less anxiety 
provoking than the paper family. However, there were some referrals, 
known as 'iceberg' referrals, where the problems identified in the 
referral were symptoms of deeper and more complex problems.  
 
 
8.2.2. The influence of organisational settings  
 
 
The second cluster of findings focus upon the question of how 
practitioner sense-making is influenced by organisational settings. 
Three themes were identified: the amount of time that practitioners had 
to think ('time to think'), the extent to which they had opportunities for 
shared case discussion ('space to think') and the culture of 
accountability within the organisational setting ('an accountable 
service').  
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8.2.2.1 ‘Time to think’ 
 
The first theme, 'time to think', expressed how timescales influenced 
practitioners' sense-making. Whilst the impact of rigid, short timescales 
was a strong theme in the City teams, it did not feature as a significant 
theme in the Sycamore service, which was linked with the longer and 
more negotiable time limits. A significant contextual factor was that the 
usual high pressure on local authority intake services such as the City 
teams had substantially increased during the period of the fieldwork in 
the wake of the death of Peter Connelly and the subsequent media 
scandal. 
 
In response to these pressures, City practitioners and managers used a 
range of operational strategies that aimed to either reduce demand 
upon the service (operational defences) or to complete work within 
timescales by creating shortcuts (speed practices). Operational 
defences included disputing responsibility if other local authorities were 
involved, a 'robust' approach to challenging referrers, the ‘normalising’ 
of referrers’ concerns (parental behaviour was reframed as being part of 
a wider continuum of ‘ordinary’ though imperfect behaviour) and 
strategic deferment (sending the referral back to the referrer to ask for 
more information). Similar strategies were identified in both the ICS 
study discussed in chapter 2 (Broadhurst et al., 2010; White, 2009; 
Wastell et al., 2010) and a study of local authority services for 
adolescents (Biehal, 2005), which found that sometimes practitioners 
attempted to manage demand for non-urgent services by ‘normalising’ 
the young people’s behaviour as means of justifying non-intervention by 
downplaying parental concerns (Biehal, 2005).  
 
Speed practices included early categorisation and algorithmic 
reductionism (reducing the complexities of a case to a series of either/or 
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decisions), early foreclosure (lowered thresholds for an acceptable 
story), standardised responses and reducing time spent with children 
and their families. These were very similar to the speed practices 
identified by Broadhurst (2010) in their study of the ICS system in five 
local authorities. When faced with challenging time limits, one of the first 
tasks to be sacrificed was time spent communicating with children, but 
various reasons for this were explored, including practitioners seeking 
to defend themselves against children's painful experiences by avoiding 
contact with the child. Another way that practitioners may manage rigid 
and short time limits was lowering the threshold on what is an 
acceptable story if existing information could be understood in a positive 
way so further action was not necessary. There were similarities to the 
'rule of optimism' identified in Dingwall et al (1983), where child 
protection practitioners are expected to apply positive interpretations 
unless there is overwhelming evidence to the contrary. However, whilst 
Dingwall et al (1983) saw this as an inherent part of the social licence 
granted to the child protection system in a liberal society, this study 
suggests that it may also function as a means of managing demand 
within finite resources.  
 
One of the ways in which differences in time scales affected practitioner 
sense-making was the relative emphasis on intuitive and analytic 
processes (Systems 1 and 2) and the stage at which conclusions were 
reached. The short and rigid timescales in the City teams increased the 
pressure to analyse information and come to conclusions earlier in the 
assessment process. The longer and more flexible timescales in the 
Sycamore service meant that there was little pressure to come to firm 
conclusions early and the organisational culture valued delaying 
assessments until later in the assessment process. As discussed 
earlier, this was at least partly because it was regular practice for the 
barristers representing the parents to examine the final report for 
evidence that the team had come to precipitous conclusions early and 
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had shaped the evidence to fit their early conclusions, i.e., confirmation 
bias. Consequently, Sycamore practitioners were particularly cognisant 
of heuristics and biases and demonstrated vigilance against them. 
 
 
8.2.2.2 ‘Space to think'    
 
The theme of ‘space to think' explored how opportunities for case 
discussion influenced practitioners' sense-making. It was argued that 
opportunities for case discussion supported practitioner sense-making 
in two ways. Firstly, it supported the dynamic interplay between intuitive 
and analytical sense-making reasoning processes. Case discussion 
provided practitioners with valuable opportunities for others to offer 
either their own intuitive judgments (System 1) or for their own intuitive 
judgments to be challenged by the analytic reasoning (System 2) of 
others. This enabled others to act as a second pair of eyes in the sense 
of offering alternative intuitive judgments and offering analytic scrutiny 
of existing judgments. This was significantly more formalised in the 
Sycamore service, where this interplay changed as the assessment 
progressed. In the early stages, discussions were more dominated by 
intuitive thinking processes with less pronounced analytic evaluation. In 
the final stages, discussions were more focused upon formulating a final 
account and recommendation that would be written as the assessment 
report. At this stage, the discussion tended to feature more analytic 
(System 2) features because formulating the final story about the family 
required the team to develop an overall account that explained the key 
features in a way that would be defendable in a court arena.  
 
The second way in which opportunities for case discussion influenced 
practitioners' sense-making was that it provided space for practitioners 
to make sense of their emotions and to have these contained. In 
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everyday practice, these were intertwined because understanding their 
emotional responses often told them something important about the 
case. Practitioners in both settings managed their emotional responses 
through discussing them but on occasion by using splitting and 
projection, usually in order to retain a sense of being 'good' in contrast 
to some ‘Other’ who was identified as ‘bad’, whether this was other 
professionals, organisations or family members.  
 
Peer discussion and support was important in both settings, but it was 
only incorporated into formal decision making in the Sycamore service. 
In the City teams, peer discussion was ad hoc and was not formally 
recognised because it did not fit within traditional accountability 
structures.  
 
 
8.2.2.3  ‘Cultures of accountability’    
 
The theme of 'cultures of accountability' examined how organisational 
understandings of accountability influenced levels of anxiety and social 
defences within the two settings. It was argued that practitioners were 
highly aware of negative media and public attitudes towards social 
workers in ways that influenced their sense-making, such as over 
responding to cases that appeared to share features with high profile 
cases, however tenuous these similarities were. A distinction was made 
between distanced and pervasive accountability to distinguish at what 
stage scrutiny took place in the sense-making process. The Sycamore 
service was characterised by distanced accountability, where the final 
assessment report was scrutinised in the court process, whilst the City 
team was characterised by pervasive accountability, where every stage 
of the process was scrutinised and was subject to challenge. It was 
argued that an overly-pervasive sense of accountability made it more 
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difficult for City social workers to retain a focus upon the child and 
encouraged case recordings that focused on a form of pre-emptive 
exoneration as a means of defending against anxiety. It could be argued 
that this finding is subtly different from the ICS study, which found that:  
 
Workers consistently claimed that it was easy to lose sight of the 
primary activities of supporting families and safeguarding children, to 
the second-order activities of performance and audit (Broadhurst et 
al., 2010, p.359). 
 
Instead of explaining this as simply about practitioners managing the 
competing claims on their time, this study suggests that it was about 
managing the anxiety-provoking nature of the work.  
 
This can be seen within the context of wider developments within New 
Public Management, where accountability is equated with 
documentation (Munro, 2004; Tsui and Cheung, 2004; Burton and van 
den Broek, 2009). It is important to note that there is a difference 
between the processes that practitioners use to make their professional 
judgments and the account that they give to justify that process (Taylor, 
2007; Gillingham, 2009). Whilst the former is about reaching a 
judgment, the latter is about being able to defend that judgment in an 
accountable way. In both research sites, the processes of accountability 
were heavily emphasised but this was particularly acute in the City 
teams because of the culture of pervasive accountability. There is 
evidence from other studies of this split between the processes used to 
make a decision and the processes used to justify that decision. In his 
study of the use of structured instruments in Australia, Gillingham 
(2009) concluded that although the structured instruments were 
designed to support decision making processes, their dominant use 
was as a means of defending decisions that had been made by other 
processes. This is also consistent with the ethnographic study of child 
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protection services in the UK completed by Holland (1999, 2010), in 
which she found two discourses of decision making, scientific 
observation and reflective evaluation. She found that the dominant 
discourse used for communicating and justifying assessments to the 
court was scientific observation, even if that was not the dominant 
process used to make the decision.    
 
All three themes are interlinked, in the sense that supporting 
practitioners in their professional judgment required both the time to be 
able to think, the availability of space for discussion and for that space 
to not be dominated by the concerns of accountability. As such, the 
study provides evidence for Munro’s assertion that shorter timescales 
mean that practitioners rely more on intuitive reasoning and the more 
supervision focuses upon performance indicators, the less it will 
contribute towards or provide opportunities for reflective thinking 
(Munro, 2008a). 
 
 
In summary, the model for understanding practitioner sense-making is 
illustrated in figure 8.2 below:  
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Defences against 
anxiety at a 
personal level:  
Social defences 
(upward delegation, 
ritual task performance) 
and individual defences 
(splitting, projection) 
Defences against 
demands at an 
organisational 
level:  
Speed practices and 
operational strategies 
for managing 
demand  
Figure 8.2 The DEED model of practitioner sense-making and professional judgment. 
Individual practitioner 
Psychological 
defences 
Organisational 
defences 
 
 
The acronym DEED has been used to capture the different elements of 
the model, which refers to:  
D – Dual process (intuition and analytic processes) 
E – Error (heuristics and biases) 
E – Expertise (pattern recognition and story building) 
D – Defences (psychological and organisational)’.  
  
The central funnel represents the cognitive and emotional processes 
practitioners engage in to form professional judgements. As such, it can 
be seen as a triple process model in which the two processes of 
intuitive and analytic reasoning occur within a third emotional context.  
 
In this model, the focus of the emotional context is on the social 
defences, and from the analysis of the data from the two sites, on the 
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defences of splitting and projection. Intuition and analytic reasoning 
interact interact in a two-way flow with the psychological and emotional 
defences that individual practitioners and organisations engaged in. To 
be clear, these social defences should not be automatically regarded as 
negative, since they form a boundary around the organisation and serve 
to protect it. As such, these defences are neither inherently negative nor 
positive, but should be evaluated upon the consequences that they 
produce. Thus the model incorporates the inner lives and interior world 
of the organisations and individuals and is thus constitutive of all 
experiences and decision-making processes. 
 
 
8.3 Implications  
 
The implications of the study can be divided into theoretical implications 
and implications for child protection practice. Rather than provide an 
exhaustive discussion of all of the implications, my aim is to focus upon 
key implications in each domain.  
 
8.3.1.  Theoretical implications  
 
There are three key theoretical implications of the findings of the study. 
Firstly, the application of the dual process model to practitioner sense-
making deepens our understanding of the traditional debate between 
intuitive and analytic reasoning processes. Rather than competing 
alternatives, they are two ways of thinking that are recursive, interactive 
and integrated into our everyday reasoning processes. As well as 
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theoretical implications, this has implications for everyday practice that 
will be discussed in the next section.  
 
Secondly, the application of the recognition primed model of decision 
making extends our understanding of how experienced child protection 
practitioners make sense of information in a different way to less 
experienced practitioners.  More specifically, the concept of pattern 
recognition and story building focuses attention on the specific sense-
making processes that experienced practitioners use and enables the 
possibility of capturing these through further research, which will be 
discussed later in this chapter.  
 
Finally, there are theoretical implications for the conclusion that 
practitioners were subject to heuristics and biases as suggested by 
Munro's (1996, 1999) previous study of child death inquiries, but these 
were less pronounced or frequent. Whilst this supports the substance of 
Munro’s claims, it also suggests that the study’s focus on exceptional 
cases may lead to overestimating the influence of heuristics and biases 
in everyday practice. To be fair, this limitation was acknowledged by 
Munro in the original study and it is a common critique of the heuristics 
and biases approach that studies often find less frequent or pronounced 
effects in naturalistic settings than experimental conditions, which have 
been purposefully designed to maximise the effects (Klein, 2009; 
Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999).  
 
 
8.3.2.  Implications for policy and practice 
 
The main implication for practice is that organisational systems need to 
recognise how judgments are formed in real life situations, which has 
several aspects. Firstly, organisational systems could provide a means 
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of raising awareness of the predictable and avoidable errors that arise 
from vulnerabilities in human reasoning. Practitioners, however 
experienced they are, are as vulnerable as the general population to 
making these errors through faulty heuristics. Organisational systems 
could provide a means of raising awareness of the weaknesses in 
sense-making processes that affect all practitioners, e.g., availability 
heuristic, halo effect and confirmation bias. However, they could also 
raise awareness of the specific weaknesses in sense-making processes 
that affect inexperienced practitioners, e.g., cognitive overload, an 
inability to spot what is missing. 
 
Secondly, one of the key implications is that an organisational approach 
that only focuses upon reducing errors is insufficient. Strengthening 
analytic (System 2) processes would mean more robust evaluation of 
intuitive (System 1) judgments to ensure that they are not derived from 
faulty heuristics and biases. But good professional judgment requires 
not just high quality analytic (System 2) evaluation but high quality 
intuitive (System 1) judgments, which can only consistently come from 
skilled and experienced practitioners.  
 
Thirdly, an implication for organisations is that practitioner sense-
making can be supported by providing opportunities for shared case 
discussion in a safe space which is not dominated by a focus on 
accountability or the need to defend a position. Whilst this can be seen 
as relevant to all practitioners, it is particularly important for local 
authority social workers, as this was most acute in the City setting. 
Such opportunities support the dynamic interplay of intuitive and 
analytic thinking processes and provide practitioners with opportunities 
to understand their emotional responses. The study provides evidence 
for the importance of what Ruch (2007b) describes as 'emotionally 
informed thinking spaces'. The purpose of these thinking spaces is that 
they support practitioners' professional judgment as well as their 
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emotional well being, because they enable practitioners to share their 
intuitive judgments and the emotions that are provoked by the work. 
This process can support the effective use of Systems 1 and 2 by 
enabling practitioners to share intuitive judgments that can be 
scrutinised by practitioners themselves and others. This process can 
help to determine whether intuitive judgments are grounded within the 
practitioners' experience or could be the result of faulty heuristics.  
 
The opportunity for practitioners to experience this form of ‘thinking 
space’ is traditionally seen as the domain of individual supervision, but 
this study suggests that this may be avoided or compromised at times 
because of the dominance of managerial concerns that provoke 
accountability anxiety in both practitioner and manager and damage the 
ability of supervision to be a containing experience. Across both 
research sites, it was peer discussion that provided the clearest support 
for practitioners, whether this was the formalised group discussions of 
the Sycamore team or the informal, ad hoc discussions of the City 
teams. Ruch (2013) described a study involving reflective case 
discussions with local authority practitioners from a range of teams 
where co-working cases was viewed as valuable by practitioners but 
this formed the exception rather than the rule. More formalised models 
for providing peer 'thinking spaces' are provided by work discussion 
groups within the Tavistock tradition (Rustin and Bradley, 2008) and the 
case discussion groups described by Ruch (2007b). 
 
Fourthly, there are a number of implications for social work education on 
qualifying and post-qualifying courses. Formal teaching on decision 
making using the models described in this study would enable students 
to have a deeper understanding of real life processes, including the 
strengths and weaknesses of intuitive judgments, the role of emotions 
and the importance of analytic reasoning. The use of case discussion 
groups described above would enable students to develop their 
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reasoning and pattern spotting skills in a supportive environment and 
reinforce the value of peer supervision.  
 
Finally, there are wider policy implications for the finding that an overly-
pervasive sense of accountability made it more difficult for practitioners 
to retain a focus upon the child and encouraged case recordings that 
focused on a form of pre-emptive exoneration as a means of defending 
against anxiety. Put simply, the commonly expressed view that if 
'bureaucracy' and 'paperwork' are reduced, this means that practitioners 
are freed up to spend more time with children and their families is likely 
to be over simplistic. The study would suggest that if the actual number 
of forms is reduced but the culture of pervasive accountability remains 
as strong, the levels of accountability anxiety will remain or may even 
increase because there are fewer opportunities to manage this anxiety 
by engaging in defensive strategies such as pre-emptive exoneration. 
This will be discussed further in the conclusion.  
 
8.3.4.  Dissemination of findings and 
recommendations for future research 
 
I have already undertaken a number of dissemination activities as the 
research has developed. These have included a peer-reviewed journal 
article that used early data to examine whether Menzies Lyth's (1960) 
model of social defences remained relevant to current child protection 
services (Whittaker, 2011b) and several conference papers that have 
presented preliminary findings as the study developed (Whittaker, 
2011a, 2012a, 2013). A full list of these outputs is presented in 
Appendix 4. Another key means of disseminating the findings is through 
teaching, which I have done on social work courses in my own and 
other universities. Interestingly, I presented my findings to a research 
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conference within my university and have subsequently received 
multiple requests to talk on nursing, public health and health service 
management courses because it was felt that the findings were relevant 
beyond child protection social work.  
 
Future plans for disseminating my findings are mainly through peer 
reviewed journal articles and conference presentations. It would appear 
that there is a growing interest in applying psychological and 
behavioural science approaches to professional judgment and decision 
making in child protection (Platt and Turney, 2013; Kirkman and 
Melrose, 2014) so this would be a key area. But the findings that relate 
to organisational influences, the impact of timescales and accountability 
cultures are also relevant for current debates about child protection and 
social work more generally.  
 
There are two interrelated areas of future research that can further 
develop the knowledge generated by this study. The two areas are 
interrelated because the research problems that they address are, 
firstly, whether the skilled pattern recognition and story building that 
experienced practitioners engage in can be captured and secondly, 
whether this knowledge can be used to accelerate the pattern 
recognition skills of novice practitioners.  
 
A potential research design that would address both areas of research 
is the use of a computer simulated practice environment, in which 
skilled practice can be captured in controlled conditions and taught to 
less experienced practitioners. There are several projects already 
underway in which computer simulations or 'micro-worlds‘ are being 
used to enable students and practitioners to engage in exercises that 
simulate real world situations, which could be adapted for this study. For 
example, the computer simulated microworld 'Brigit' has been 
developed to examine how practitioners use case documentation 
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(Wastell et al., 2011) and the ‘Rosie’ project provides a virtual reality 
environments with real life scenarios (Reeves et al., 2012).  
 
In the first stage of this project, highly experienced practitioners would 
engage in a number of case scenarios within the virtual microworld and 
provide a running dialogue about what they are paying attention to. In 
addition, the software would measure which documents the 
practitioners pay attention to and how long they view each document. 
The responses would be synthesised to capture the pattern recognition 
skills that they employed, which would inform focus groups in which the 
same practitioners developed expert guidance to accompany each case 
scenario.  
 
In the second stage of the project, novice practitioners would engage in 
half of the microworld scenarios chosen randomly whilst providing a 
running dialogue about what they are paying attention to. They would 
then repeat the exercise with the other half of the scenarios but would 
receive the expert guidance developed through the focus groups. They 
would then be interviewed in order to explore their experiences and 
sense-making processes. This would provide two sets of data, a 
benchmark of their initial performance within guidance and their 
performance while receiving guidance. This would be augmented by 
data on which documents they viewed and how long they spent reading 
each document. This exercise could be undertaken as a one-off event 
or as a series of events with the novice practitioners.  
 
This research design utilises some of the features of the Shadowbox 
technique, a training technique in which less experienced practitioners 
engage in vignette exercises with expert opinion (Hintze, 2008).  This 
has already been successfully used in studying the decision making of 
Dutch forensic crime scene team leaders (Helsloot and Groenendaal, 
2011) and to train police officers in social interaction skills (Klein et al., 
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2013). An initial focus group was used to identify contextual factors that 
might influence decision making and a 'serious game' was conducted in 
order to understand how these contextual factors might influence the 
decision making process.  
 
Each stage of the research design addresses a different research 
problem. The first stage addresses the problem of whether skilled 
pattern recognition can be captured and the second stage explores 
whether this knowledge can be used to accelerate the pattern 
recognition skills of novice practitioners.  
 
Another way that the research can be extended is to engage in 
exploratory research with local authorities to investigate three areas of 
potential benefit. Firstly, to examine ways of raising practitioner 
awareness of errors arising from heuristics and biases. Secondly, to 
explore ways that local authorities can value and harness the expertise 
of experienced practitioners. Thirdly, how peer discussion can be 
promoted and become more formally recognised within organisations.  
 
A final potential area for future research is undertaking similar research 
in collaboration with researchers in other countries. The serendipitous 
nature of having practitioners who had trained overseas was particularly 
useful because it helped identify and challenge unexamined 
assumptions, which is a strength of international research (Finch and 
Poletti, 2014).  
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8.4 Limitations, strengths and potential 
contribution to knowledge  
 
The study had a number of limitations. A limitation of naturalistic 
research is that it does not enable for a controlled environment in which 
particular phenomena can be manipulated and controlled. As a piece of 
ethnographic research, the study was limited by the opportunities that 
were present at the time of the fieldwork. In general, there was a richer 
range of opportunities that were available than were originally 
envisaged. However, one notable exception was that there were no 
opportunities to observe individual supervision in the City teams. It was 
agreed that I would observe a supervision session on one occasion, but 
the manager shortly afterwards became ill and so the session could not 
go ahead. According to the accounts of practitioners, a likely 
explanation is that individual supervision happened relatively 
infrequently but there is also the possibility that neither practitioners nor 
managers wanted to be observed. A more general limitation is that any 
such study is always a snapshot at a particular point in time. The field of 
child protection is particularly historically contingent and fieldwork 
undertaken at earlier or later points in time would be likely to find 
different attitudes, organisational structures and constraints.  
 
It could be argued that a limitation of the study design was that, 
although sense-making was visible in both sites, it was naturally more 
visible in the Sycamore service because of the opportunities for group 
sense-making in the team meetings that occurred before and after 
sessions with the family. An alternative argument is that this difference 
was not a limitation, but a finding, in the sense that shared sense-
making received greater emphasis in this setting in Sycamore service.  
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Another question that I have asked myself is whether I should have 
focused upon a more formal sample of cases or decisions, e.g., 
selecting a specific sample of cases or focusing on formal decision 
making such as child protection conferences. This would have enabled 
me to provide more structured data, e.g., quantitative data on 
frequencies and categories. On balance, I would argue that the 
ethnographic design that I used deliberately focused on the less formal 
aspects of sense-making rather than the formal decisions. This was a 
significant strength because it was better at capturing the 'corner of the 
eye' processes that occur in everyday practice but which rarely 
command attention.  
 
As a small-scale ethnographic study, another limitation is that it was 
difficult to isolate specific factors that may have influenced sense-
making processes. For example, practitioners in the multi-disciplinary 
Sycamore teams came from different professional backgrounds and 
one hypothesis is that practitioners from disciplines such as psychiatry 
and clinical psychology that emphasize formalised analytic thinking may 
approach sense-making differently. Such questions are difficult to 
answer in a small-scale ethnographic study because it is difficult to 
ascertain whether individual differences between practitioners related to 
their professional training or other factors, such as personality, 
communication skills and personal interests.  
 
When examining whether the research findings are transferable to other 
settings, a key issue is whether the research sites were typical. This 
presents different issues for each research site, depending upon the 
rationale for them being chosen. The issue of typicality is highly relevant 
to the City teams but this is less relevant to the Sycamore service 
because it was not chosen for its typicality. Instead, the Sycamore 
service was chosen because it is a specialist service that provided a 
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contrasting setting to the City teams in order to help identify which 
factors in the organisational setting influenced sense-making.  
 
The issue of whether the City teams were ‘typical’ of local authority 
children’s teams is important but problematic one because there are so 
many dimensions to potentially consider. It was one of a large number 
of local authorities in that city, which have significant differences to rural, 
semi-rural and even other major UK cities. Within the range of local 
authorities, it was mid-range in several dimensions, such as size, 
resources and inspection ratings and had a structure that was typical of 
local authority children’s services. At an experiential level, two of the key 
respondents were asked whether the City teams were ‘typical’ of their 
experiences in other local authorities. One had experience in eight local 
authorities across the course and stated that they felt it was a relatively 
‘typical’ local authority. The other key respondent went on to gain 
experience in another local authority and regarded the City teams as 
‘more typical’ than the other local authority that he now worked in, which 
had greater resources and a higher national profile. In summary, it 
would be more accurate to state that there were no clear indicators that 
the City teams were untypical of local authority children’s teams. As 
such, the findings should be treated with a degree of caution as to their 
immediate transferability to other local authorities, particularly in rural 
and semi-rural settings, but there were no indicators that there were 
significant barriers to transferability.  
 
The limitations of the study were not limited to methodological 
limitations but were also about my own limitations as a researcher. 
Being a White, middle class male, it is likely that there will have been 
aspects of situations that I will have been unaware of that would have 
been picked up by other researchers. Similarly, participants may have 
related to me in particular ways, which was discussed in more depth in 
chapter 3. My own inexperience as a researcher may have meant that I 
  
287 
missed things that a more experience researcher would have noticed, 
though my previous experience as a practitioner in the settings was 
helpful in this respect.  
 
Evaluating the study at this stage, I would argue that observing the 
relatively protected world of the office had its limitations. It was 
essentially an institutional ethnography in its focus and design, since it 
sought to examine the influence of organisational settings (Ferguson, 
2014b). In the City teams, there was the possibility of observing home 
visits and I undertook several visits as part of my orientation rather than 
data collection. However, I thought that it would be problematic to gain 
the consent of families who were subject to child protection 
investigations. Whilst this was not insurmountable, I believed that it 
would have been very difficult to obtain NHS ethical permission to 
undertake similar activities in the Sycamore service. There is some 
evidence for this as, when I attended the NHS research ethics 
committee hearing in relation to my ethics application, the main issue 
that they sought reassurance on was that I would not be directly 
observing children and their families. Reflecting upon this now, I think 
that my decision was also influenced by my inexperience as a 
researcher and a fear that if I included home visits, I could potentially 
become embroiled in an ethical quagmire that could seriously 
undermine the viability of the study. Given that the study was so 
important to me, this appeared as too great a risk at the time. However, 
with hindsight I recognise that there is a danger that this colludes with 
ways in which the social work research community can be ‘self-
policing’; we assume that we would not get ethical permission for 
research activities involving service users so we do not seek 
permission.  
 
In defence of the study design, I would argue that my research question 
did not require me to directly observe practitioners working with families 
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because I was interested in practitioner sense-making processes and 
these were more likely to be visible when they were in the office having 
discussions with managers and colleagues. However, I do have a regret 
that I did not challenge my own assumptions more vigorously as 
observing practitioners with families would have broadened my data 
and would have been likely to produce valuable insights. As a study 
about sense-making in office settings, it has all of the limitations that 
this entails, i.e., a focus on organisational matters at the expense of 
direct work with children and families. If I had included observations of 
direct work with children and families, it is likely that I would have much 
more material about emotions. My data about emotions has primarily 
been about the emotions provoked by the organisational context and 
less about the work with families. Observation of direct practice would 
have enabled analysis of a wider range of situations and contexts and 
psychoanalytic ideas could then have been applied beyond an 
institutional ethnography. And, in particular applied to the 
psychodynamics of individuals and within families. So in that sense, my 
study is limited by my choice of what and where I observed.  
 
The study had a number of strengths, which are interlinked with its 
potential contribution towards the literature. The study had all of the 
strengths of a naturalistic study, because it provides an account that is 
grounded in everyday practice rather than artificial or exceptional 
circumstances. The ethnographic design proved to be well suited to 
studying everyday sense-making in naturalistic settings as it utilises 
both observational and interview data, which reduces the risk that the 
findings are method-dependent (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). But 
the strength of using both research methods was more than this, 
because there was an iterative process between observation and 
interviews, in which insights derived from observations were followed up 
in interviews and vice versa. 
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The contrasting research sites worked well in helping develop an 
understanding of how organisational settings can influence practitioner 
sense-making. There were also serendipitous aspects, e.g., having 
participants who were overseas-trained provided additional insights into 
child protection practice in England compared to a range of other 
countries. 
 
8.4.1  Contribution to the literature 
 
The study has contributed to the existing literature in three main ways. 
Firstly, the study applied the dual process model and the recognition 
primed decision making model to child protection practice. Whilst the 
former offers a new model for understanding the relationship between 
intuition and analysis, the latter explains how experienced practitioners 
develop their sense-making skills as they become more experienced.  
 
Secondly, the study has integrated approaches that are traditionally 
regarded as incommensurate by combining psychological models of 
judgment and decision making (Klein, 1999, 2009; Kahneman and 
Klein, 2009; Gilovich et al., 2002) with psychoanalytic approaches to 
organisations (Menzies, 1960; Hinshelwood and Skogstad, 2000). 
These were linked through research from a neuroscience approach 
(Damasio, 2006) that has linked emotions with intuitive judgments and 
built upon existing insights into how ‘gut feelings’ can inform practitioner 
judgments (Ferguson, 2009, 2011).  
 
Thirdly, one of the key strengths of the study is that, unlike previous 
studies, it explored practitioner reasoning processes within their 
organisational settings rather than through the retrospective file analysis 
that has characterised previous studies (Munro, 1996, 1999; Taylor, 
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2007). This enabled the organisational dynamics and the vicissitudes of 
everyday practice to become visible and their influence on professional 
judgment to be explored. In chapter one, Simon's (1956) metaphor of 
human decision making as a pair of scissors was introduced, in which 
the individual decision maker and their reasoning processes was one 
blade and the decision environment was the other. The strength of the 
current study is that it is the first psychological study to combine 
observational data as well as individual interviews and so pays attention 
to both the individual decision maker and the decision environment. 
 
 
8.5. Conclusions  
 
The thesis began with the well-established argument that the dominant 
response to high profile failings in child protection has been a rational-
bureaucratic approach that is wary of allowing social workers to use 
their professional judgment and seeks to promote compliance through 
standardised procedures and performance indicators (Ferguson, 2004; 
Munro, 2010).  This approach is guided by a technical-rational approach 
to decision making, in which it is assumed that practitioners and 
managers evaluate the potential risks and benefits of every option 
available. It was maintained that this is a prescriptive model of decision 
making that advocates the use of analytic reasoning processes and is 
highly mistrustful of the use of intuitive reasoning. This conception of 
human decision making has been widely challenged in the 
psychological literature on judgment and decision making as being 
unrealistic and ignoring how decisions are made in real life situations 
(Klein, 1999, 2002; Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999; Gilovich et al., 2002).  
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The first overall conclusion of this thesis is that psychological models 
can make an important contribution to understanding professional 
judgment in child protection in more realistic and in-depth ways. The 
study found that experienced practitioners were engaging in skilful 
sense-making and professional judgment that was more complex than 
the rather simplistic accounts prescribed by formal models of decision 
making. Whilst such models emphasise the importance of technical-
rational comparison of alternatives using analytic reasoning, real life 
decision making consisted of a dynamic interplay of intuitive, 
emotionally-informed judgments and analytic evaluations. As 
practitioners gained experience, they managed large volumes of referral 
information by selectively focusing on the most salient information, 
engaging in pattern recognition that drew upon their previous repertoire 
of experience in fast, intuitive ways and using sophisticated evidential 
approaches to evaluate information. The study found that although 
practitioners were vulnerable to the same heuristics and biases that 
affected the general population, they were less frequent than would be 
suggested by a previous study that applied the heuristics and biases 
model to child protection practice (Munro, 1996, 1999). This is likely to 
be because that study used child death inquiry reports rather than 
everyday practice, so is likely to suggest a picture of practice that 
overestimates the frequency of errors.  
 
The second overall conclusion is that organisational settings can have a 
significant impact on practitioner judgment for better or worse. There 
were three themes that related to the influence of the organisational 
setting on practitioners' sense-making processes. The first two themes 
were interrelated and consisted of the time and space that was 
available to undertake assessments and to discuss cases with 
colleagues. Time pressures were likely to increase the use of 
operational strategies as shortcuts designed to manage the workload 
within the timescales. Having space to think in the form of opportunities 
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to discuss cases with managers and colleagues supported the interplay 
of intuitive and analytic sense-making processes. The third theme was 
the culture of accountability that operated within the organisation, 
specifically the stage at which practitioners were subject to scrutiny. 
Whilst the NHS court assessment service experienced distanced 
accountability, i.e., scrutiny of the final report, the local authority teams 
experienced pervasive accountability, where their practice was subject 
to scrutiny at every stage. Whilst a culture of pervasive accountability 
was designed to ensure that practitioners focused on protecting 
children, this appeared in practice to be self-defeating because it raised 
anxiety levels beyond limits that can be tolerated without individual and 
social defences that distracted practitioners away from the primary task.  
 
In evaluating the contribution of the study to child protection policy and 
practice, I would like to emphasise two key messages from the study. 
The first message is that improving decision making requires 
organisations to create conditions for supporting practitioner expertise 
rather than merely minimising errors. As Reason (2008) argues, the 
study of error (‘human as hazard’) has traditionally received greater 
attention than the study of skilled practice (‘human as hero’). In the child 
protection field, this has followed the contours of a rational bureaucratic 
approach, which has focused upon reducing errors by increased 
prescription. The consequence is that this restricts the opportunities for 
experienced practitioners to be able to use their expertise and reduces 
the incentives for practitioners to remain in frontline practice. In the 
context of this study, ‘heroic’ practice refers specifically to the skilled 
pattern recognition and story building skills that experienced 
practitioners developed rather than a wider range of practice skills. The 
proceduralised nature of the English child protection system lends itself 
to recently qualified social workers and presents retention challenges 
for more experienced practitioners, who lack clear mechanisms for 
maximising practice skills compared to other professions such as 
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nursing and teaching (House of Commons, 2009; Webb and Carpenter, 
2011).  
 
These have been key messages of the Social Work Reform Board 
(2009), which argued for advanced practitioner status and the Munro 
Review (2010), which argued for increased space for professional 
judgment. By examining practitioner expertise in the form of pattern 
recognition and story building, this study identifies a key area of expert 
practice that can be further researched in a systematic way and offers 
the potential to benefit less experienced practitioners.    
 
The second key message for child protection policy and practice is that 
further debate is needed about accountability in local authority child 
protection social work. The study found that a culture of pervasive 
accountability created significant anxiety, which increased the risk that 
practitioners defended themselves by directing their attention towards 
case recording as a form of pre-emptive exoneration. This directed 
attention away from the primary task of protecting children and the 
decision making processes that support this towards defensive 
strategies that protect practitioners and organisations. Indeed, the 
concept of ‘pervasive accountability’ challenges the dominant discourse 
of accountability being an inherent good.  
 
It can be politically sensitive to challenge the emphasis on 
accountability within social work, because it can be perceived as 
advocating unbridled professional power over the lives of others, 
seeking unfettered freedom for oneself or arguing that social work is not 
a responsible or ‘proper’ profession. To be clear, this study does not 
argue against the concept of accountability per se. Instead, it suggests 
that accountability should be appropriate to the task and should 
promote the practitioner performing the task well. If the approach to 
accountability diverts attention away from children and reduces the 
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capacity of the practitioner to perform the task, it stops becoming a 
means of promoting good practice and merely becomes a means of 
allocating blame for the poor practice that it has unwittingly contributed 
towards. This is not an argument against accountability, but for better 
accountability that serves to promote rather than inhibit or distort good 
practice.  
 
A final thought is that I regard my central findings as essentially hopeful. 
Academic studies of everyday practice in social work can sometimes 
provide rather pessimistic accounts, as described by Pithouse and 
Williamson (1997): 
 
'…the unrelieved gloom that sometimes characterises academic 
accounts of practice, particularly social work, whereby oppression, 
neglect, and incompetence are unerringly found by those whose 
intellectual fascination with welfare is to ensure they find little that is 
positive or liberating about it (Pithouse and Williamson, 1997, p.xiii).  
 
This study offers grounds for cautious optimism because it suggests a 
more developed way of looking at human reasoning that can help move 
us beyond the tired battle lines of the intuition versus analytic reasoning 
debate. By focusing on the strengths as well as the weaknesses of 
intuitive judgments, it challenges the traditional 'human as hazard' 
approach that focused exclusively upon errors of judgment. As such, it 
offers new ways of understanding professional judgment and can 
contribute towards developing organisational cultures that genuinely 
support and value practitioner expertise.  
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Appendix 1: Participant information sheet and 
consent form 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
Section A: The research project 
 
Title of project: Child protection professionals’ accounts of ‘high risk’ 
families: An ethnographic study. 
 
Purpose and value of study: The purpose of the study is to 
understand the accounts that child protection professionals give of 
the families that they work with and to analyze the underlying 
narratives or stories that these accounts tell. The value of the study is 
that it can provide valuable insights that can inform frontline practice 
in the child protection field.   
 
You are invited to participate in this research study, which is a PhD 
project undertaken through the Tavistock Clinic and University of 
East London. The study is a piece of individual, independent 
research that is not funded by any organization. It is intended that the 
results of the study will be published in an academic journal or similar 
forum, but all identifiable information about the centre and individual 
staff members will be removed.    
 
If you would like any further information, please contact the 
researcher, Andrew Whittaker. His email is whittaka@lsbu.ac.uk and 
his telephone number is 020 7815 8438.  
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Section B: Your participation in the research project 
 
You are invited to take part in this research project because you are a 
staff member at the [Sycamore Family Assessment Service]. You can 
refuse to take part or withdraw at any stage without having to give a 
reason by informing the researcher, Andrew Whittaker.   
 
It is intended that principal researcher will attend the [Sycamore 
Family Assessment Service] on approximately 15-20 days. He will 
observe the everyday running of the team, which is likely to involve 
attending team meetings and other forums where individual families 
are discussed. If you give your informed consent, this could include 
observing supervision sessions that you attend. You will also be 
invited to be interviewed by the researcher, which will be for 
approximately one hour at a time and place that is convenient for 
you. The interview can take place either during work time or in your 
own time if you prefer this. 
 
During the interview, I shall ask you about how you make sense of 
information contained in the initial referral and the information that 
you receive from interviewing families in order to create an overall 
account of the family. I will also ask you about how you use 
supervision to help you with this process. 
 
It is not anticipated that there will be any significant risks involved in 
this study, but if you are unhappy about any aspect please discuss 
this with the researcher or with [X], who is the link person. Agreement 
to participate in this research will not compromise your legal rights 
should anything go wrong.  
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All information will be stored on an encrypted file on a password 
protected computer. All data will be destroyed within one year of 
completing the project. You will be given a copy of the summary of 
the findings and will have the opportunity to address concerns about 
anonymity of findings.  
 
 
Although participating in the research study may not benefit you 
personally, the study will contribute towards an increased 
understanding of practice in the child protection field and can 
contribute to the training of practitioners in the future.    
 
Your participation in the project will be kept confidential in 
accordance with the [Sycamore Family Assessment Service] 
confidentiality policy. Providing you give your informed consent, any 
individual interview will be digitally recorded to ensure that your views 
and comments are not lost. You will be asked at the beginning of the 
interview to not use your own name or the names or identifying 
features of colleagues or clients during the interview to protect 
confidentiality.  The digital recording will be kept secure by being 
immediately transferred onto a password-protected computer. Once 
they have been transcribed, the digital audio files will be destroyed 
securely. When the recording is transcribed, you will be allocated a 
pseudonym and your personal details will be stored separately from 
the transcript at all times.  You will be given a copy of this information 
sheet to keep.  
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Appendix 2: Participant Consent Form  
Title of the project: Child protection professionals’ accounts of ‘high risk’ families: An 
ethnographic study. 
 
Main investigator and contact details:  Andrew Whittaker, c/o Faculty of Health and 
Social Care, LSBU, 103 Borough Road, London SE1 0AA. Email: 
whittaka@lsbu.ac.uk. Tel: 020 7815 8438 
1. I agree to take part in the above research. I have read the participant 
information sheet, which is attached to this form. I understand what my part will 
be in this research, and all my questions have so far been answered to my 
satisfaction. 
2. I understand that I am free to withdraw from the research at any time, for any 
reason and without prejudice. 
3. I have been informed that the confidentiality of the information I provide will be 
safeguarded.  
4. If I raise issues about my being hurt or abused or some other vulnerable person 
I understand that someone will contact me to talk about it before taking further 
action.  
5. I have been provided with a copy of this form and the participant information 
sheet. 
Data Protection Act 1998: I agree to the researcher processing personal data that I 
have supplied. I agree the processing of such data for any purposes connected with the 
research project as outlined to me. I further agree to the researcher processing 
personal data about me described as sensitive data within the meaning of the Data 
Protection Act 1998. 
Name of participant 
 ............................................................................   ..........................................................    .................................  
(print)     Signed    Date 
Name of researcher  
 ............................................................................   ..........................................................    .................................  
(print)     Signed    Date 
If you wish to withdraw from the research at any point, please contact the researcher 
at the address above.  
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Appendix 3: Interview schedule  
 
Introduction and consent  
 
Give participants another copy of the Participant Information Sheet, 
explain about research 
 
Give participants another copy of the Consent Form. Go through the 
consent form, highlighting all the issues.  
 
Preamble  
 
What I am interested in is the real life process of you getting in 
information from referrers and other agencies, going out to talk to family 
members, making sense of all the information and then ‘tell the case’.  It 
may help to think of particular cases that you’ve worked on.  
 
 
Topic 1: Making sense of referral information  
 
1. When you first read the information from referrers, what are you 
looking out for, what are you paying attention to?  
 
Prompts  
Details of who is in the family?  
Details of the cause for concern?  
 
 
Topic 2: Making sense of client accounts   
 
2. When you meet with parents and other close family members and 
you are listening to them, what are you looking out for, what are 
you paying attention to?  
3. What happens if they give you their account and some of it doesn’t 
make sense?  
 
Prompts  
 
Is their story is consistent with the facts? 
Does their story contradict itself? 
Is there corroboration with other sources? 
 
What makes a parent's account convincing? What would respond if you 
found a parent’s account unconvincing? 
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Topic 3: Developing an overall account   
 
When you are collecting information from families, referrers and other 
agencies, how do you create an overall account?  
 
Prompts 
 
Are there times when you’re found it difficult to be able to make sense 
of all of the information to form an overall narrative about what is going 
on?  
 
 
 
Topic 4: Telling the case, presenting an overall account  
 
When you are presenting the case, either in a report or verbally at a 
strategy meeting, a conference or in court, how would you ‘tell the 
case’? Have you found that there are ways of presenting the case that 
have worked better than others?  
 
 
Topic 4: Supervision  
 
How do you use supervision to help you in your work with families?  
 
 
Prompts 
Process of working with family 
Decision-making  
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In addition to formal outputs, I have incorporated my study into teaching 
on qualifying BA and MA courses at LSBU and on post qualifying 
courses at Royal Holloway, University of London and Kingston 
University/St George's, University of London. 
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Appendix 5: UEL ethics approval 
                                    
 
Stephen Briggs 
Psychology School, Stratford 
 
 
ETH/11/87 
 
29 April 2010 
 
Dear Stephen, 
 
 
Application to the Research Ethics Committee: Childcare social 
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